On Causation and the Ethics of Discourse

by Scott Clifton on May 31, 2011

Recently, Dr. William Lane Craig posted a short note on his Facebook page in which he purported to refute what he called “Another Hopelessly Bad Objection”¹ to the Kalam Cosmological Argument. This objection takes the form of a syllogism (consisting of premises and a conclusion) entitled “The Kalam Argument AGAINST the Existence of God,” and came to Dr. Craig as a submission to his “Question of the Week” blog on the Reasonable Faith website. Even more recently, Craig referred to this syllogism again on Reasonable Faith, this time in his response to a different but related question.

But here’s the thing about this “hopelessly bad” objection to the Kalam Argument: I wrote it. It’s mine, verbatim. And it comes from a video I made for YouTube, entitled “I Kalam Like I See ‘Em”.

But the syllogism you see, the one Dr. Craig represents in his blog as my hopelessly bad objection… wasn’t my objection at all. It was a cute little tongue-in-cheek accessory to my objection thrown in at the very end of a 13-minute video exploring the nature of existence, causality, and metrology, totally stripped of it’s context. So much for that.

Now the worst-case scenario is that Dr. Craig himself made the conscious decision not only to keep my words liberated from their proper context, but to withhold from his audience the source of the objection to which he was responding; a source which would have illuminated just how misleading Craig’s treatment really was.

But even if that’s not what happened; even if this a case of the dumbest atheist in the universe submitting this syllogism to Dr. Craig thinking it would stump him as a stand-alone argument, or maybe one of Dr. Craig’s loyal fans coming across my objection and deciding to pass along only the decontextualized version of it…

The point is that you’d think Dr. Craig would decline to comment on an argument without an understanding of what the premises are in fact referring to and how they are supported.

Take the Kalam argument itself. Two simple premises and a conclusion, that’s it, and yet Craig has devoted a 224-page book to supporting the premises of this cute syllogism. Imagine how easily this argument would have been laughed off the academic stage had no one of scholarly repute been afforded the opportunity to elaborate upon it. Heck the argument doesn’t even conclude with God’s existence. Throw that one out with all the other pop internet trash, right?

Even more so, if the syllogism from my video were truly the comically absurd rhetorical junkyard Craig claims it to be, why is he wasting his time drawing so much attention to it? The guy gets a hundred Q&A submissions a week, and this hopelessly bad, supposedly anonymous pop internet objection is the one he finds most pressing? I call bullshit. After all, Craig himself claims:

I read scholarly criticisms of my work, but I tend to ignore popular stuff on the internet, since I figure the internet critics are not likely to say anything of substance that the scholars have missed.

This is at least an understandable principle (albeit snobby and cynical) so long as Craig actually stood by it. But he doesn’t “ignore” pop arguments on the internet. On the contrary, Craig has made a hobby of regularly drawing attention to arguments presented by the YouTube community and other forums, distorting them to a point of unrecognizability (while conveniently leaving their authors and sources anonymous), and then tearing those mischaracterizations to shreds with a nearly uncomfortable degree of mockery and condescension.

I mean it’s sort of a self-fulfilling prophecy isn’t it? If you begin with the assumption that certain critics are so unsophisticated and ignorant that their arguments should at face value be given the least charitable interpretation possible, then you’ve already predestined those arguments to confirm your prejudice.

In any intellectual or academic community, there is a courtesy extended to those of opposing views, especially once we make the commitment to engage them in discourse. And that courtesy is the honest attempt to represent their objections as fairly and generously as possible before taking them on. Not only is this the ethical thing to do, it’s efficient. It saves us the time and embarrassment of having to correct our own strawman fallacies.

But it would almost seem that Dr. Craig believes he is not only justified, but entitled, to treat non-scholarly objections with a dismissive carelessness and uncharitability that he wouldn’t dare subject his academic peers to (at least in principle). And I think that’s remarkably disingenuous.

But let’s be honest, I’m not doing myself any favors by “scolding” William Lane Craig for his debate etiquette.

What I can do is use this time to re-present my actual objection to the Kalam argument, and hopefully I won’t be leaving any room for ambiguity or misinterpretation. In fact, the more I reflect upon the video that originally spawned all of this, I’m secretly grateful that Craig hasn’t directly addressed it, because I really think that I can now do a much better job of articulating the concepts therein.

…So let’s get started:

Anything material we’ve ever seen come into existence (babies, sculptures, cars) has been a reconfiguration of previously existing material which was once *not* that thing. This matters because the only way we’ve ever seen causality work is in the form of actions and reactions between stuff which already exists.

We’ve never seen something which doesn’t exist caused to begin existing. Things which don’t exist can’t be caused to “do” anything, since they aren’t *there* to be influenced by a cause.

You may be thinking, “But that’s absurd, a carpenter causes a previously nonexistent table to exist!”.

Well no, not in any literal sense. To say that a carpenter “caused a table to exist” is more or less a figure of speech, and a misleading one at that. The carpenter didn’t cause “the table” to do anything, since the table didn’t didn’t exist yet. What the carpenter DID was cause material which was not the table to *become* the table. THIS is how the table comes into existence: When non-table material is assembled by a carpenter into a table. But if what you’re acting upon–what you are causally affecting–is already a “table”, then the table existed before you ever got to it and thus you didn’t cause it to begin existing.

After all, what is a table? Well, it’s a combination of different material (wood, nails, lacquer), none of which is a table in itself. Likewise, what is a baby? A baby is a combination of different material (bone, tissue, cells), none of which is a baby in itself. William Lane Craig has argued this point himself many times, so he shouldn’t find it all too controversial.

So when we say that babies or tables are “caused to exist”, what we are really referring to is the phenomenon of non-baby, non-table material being reassembled into babies and tables. You can’t causally affect a baby before it’s a baby. No baby exists yet, only an egg, and a sperm. But that sperm can be made to affect that egg… causing them to assemble INTO a baby. This is how children–and any other material thing–come into existence, so far as we’ve ever observed.

In the past, Dr Craig has responded to a misleadingly literal understanding of this very simple observation, claiming that atheists on the internet:

…Say nothing ever begins to exist, because everything has material out of which it’s constituted, and those atoms and particles existed before the thing did, and so nothing ever begins to exist, the first premise is false. And I think, what is the matter with these people? Have I always existed? Didn’t I begin to exist at the moment, say, when my father’s sperm and my mother’s egg came into union? If so, where was I? Was I around during the Jurassic age when the dinosaurs were about? Have I always existed? That is so absurd to think that I never began to exist, even though the material stuff out of which I am made existed before me. So I don’t know what’s the matter with these people.

He goes on to say:

It’s just irrational, and yet people think that refutes the premise that whatever begins to exist has a cause, when it doesn’t do so at all. So I’m just utterly bewildered by how people are taken in by this lack of rigorous thinking.

No, Dr. Craig, you did not always exist. But the only way you could have begun to, was if previously existing stuff was caused to reassemble INTO you. Your parents didn’t cause you to magically pop into existence out of nothingness. Nor has anything else in the observable the begun existing in this way.

And yet… this is how you think the universe came into being.

How did you arrive at that conclusion? To propose that a being “caused the universe to begin existing” should infer–so far as we understand causality to work–that non-universe material was reassembled in such a way as to become the universe. That’s the only way we’ve ever seen things come into existence, so that would obviously be the most parsimonious explanation.

But this is not what you are proposing. You believe that God brought the universe into being without having ever caused anything, of any kind, to become the universe. The stuff from which the universe was made, you believe, was literally nonexistent: There was no stuff, there was only an absence of any material or substance to act upon. You believe that all of the stuff of which the universe is composed just “popped” into existence, out of nothing, and that God somehow facilitated this event.

So the criticism–the real criticism–is that we have two distinct concepts here; two very different notions of what it means to “come into existence”, which are being fallaciously conflated by Dr. Craig:

1) Something caused to come into being wholly separate from previously existing stuff. (i.e., “creatio ex nihilo”, or creation from nothing.)

And…

2) Something caused to come into being NOT wholly separate from previously existing stuff. (i.e.,”creatio ex materia”, creation from material)

Now bear in mind that nobody, anywhere, ever, has verifiably observed the former. Something coming into existence ex nihilo is 100% conjecture. We’ve only ever seen things begin to exist ex materia–from previous stuff. So how do we know that if anything ever began to exist ex nihilo, it have a cause? We don’t, we know that things that begin to exit ex materia have a cause. And that’s all we know.

But Craig is plainly and explicitly arguing that the universe was caused by God to come into existence from nothingness. In other words, Craig is arguing that the universe is an example of (1), and NOT (2).

And yet, how does Dr. Craig attempt to demonstrate this? Amusingly, he does so by appealing to examples of (2), instead of (1). Astonishingly, he regularly uses the beginning of his own existence as an example!

Now what do you suppose would happen if we were to factor this profound distinction back into the Kalam Argument?

P1: Whatever begins to exist from previously existing material has a cause. (That much we know.)
P2: The universe began to exist, but not from any previously existing material.
C: Therefore, the universe has a cause.

That’s an invalid argument. The conclusion does not follow from the premises.

Now one response I can anticipate to this is that even though we have no empirical evidence we can point to in support of ex nihilo requiring a cause, it just seems intuitively true, because it seems more plausible than the alternative: something coming into existence ex nihilo uncaused. It’s just easier to picture in your head, right?

Well I’d say the repeatedly demonstrable failure of our intuitions to grasp matters of physics is enough to dismiss this complaint outright. But my objection to the Kalam argument goes a step further. I can make a positive case that creatio ex nihilo is a mythical phenomenon; that it is less plausible than it’s alternative. Because not only is it unsupported by evidence, it requires us to commit the fallacy of redefining causality into meaningless incoherency, in order to save creationism from being falsified, ad hoc.

There’s only two ways you can look at this as a causal event.

If we’re talking about a state of affairs in which the universe doesn’t yet exist, you can’t say that God caused “the universe” to do anything (such as “start existing”), because there is no universe. That’s absurd. The only thing God is capable of causally influencing is existent, non-universe stuff. In the same way that a carpenter can only causally influence existent, non-table stuff in order to create a table.

But what existent, non-universe stuff was available for God to causally influence? According to Craig, there was nothing. God literally caused “nothing” to become the universe. Or to put it more accurately, God didn’t cause anything anything to become the universe. (Nothing, after all, is the absence of anything by definition.)

So we can’t say that God “caused the universe to begin existing” in any literal sense because that’s absurd, and we also can’t say that God “caused nothing to become the universe” in any literal sense, which is equally absurd. So what does the good doctor actually mean when he says that God was the cause of the beginning of the universe?

Well it turns out, Craig doesn’t know what he means any more than I know what he means. All he knows is that he wants to attribute the universe’s existence to the deity of his particular religion, somehow. We have a moment at which the universe didn’t exist, and another moment at which it did exist, and God existing at both of these moments, and therefor God must be causally responsible for this change in states of affairs. I’m sorry, but that doesn’t follow.

Simply being present for a change in states of affairs does not establish something as the efficient cause of that change. If you’re going to assert that the universe began to exist at a finite point, and that God caused this event to happen, you have to actually demonstrate that God caused it. Unfortunately, we’ve already ruled out any meaningful way in which this could possibly be the case.

Let me digress for a moment to be perfectly clear about what I’m arguing here. I don’t claim to know whether the universe began to exist at a finite point or whether this is even a sensical question to ask in light of our advancements in physics. The point I am making is that even if the universe began to exist ex nihilo and God was present for this change in states of affairs, God cannot have been the efficient cause in any logically intelligible way.

Just think of any possible causal interaction, and you’ll notice that there are three necessary elements:

A: Something exerting causal influence. That which is doing the causing; the “affecter”.

B: Something being influenced; that which the “affecter” is acting upon; the “affected”; and

C: That which results from the interaction of A and B; the effect.

Go ahead and mull this over, test it out in your own head for a minute. See if you can come up with an instance of causality in the real world in which all three of these elements are not present. Does it even make sense posit a causal event without an A, a B, and a C?

Because this is exactly what Creationism postulates. In the case of God creating the universe ex nihilo, we go right from A to C… skipping B altogether. Dr. Craig believes there was literally nothing at all for God to causally influence. This is no different from admitting that God didn’t causally influence anything. And that is no different from admitting that God didn’t cause anything.

If the universe did come into existence ex nihilo, God couldn’t have been the cause.

So remember that syllogism I mentioned in the beginning? The one Dr. Craig called “another hopelessly bad objection to the Kalam Argument”? Let me wrap this up by taking another look at that with fresh eyes, and this time I’ll amend some of my language, just so certain satirically-challenged people can’t run a muck with it like last time. I’ve already spent this entire video arguing for the first premise. So let’s go from there:

P1: Nothing which exists can cause something which does not exist to begin existing ex nihilo.
P2: Given (1), Anything which begins to exist ex nihilo was not caused to do so by something which exists.
P3: The universe began to exist ex nihilo.
P4: Given (2) and (3), the universe was not caused to exist by anything which exists.
P5: God is defined as a being which caused the universe to begin to exist ex nihilo.
C1: Given (4) and (5), God does not exist by definition.

A while back I made a video called “Klarifying Kalam Kraziness” as a follow-up to the video in which I first presented this argument, and the idea was to unpack my reasoning behind each step of the syllogism. For example, a lot of people thought my third premise was a personal endorsement of P2 in original Kalam argument, and it’s not. It’s about forcing the theist into a position of having to choose their battles. So I strongly recommend checking that video out, especially if you have any intention of responding to this.

That said, while I’m confident that at this point in his career, no criticism could or would ever persuade Craig to abandon his arguments or your position, my wish is that he would come to appreciate this objection as one that merits a thoughtful response.

“Another Hopelessly Bad Objection.” William Lane Craig. ↩

PDF

John

You can’t just say, “Just think of any possible causal interaction, and you’ll notice that there are three necessary elements.”

What you’ve got to say is, “Think of what’s *necessary* for causality.”

All that’s necessary for causality is a cause and an effect.
- Mason
  
  “All that’s necessary for causality is a cause and an effect.”
  
  That seems to be an oversimplification. You do not just get causes producing effects, you get an being, or object interacting with another being or object which produces an effect. To ignore this interaction makes any notion of “causality” incoherent. But if you want to play that game, we’ll play that game.
  
  Okay, so according to your notion of causality, I pull a trigger and a bullet flies out- right? Well yes, but that doesn’t just happen in the sense your implying. The trigger of a gun interacts with another object which interacts with a mechanism which then interacts with the bullet and causes it to expel from the gun’s chamber. These interactions are necessary to make any sense of “A gun fired a bullet” causal chain of events to have meaning. What connects A to C? Your suggesting, not only is nothing connecting A to C, but nothing is necessary for A to be connected to C? I don’t fidn that compelling.
  
  If you simply assert that A produces C, well then your notion of causality completely ignores part B, which connects interaction A with effect C. By throwing out B, you seem to imply that a cause can produce an effect without anything being interacted with by that cause.
  
  Consider for example; cause- baseball bat, receiver of the cause, a baseball, and the resulting effect- a baseball flying away. Riddle me this: how do you make sense of causality without ANY reference to the interactions the cause has on effecte, or a receiver? In your mind, swinging a baseball bat just knocks away a baseball? No. That bat hitting, and therefore, interacting with the baseball itself, is a NECESSAY step in establishing the effect of the ball flying away.
  
  If you don’t agree then please, explain to me how I can cause a baseball to move without doing anything to interact with it, directly or indirectly. Yeah, no longer makes any sense, does it? So I argue your objection is drastically flawed for the same reason Craig’s argument for creatio ex nihilo is for the universe. The phrase “God caused the universe to begin to exist,” raisies the immediate question: what recieved the interactions of the cause? Nothingness? No middle man is necessary? Sorry my friend, but these objections are not only logically problematic, but they cease to accurately describe causality as we understand it in reality.
  - John C.
    
    Again, youre projecting YOUR notions of causality that you’ve experienced onto everything else.
    
    I’m talking about what’s possible, not what you’ve experienced.
    
    It’s *possible* for a single entity to produce an effect, without ever having to interact with anything else. You don’t NEED a “b”.
    
    Plus, where is Scott getting all of this crap that you need an a, b, and a c? He’s not a trained philosopher. He doesn’t get paid to think about and research this stuff.
    
    He’s making it up.
    - Mason
      
      “Again you’re projecting YOUR notions of causality onto everything else.”
      No, that is how causality has only ever been observed. Sure, we might grant that causality might occur under different contexts, but if that the case then you have to 1) Provide evidence for it and 2) Explain how it would occur. You ee, we also are talking about what it possible, and causality has only ever been shown to be applicable where there is material from whcih we can have changes. If you argue it is possible to have otherwise then the ball is in your court. I await you evidence.
      
      “Plus, where is Scott getting all this crap that you need a,b and c? He’s not a trained philosopher…. he’s making it up.”
      Great ad hominem attack. As if not being a trained philosopher makes his argument unsound, or that somebody else had to come up with the same idea in order for it to be valid? Scott couldn’t have made thsi observation himself? Bullshit! He isn’t making up anything, he is only taking an observation from reality and making an argument from it. That’s not being a liar under any contexts.
      
      Stop wasting our time with ad hominem attacks and speacial pleading, present your evidence for your position or give it up already.
      - John C.
        
        Yo…um…hello….Scott is the one making the claim in the video, namely that it is
        *logically* impossible for God to create ex nihilo.All I have to do to refute this is to show that in some logically possible world this CAN happen. So long as it isnt self contradictory.
        
        We can imagine a possible world in which some entity produces an effect all by itself, without having to interact with anything.
        
        Theres nothing self contradictory about that idea, therefore, its possible.
      - http://godlessons.com Godlessons
        
        There is nothing self contradictory about something popping into existence from nothing, but there is something self contradictory about something causing something to pop into existence out of nothing. You can have it one way, but not the other.
      - Poo
        
        poo
      - Mason
        
        “Yo…um…hello….Scott is the one making the claim in the video, namely that it is *logically* impossible for God to create ex nihilo.”Yes, but claiming something is not the case is not making an affirmative case. If you argue creation ex nihilo is possible you shoulder the burden of proof to establish that. Just as, if I don’t believe in God and you do, I don’t have to show God doesn’t exist, you have to prove he does. Logic 101, my friend! Don’t shift the burden of proof.
        
        “All I have to do to refute this is to show that in some logically possible world this CAN happen. So long as it isnt self contradictory.”
        
        Okay, you have not shown that creation ex nihilo is possible. I asked you for your evidence many times and you have consistently failed to present it. So, I ask you again, where is your evidence? Scott was not arguing that creation ex nihilo was self contradictory, he was arguing causality as observation has shown us, is inapplicable in that nothingness lacks any material to be effected or interacted with… AND DON’T SAY “YOUR ONLY PROJECTING YOUR NOTION OF CAUSALITY.” Bullshit. Pick any example of cause- effect you want and see if you can have a causal chain without interactions.
        
        “We can imagine a possible world in which some entity produces an effect all by itself, without having to interact with anything.There’s nothing self contradictory about that idea, therefore, its possible. “Are you kidding me? Please tell me you are kidding me! No, you’re actually serious? This is your argument….??? (Okay, look, if your just going to waste my time- just say so.)Okay, just because we can IMAGINE a world where causality without interactions is possible, it does not logically follow that therefore it is possible. There is a reason why we use the word “imagine”, because these are only THOUGHTS. Hey, I can think of having a trillion trillion dollars, by your SAME LOGIC, it is therefore possible that I can have a trillion trillion dollars. Or hey, I can imagine a world where I can fly like Superman… therefore it is possible for me to fly like Superman??? What?Okay, I hope those examples I have just used are enough to expose just how bad of an argument you have going on here. Just because we can imagine something, that does not mean it is possible. We have to rely on empirical observations to tell us how reality works, to then infer what the case ought to be in future cases. In the case fo causality, we have only observed cause-interactions-effect, no exceptions. If you have EVIDENCE to the contrary, please present it. Sorry, but one’s imagination does not count. And just because something is not self-contradictory, it does not follow that it is therefore possible. You still need a few other conditions for it to work. In the case of ex nihilo creation, you would need nothingness before the origins of the universe. Craig has failed to establish that either in his defense of creation ex nihilo. We’d also need some understanding of how creation ex nihilo would work, which Craig also fails to provide- and we would need all those dynamics to be consistent. Again, this wasn’t Scott’s argument at all, but who cares, right?
      - John C.
        
        Listen, a little modal logic 101 for you.
        
        If someone claims that something is logically *impossible*…..the way to refute that is to show that it isnt. The way to show that, is to point out that that thing isnt self contradictory.
        
        BTW, this convo goes way back between Scott and I, way before he posted this video to Craig. He has personally told me that creatio ex nihilo is logically impossible. I am showing him that it is logically POSSIBLE.
        
        Dont have a hissy.
      - http://godlessons.com Godlessons
        
        All that’s necessary for causality is a cause and an effect.
        
        How about a little logic 101 for you. In order for something to be affected, it must exist. In order for your claim to be true, ‘nothing’ must literally exist, since it is what everything is supposed to have risen from in the opposing view. The actual existence of ‘nothing’ would negate ‘nothing’, since ‘nothing’ doesn’t exist as a thing.
        
        I would say you’re completely jumping the gun on claiming that you have split the horns of any dilemma, since you haven’t shown that your claim is anything more than nonsense.
      - Poo
        
        poo
      - Mason
        
        “Listen, a little modal logic 101 for you.”Oh boy, I can’t wait for this.’If someone claims that something is logically *impossible*…..the way to refute that is to show that it isnt. The way to show that, is to point out that that thing isnt self contradictory. ”No, that doesn’t even logically follow. Again even if we granted that creation ex nihilo was not self-contradictory, it does not follow that it is therefore possible. To have “creation ex nihilo” you need a few things- 1) A “time” at which there was nothingness (i.e. absolute non-being), 2) Have something created out of that non-being. If you don’t have a world where those two necessary conditions do not or could not be had then, BY DEFINITION, you do not have the possibility for creation ex nihilo. And that is even IF the concept were not self-contradictory.
        
        “I am showing him that it is logically POSSIBLE.”WHEN? WHEN DID YOU PROVE CREATION EX NIHILO IS POSSIBLE?
        
        Not one argument you gave came even close to proving your point. Your intial objection to Scott’s point on causation has be found to be entirely inadequate and completely lacked empirical support. Your later objection that “I can conceive of cause and effect without interactions,” is just a bad argument all-around. Just because you can think of something, it does not logically follow that it is therefore possible.
        
        Hey man, I can think of world in which I can fly like Superman. Does that mean it is possible that I can fly like Superman? If you find this argument to be ridiculous, GOOD, you should feel the same way about your previous argument.
        
        And despite me continually asking you for your evidence you have consistently failed to do so. Thus far you have presented zero evidence, zero explanations, and two argument that are just plain bad. “Don’t have a hissy.”Sorry man, I don’t mean to have a “hissy.” (When did I anyway?) But really, you are claiming victory in this debate on such porr arguments and a lack of evidence that your continued attempts at *schooling me” (Yo…um…hello) (Listen, a little model logic for you.) are really just getting annoying. You have yet to respond to my requests for evidence, and yet to shown any of my response to be flawed and still shout “It’s possible, it’s possible.”Yeah? Prove it!
      - http://godlessons.com Godlessons
        
        John is actually correct in saying, at least in this instance, that if you can show a possibility of something else that it refutes the argument as long as it’s not self contradictory. In this case though, he says he can imagine a world where it could happen, but I don’t think he understands what he is imagining.
        
        In order for it to be a coherent argument against Scott’s, it needs to make sense. That means that it must be more than a mere assertion that it can happen, or that he can imagine it. He needs to describe a way that a thing that doesn’t exist can be affected by some causal thing. Saying, “God thinks and poof there it is” is not sufficient.
      - Mason
        
        Thank you Godlessons for your response;”John is actually correct in saying, at least in this instance, that if you can show a possibility of something else that it refutes the argument as long as it’s not self contradictory.”No. I hardly see how this is the case. Just because something is not self-contradictory, it does not follow that it is therefore possible. And here’s why:What, does creation from nothingness require in order for it to occur, or even be possible to occur? Well, you would only need two, or three things:
        1) A context in which we have a state of nothingness (i.e. absolute non-being.)
        2) We need something to have been produced by, or created from this nothingness.
        
        And possibly:
        3) In the theists case, some being, which they call God, to have been active in this causal process.
        
        Now of course, if you find Scott’s argument compelling (which I do) then the third option isn’t necessary, even if we have a state of nothingness. However, we still require, practically by definition, the first two requirements. So now then, imagine five contexts with different conditions.1. Creation from nothing is self-contradictory. Well, needless to say, a priori, creation from nothing is impossible.
        2. Creation from nothing is not self-contradictory. well, great, it is possible on a priori grounds, but is it possible in entirely? That would not follow, so we need other facts to conclude if it is possible a poesteri.
        3. Creation from nothing is not self-contradictory, but we have no state of nothingness. well, here we cannot have creation from nothing, because there was never a state of nothingness.
        4. Creation from nothing is not self-contradictory, we have a state of nothingness, but nothing is ever produce by it. Again, we cannot have creation from nothingness, because there was no act of creation.
        5. Creation from nothing is not self contractory, we have a state of nothingness and something is produced from it. We finally have a context in which, creation from nothingness is possible!My argument is tht even IF creation ex nihilo is not self-contradictory, you would need, by definition, these two other states of affairs at least, to have creation from nothing to be possible.
        
        Now, John has only raised this point:”We can imagine a possible world in which some entity produces an effect all by itself, without having to interact with anything.Theres nothing self contradictory about that idea, therefore, its possible.”Now, as I hope to have established, self-consistency si not the only condition necessary for the possible existence of a thing (object, being, etc.) to be actually possible. There are certain pre-requisite that must be had for that event or thing to occur or exist. Just as, my existence wouldn’t be possible if my mother and father didn’t exist, if their genes were’nt existing, they met and mated and produced me. if they never existed, if those genes never existed, and if these genes didn’t combine in such a way to make me… my existence would NOT be possible, even if my very nature were not self-contradictory.John seem to think that if he can prove that creation ex nihilo is not self-contradictory he therefore has proven it’s possibility. I argue this is not the case. This is why I asked for his evidence that creation from nothing has occured, or does occur. So far, he has not given any evidence or examples. This is not to suggest that his failure to do so proves he is wrong, but it does give us room to doubt that creation from nothingness is a proven case, especially in the case of Craig’s KCA, P2.
        
        But it get’s worse! John has argued that we can “imagine a possible world in which some entity produce an effect all by itself, without having to interact…”This is simply a bad argument. Our ability to imagine something does not prove it’s possibility. I made this objection obvious is applying John’s same logic to my Superman example. If it is true that “I can imagine flying like Superman proves that it is possible for me to fly like Superman” then should I try flying like Superman? I won’t waste my time. Concepts can give us misleading interpretations of reality and possibility- and quantum mechanics gives us much insight and humility into this basic truth. A particle takes all paths from A to B, at the same time? Ridiculous! Yes, very much so- but still true.
        
        So, no. I argue that, firstly, John has not shown creation from nothingness to be possible. But more to the point, I argue even if he present creation ex nihilo in a perfectly consistent and coherent way, he still must provide some empirical support these pre-conditions were met, in order to prove, reletive to this argument, that our universe was either created from nothingnes, or that it allows for creation from nothingness.
      - http://godlessons.com Godlessons
        
        Our ability to imagine something does not prove it’s possibility.
        
        John is actually correct about his modal logic argument in a sense. The ability to imagine unicorns existing in some possible world makes unicorns possible. The thing is that unicorns can be positively described without being self contradictory, and therefore could possibly exist.
        
        John’s failure is that he is unable to explain how it would be possible to affect a nonexistent thing. It’s not good enough that he says he can imagine something in this case, since it needs some explanation in order to show that what he’s saying isn’t tantamount to saying “I can imagine square circles.”
        
        So, he is correct in saying that his ability to imagine something would bring the possibility of his imaginings into existence as long as the thought isn’t self contradictory. I don’t believe he has done this, especially since he is unable to explain the method by which something can be affected without first existing.
        
        To put it another way, if I said that I can imagine a method by which a square circle could be made, I would certainly need to explain myself before I could refute the statement, “Square circles are impossible”. John is in this same boat, but refuses to make explanations.
      - Mason
        
        “John is actually correct about his modal logic argument in a sense. The ability to imagine unicorns existing in some possible world makes unicorns possible. The thing is that unicorns can be positively described without being self contradictory, and therefore could possibly exist.”
        
        No, again I explained my reasons why this is not the case. Again, just because one can imagine a self-consistent unicorn or creation event in one’s mind, it does not, in any logical way, that it is possible for that said unicorn or creation event to exist in reality. This is just simply a bad argument.
        
        Again, consider my example. How on earth does it follow from “I can imagine myself flying like Superman.” that “Therefore it is possible for me to fly like Superman?” How does that logically follow at all? It doesn’t. Just because something is possible and consistent in one’s mind, again, it does not follow that it is possible and consistent in reality.
        
        And more to the point, this is also just John assuming that he has a consistent and non-self-contradictory model of creation ex nihilo in his mind. How does he know this idea is actually consistent? How does he know his imagination is actually valid, and that his interpretation of his imagination isn’t incorrect?
        
        The only way he could illustrate that is if he gave some account or explanation as to how creation from nothingness would work, which he has failed to do so. Until then, I can’t take his imagination seriously, because for all I know his conscious mind is mis-interpreting a thought he believes to be self-consistent. And again, this says nothing of something being possible in reality.
        
        For something to be possible, we need two things. We need that given concept to be A) a priori self-consistent, and B) A posterori possible given the necessary conditions for it’s possible existence are met.
        
        With creation from nothingness, we need, by definition, at least two pre-requiste conditions to be the case for creation ex nihilo to be possible in reality. 1) A state of non-being and 2) Something being created from, or porduce by, that state fo non-being.
        
        If you don’t have a state of nothingness, then that universe could not have creation ex nihilo in reality, because there is no “nothingness” for the ex nihilo part. And even IF you did have this state of nothingness, you need soemthing to be created from it, satisfying the “creation” condition. If you have both of these conditions, and creationex nihilo is self-consistent, then yes, creation ex nihilo is possible. My argument is that even if the former is the case, we have no evidence for the two latter. Therefore, we have no evidence that creation from nothingness is possible in reality, as we have no evidence the two necessary conditions are met.
        
        I think the problem we have is that you are arguing whether or not something is logically possible. Fine, but I am not. I am arguing whether or not something is physically possible. I don’t care if you can make a logically possible case for a hypothetical statement, I only care if you can make this case be physically possible.
        
        Even if John was successful in illustrating creation ex nihilo is possible, logically- I would still argue that he has failed to prove it’s physical possibility in our universe. Until he does so, then Scott’s objection to creation ex nihilo still stands and Craig’s detailed argument behind premise 2 is unsupported.
      - http://godlessons.com Godlessons
        
        No, again I explained my reasons why this is not the case. Again, just because one can imagine a self-consistent unicorn or creation event in one’s mind, it does not, in any logical way, that it is possible for that said unicorn or creation event to exist in reality. This is just simply a bad argument.
        
        Mason, something is possible in reality if it isn’t self contradictory. It may not be in existence, and it may go against what we know to exist, but the possibility in any possible world makes it possible in all possible worlds. So, if John can make a coherent explanation of how something can create from nothing, and it isn’t self contradictory, he is correct, he has split the horns of Scott’s dilemma.
        
        For something to be possible, we need two things. We need that given concept to be A) a priori self-consistent, and B) A posterori possible given the necessary conditions for it’s possible existence are met.
        
        You are incorrect. For something to be possible, the concept must be self-consistent. B has nothing to do with possibility. I’ll explain.
        
        It is possible for sodium metal to exist in its pure form. You should know that is true. On the other hand, if it comes into contact with water, it violently oxidizes. If the entire universe were filled with nothing but water, does that mean that it suddenly becomes impossible for sodium to exist in its pure form? No, it only means that it is impossible for sodium to exist in its pure form under those conditions.
        
        So, when you propose B, you set limits for actual existence under a set of circumstances, but you have not prevented possible existence under all circumstances, and that is required in order to defeat a proposal that attempts to counter Scott’s argument, since the circumstances would necessarily be devoid of any limitations other than purely logical limitations.
      - Mason
        
        *Sigh*
        Your missing the point!!!!
        
        “So, if John can make a coherent explanation of how something can create from nothing, and it isn’t self contradictory, he is correct, he has split the horns of Scott’s dilemma.”Bullshit! All he has done is make the case coherent, he hasn’t proven that it is physically possible in our universe under any context. The necessary conditions for creation ex nihilo to occur have not been met, then the self-consistency of ex nihilo is irrelevant.
        
        “Mason, something is possible in reality if it isn’t self contradictory.”Really? So, in a given universe, I could exist without requiring the genes of my father and mother? Just so long as I am not self-contradictory, my existence is possible? HOW??? The genes which determined my existence, no, the genes which are necessary for my existence to be possible do not exist!!! How the hell could I exist in a world where the necessary conditions for my possible existence are NOT MET!!!!
        
        “So, when you propose B, you set limits for actual existence under a set of circumstances, but you have not prevented possible existence under all circumstances…”
        Yes and no. Of course there are limits for the actual existence of something! There are necessary conditions whcih must be met for the possible existence of a future entity to be possible. So… what “under all circumstances” are you talking about? Are you suggesting, that in some other world, my existence is possible without nything that was necessary to produce me existing. Just so long as my existence is self-consistent I don’t need any of those pre-requisites? What? Okay, I would just love your explanation as to how that it possible!Admit it. Your modal logic is only discussing hypothetical circumstances, whcih have never been empirically verfieid, and absurd just to read. So, my existence being self-consistent means I can break the laws of biology and genetics and exist! If these conditions are unnecessary for some other circumstances, then please give me just one example of such a world. I would like some empirical evidence for this.Your example with sodium hits the point I’m taking abour right on the head! Of course is doesn’t make the sodium logically impossible, it could still exist if conditions were different, but the conditions aren’t- therefore the laws of chemistry clearly say this shit just ain’t happening.
      - http://godlessons.com Godlessons
        
        You don’t find it necessary to explain all the necessary preconditions for the big bang, but you can still show that it happened can’t you? So, necessary preconditions aren’t required, no matter how much you bluster about it.
        
        Anyway, I don’t see why you’re so set on preconditions. The precondition that even John admits is necessary hasn’t been met. Namely that he comes up with a scenario that is not self contradictory.
      - Mason
        
        “You don’t find it necessary to explain all the necessary preconditions for the big bang, but you can still show that it happened can’t you? So, necessary preconditions aren’t required, no matter how much you bluster about it.”That’s different, we actually have evidence supporting the big bang theory. We may not know of the necessary conditions that allowed the big bang to occur, but it hardly follows from that that there were no conditions necessary. If we later learned something was needed, no, absolutely required for the big bang to occur, and the previous state prioir to the “big bang” did not allow for that condition, we would have to throw the Big Bang theory off the table, or refine it to fit the new data, because the necessary conditiosn which allowed the Big Bang to occur were no longer possible. “Anyway, I don’t see why you’re so set on preconditions.”
        Because- thsi is exactly what distinquishs hypothetical possibility from physical possibilities. If you have a a given world where the logic allowing for say, super powers, was consistent- you still cannot argue that that same given world allow the physical possibility of those super powers. Now the question is no longer self-consistency, the question now comes down to the laws of physics, chemsitry, biology and geology as to whether or not such things can occur.I agree, that IF John could present a case for a logically consistent creation ex nihilo model, then it has a hypothetical possibility, but it still does not follow that it is possible in this universe- because you would still have to prove there was, or are, states of nonbeing, and that something can, or has been created by these states. If you don’t have these two conditions, then by definition, creation ex nihilo is impossible.
      - http://godlessons.com Godlessons
        
        WTF? We’re dealing with hypothetical possibilities here. I don’t have to explain how the big bang happened in order to say that it happened, and John doesn’t have to explain how creation ex nihilo happened in order for it to have happened. The ONLY reason he has that requirement at this point is because he is saying something that I would say is self contradictory. If it’s not, he needs to show it’s not.
        
        I’m sorry, but that’s all there is to say on the matter. I’ll let you have the last word, but there’s nothing you can say that can overcome the fact that he is correct on this point.
      - Mason
        
        “WTF? We’re dealing with hypothetical possibiltiies here.”Did you read ANYTHING I just said???? I know you are refering to hypotheticals, BUT I AM NOT!!! I do not care if somethig is hypothetically possible, I only care if it is possible in reality. AND THE ONLY WAY YOU COULD PROVE THAT IS IF AND ONLY IF THE NECESSARY CODNITIONS FOR SAID HYPOTHETICAL TO BE ACTUAL ARE REALIZED!!!
        You and John seem to think if you can make the case that creation ex nihilo is self-consistent therefore it si possible within this universe. BULLSHIT! With that (lack of) logic scientists could justify just about any f***ing idea that pops in their mind. Do you have evidence? Who cares apparently! So long as a little thought experiment makes the case consistent it’s possible right?
        
        Einstein didn’t have his thought experiments and then conclude, “Well, this is the way things are in this universe.” Bullshit, he would have dropped his theory as impossible the moment any kind fo evidence disconfirmed it. Just imagine how lauaghable general relativity would have been if, had it been disconfirmed, Einstein said “Well, it’s still possible given…” “I don’t have to explain how the big bang happend to say it happened.”NO WAY SHERLOCK! REALLY? If you actually read ANYTHING I JUST SAID, you would have seen I SAID THE EXACT SAME THING. Read my responses before you just start talking, saves me a little bit of time from having to correct you.
        
        “He’s correct on this.”Bullshit. Until he gives some sort of evidence that creation ex nihilo is physically possible in this universe, he hasn’t made his case any more than I’ve proved I can fly like Superman. but hey, I can think it so it must be true, right? Hey, your logic man, not mine.
      - Poo
        
        lots of mad on dis page. u mad?
      - Poo
        
        lol he mad
      - Poo
        
        lol u mad
Ian Smithers

I’m not sure how this succeeds in making the argument any less poor. The reason there are volumes dedicated to the KCA is due to it being a defensible position, whereas this position is indefensible – ie dead-on-arrival, and so providing supporting text is irrelevant.

Wrt point 1, this suggests that there are such things as ‘non-existent’ things. But, even if we grant that, 2 doesn’t follow anyhow since things which begin to exist, were not non-existent things, which then started existing.

In my view, this is the result of over-thinking the problem and you have tied yourself in knots over it.

P.S. Nice commenting system. :>
- Scott Clifton
  
  “Wrt point 1, this suggests that there are such things as ‘non-existent’ things.”
  
  Oh dear, don’t pull a “Craig”. The entire point is that there are NOT non-existent things. I’m skeptical you gave me the consideration of reading my argument in full.
  - Ian Smithers
    
    Apologies if it seems like I didn’t give you full consideration. For what it’s worth, this isn’t a new objection to the KCA, but just to clarify, is your view that the universe began to exist out of nothing? In fact perhaps I should further sharpen the question, is it that the universe’s existence uncaused out of nothing, or it’s caused out of nothing, or something other?
    - http://godlessons.com Godlessons
      
      I don’t mean to speak for Scott, but considering what he has said, it seems that he believes that it’s not possible for the universe to have been created out of nothing. I would agree. It seems a logical contradiction for nothing to have actually ever existed actually.
    - Scott Clifton
      
      “…is your view that the universe began to exist out of nothing?”
      
      No, that’s not my view. Personally, I suspect the notion that the universe either has a temporally infinite past, or that it came into existence from nothing, is a false dichotomy–in the same way that it was a false dichotomy to assert that the Earth must either spread out forever or have a definitive edge. But for the sake of my argument, I am actually granting the second premise of the KCA in order to make my point about the impossibility of creatio ex nihilo, even if anything actually could come into existence in such a way.
      - Ian Smithers
        
        Well certainly the universe has (based on the leading modern day cosmological views at least) not always existed, so in the context of the universe, ‘nothing’ would describe a state where it did not exist. But I sort of digress there.
        
        I think my main issue, given that you clarified the meaning of ‘non-existent’ is that you use ‘exist’ in an equal context to describe both God and matter. Is that not erroneous to do so? As your premise 1 only applies within the natural world, and God as defined is not natural and not within the natural world.
      - http://godlessons.com Godlessons
        
        Well certainly the universe has (based on the leading modern day cosmological views at least) not always existed, so in the context of the universe, ‘nothing’ would describe a state where it did not exist. But I sort of digress there.
        
        Could you please support that statement? I understand that the universe has not always existed as what we understand as the cosmos, but not always existing needs some clarification.
        
        Do you mean it hasn’t existed in the way it does now? If that is the case, you will probably get little argument. If you mean that nothing that exists now existed at one point, there will certainly be some argument, especially since I don’t think you can cite a single cosmologist that would back that assertion.
        
        In the second case, I think you are full of fail. If the first case is the case, the second paragraph is all that’s full of fail.
      - Guest
        
        How’bout this guy? http://letterstonature.wordpress.com/2011/04/01/of-nothing/ Luke Barnes, not a Christian or a theist as far as I am aware, commentating on the recent Craig/Krauss debate.
      - http://godlessons.com Godlessons
        
        Yes, I have seen the debate. Krauss did an excellent job considering that he’s not a professional debater. I think he held his own with people that actually understood what he said. Craig, on the other hand, does much better with people that don’t know much about science and philosophy.
        
        Anyway, what do you think that link was supposed to teach me? I still think Craig is extremely flawed, and if you think that Krauss supports your idea, you need to see everything Krauss has said on cosmology. You wouldn’t want to be accused of cherry picking, would you?
      - Ian Smithers
        
        I find this assessment dishonest. WLC’s debate experience was from high school if I recall rightly, and yet it’s constantly raised as a reason for his opponents fairing badly. Like somehow because Prof Krauss has not participated in debates, that we should take that into account when hearing his arguments, and award them more merit, than we otherwise would.
        
        Prof Krauss may as well not have even shown up to that debate, he did *that* badly. I stopped watching, as it’s no fun watching WLC educate his opponent and refute him at the same time. I wanted to do the same thing when he debated Lewis Wolpert, but I find him quite charming, and so persisted despite it being pretty cringe-worthy.
        
        Prof Krauss lost that debate because of logic like this: “It sometimes surprises me, although it shouldn’t, how religious devotees feel the need to regularly reinforce their own convictions in groups of like-minded individuals.” this is the opening line of his blog post, on a popular atheist-centered blog. He’s right, it shouldn’t surprise him considering he is doing the exact same thing. Prof Krauss didn’t follow any of WLC’s arguments, and this isn’t down to debating experience, it’s because he has no philosophy training.
        To say that WLC does well vs people who are philosophically lacking, I would agree with. To say he does well vs people who are ignorant of science, I would say is a gross misrepresentation of WLC, and his endeavour to engage with those very people. His written works takes on challenges from Hawking for example, he is actively engaged in discussion with people of science in academic settings, this however doesn’t often translate well to non-academic settings, science as understood by laypeople (you me, etc) is somewhat less science, more science fiction.
      - Mason
        
        Your judging how Krauss lost the debate, by citing a reason that had not been stated during the debate, but after??? Okay, I’d call that an un-fair review, but okay… whatever.
      - http://godlessons.com Godlessons
        
        So, you think that since Craig learned how to debate in high school, he is somehow not a professional debater? He gets paid to debate. He has done almost nothing but debate for 30 years. He has been in more debates than anyone ever has in the history of time, yet you think he is no better than a high school kid?
        
        As for not following any of Craig’s arguments, WLC has a habit of doing a shotgun approach to debate, where he inundates his opponents with all sorts of fallacies and rhetoric and by the time his opponent has even started responding to his stupidity, they have no time to address points they may like to raise.
        
        Krauss obviously could have done a couple things better, but considering how badly people generally do against Craig, I think it was a very good effort on Krauss’ part.
      - http://www.facebook.com/Graffight Robert Graffight Waters
        
        LOL @ “He has been in more debates than anyone ever has in the history of time” True as this may be, the REALLY bad part is he’s been using the EXACT same arguments the whole time. It took me a day of watching Craig Debates to learn pretty much what he would say in most situations…why can’t anyone else do this? Craigs debates are out there, there is absolutely no excuse for people who debate him not to be prepared…he’s going to say the EXACT same thing EVERY time.
      - http://godlessons.com Godlessons
        
        Yes, but you don’t seem to recognize that he actually does his homework about his opponents. He generally knows what his opponent is going to say prior to them saying it, and he has a response already ready for them. Further, he has dissected his own arguments enough that he has been able to come up with a very easy to understand answer for the layman, where scientists are used to talking to other scientists and don’t often have the ability to dumb things down.
        
        Anyone can pick apart his arguments outside of a debate context, but Craig knows full well how to baffle the audience with bullshit, so it’s not so much that he’s right, it’s that he has a better rapport with the audience.
      - http://www.facebook.com/Graffight Robert Graffight Waters
        
        “Yes, but you don’t seem to recognize that he actually does his homework about his opponents. He generally knows what his opponent is going to say prior to them saying it, and he has a response already ready for them.” If Craig can do this for people who don’t generally debate SURELY these people can do so for someone who not only has ton’s of literature out, but has debate videos chronicling EXACTLY the same thing over, and over, and over, and over again.
        
        Yes Craig is a very talented speaker, but this does not move me to say “oh, well…the atheist tried”. NO, it’s like the atheists don’t prepare AT ALL. There’s no excuse for this, and it just sounds like whining on the part of their defenders. Even old boy at common sense atheism blog realizes this. Craig’s opponents are generally unprepared, and this is not Craigs fault.
      - http://godlessons.com Godlessons
        
        Well, if it’s so easy, why don’t you debate him. It sounds like you think there’s a magic method. Craig can’t use the excuse that you’re a former student like he does against Loftus.
      - Ian Smithers
        
        I find this assessment dishonest. WLC’s debate experience was from high school if I recall rightly, and yet it’s constantly raised as a reason for his opponents fairing badly. Like somehow because Prof Krauss has not participated in debates, that we should take that into account when hearing his arguments, and award them more merit, than we otherwise would.
        
        Prof Krauss may as well not have even shown up to that debate, he did *that* badly. I stopped watching, as it’s no fun watching WLC educate his opponent and refute him at the same time. I wanted to do the same thing when he debated Lewis Wolpert, but I find him quite charming, and so persisted despite it being pretty cringe-worthy.
        
        Prof Krauss lost that debate because of logic like this: “It sometimes surprises me, although it shouldn’t, how religious devotees feel the need to regularly reinforce their own convictions in groups of like-minded individuals.” this is the opening line of his blog post, on a popular atheist-centered blog. He’s right, it shouldn’t surprise him considering he is doing the exact same thing. Prof Krauss didn’t follow any of WLC’s arguments, and this isn’t down to debating experience, it’s because he has no philosophy training.
        To say that WLC does well vs people who are philosophically lacking, I would agree with. To say he does well vs people who are ignorant of science, I would say is a gross misrepresentation of WLC, and his endeavour to engage with those very people. His written works takes on challenges from Hawking for example, he is actively engaged in discussion with people of science in academic settings, this however doesn’t often translate well to non-academic settings, science as understood by laypeople (you me, etc) is somewhat less science, more science fiction.
      - Ian Smithers
        
        One issue is the gross misuse of the word ‘nothing’ here, but I’m not heavily invested in that argument as it was a side point raised by Scott Clifton. I asked him to clarify his view as I have issues with how he is using terms, and he didn’t. I feel the mystery Guest below has addressed this sufficiently.
        In regards to my second paragraph, the issue is that in one hand we are comparing and analysing the existence of objects, and on the other we are drawing analogies to God’s creative work. The conclusion being that if things cannot be created from nothing, then God certainly doesn’t exist as God is by nature, logically incoherant – like a square circle. However having though more on this set of arguments, I’m begining to see why Craig said it was so hopeless, as it’s filled with lacunae.
        
        Scott Clifton is smuggling in definitions and filling gaps either with silence, or with fallacious application of logic.
        
        Since the mystery Guest’s link handles Scott Clifton’s use of the word ‘nothing’ we can address other problems for instance, P1 begs the question for atheism, as it can essentially be reworded that ‘God cannot create out of nothing.’ and then I guess the appropriate response is, “Says who?”. We don’t even need 2, 3, 4 and 5. We can just say God cannot create from nothing, therefore God doesn’t exist since He is logically contradictory, like a square circle.
      - theowarner
        
        The leading modern day cosmological view is that universe has not always existed? Really? I’m pretty sure that’s a simplification of modern day cosmological thinking. Isn’t there usually talk about getting down the first part of the first second and then say, “but we don’t know what happened before that”? I don’t know… I don’t study this stuff.
    - theowarner
      
      What do you think is the value of point out that something isn’t a new objection? You’re like the twentieth person to say that!
- Mason
  
  Craig made this same point in his pseudo-response. How surprising that the Craig community never offers anything original. Now, you charge that P1 asserts that non-existing beings “exists.” But I think you haven’t given P1 any consideration, have you? Let’s explore this objection. You couldn’t have gotten it from “Nothign which exists.” Because this is meant to read as “No being or thing which exists can cause…” This is not meant to imply that there are non-existent things which exist. If that was the basis of your objection, then your objection is attacking straw men by mis-representing the logic behind P1.
  
  More reasonable, it seems, is that you got this objection from the phrase “Something which does not exist.” Now, I agree, this seems to imply that there are “somethings” which exist as “non-existent beings.” That is what this phrase seems to imply at first glance. But this is only a oversimplification on what the non-existent ”something” being referred to means.This phrase does not, as you and Craig wrongly imply, suggest that there exist non-existing things. But rather non-existence potentials which, when begun to exist, become actualizaed as beings. Here, when Scott is referring to “something which does not exist” he is in fact reffering to a non-yet existing universe, in otherwords, a potential something, not an actual something. Craig is inferring actual beings whereas “something whcih does not exist” refers to potential beings, not actual ones.
  
  For example, when I say “Table which does not exist.” I am not reffering to existing/non-existing tables, rather I am reffering to a potential table which does not exist, but when actualized- will then exist. That is what Scott’s argument is implying. So a universe which does not exist, means, a universe which does not exist yet. How a supposedly professional philosopher mis-read this easy enough to understand objection is stunning enough.
  
  But, if you want to play this game, we’ll go ahead and play this game. If “something which does not exist” is a mis-leading statement, then what would this imply for Craig’s KCA? Well, Craig argues that the universe began to exist in P2 of his argument. But, as he defends creatio ex nihilo, he asserts that before the universe exists, nothing existed. Wait, I thought “something which does not exist” was logically incoherent? If that the case then to suggest that before the universe existed “nothing existed” implies that nothignness is something? By Craig’s SAME objection to Scott’s argument, is he suggesting nothingness is a existent thing? If that the case then his own argument FOR creatio ex nihilo is debunked!
  
  Craig cannot argue that “nothing existed” is logically sound taken literally, whereas “something which does not exist” is logically fallacious taken literally. Just as Craig is not trying to suggest “nothingness” is existent, neither is Scott arguing a non-yet-existing universe, exists.
  
  So you have two options here.
  1. Dismiss your straw man objection against Scott’s KCAAGE.
  2. Accept Craig’s objection and on the same logical ground, dismiss Craig’s OWN argument- by that same reasoning.
  
  But, since you said “KCA is a defenisible argument” you have no choice but to forgo this objection, otherwise, you’d be dismissing your supposedly defensible argument on the same logical ground. Yeah, Craig, didn’t really think this one over, did you?
  
  So, since you failed to establish that P1 suggests what you and Craig thinks it means to imply, and have no choice but to accept that failures- P1, still stands. And if that’s the case then I see no reason why P2 does not follow. But I digress, you argue that the KCA is defensible. Okay, I disagree.
  
  If we study quantum mechanics, we find that causality is not the way the world works on the atomic levels. Interpretations such as the Copenhagen interpretation are indeterministic. Some leading physicists and cosmologists argue the universe is a quantum event itself. If quantum indeterminancy holds, then we can reject P1 and C1 of Craig’s KCA. Now, while I admit not all interpretations are indeterministic, no experiments have been shown to favor the deterministic ones. In fact, local hidden varaibles theories are experimentally tested yet unproven. Non-local variables theories go against Einstein’s speed limit for phenomena in that nothing can travel faster than the speed of light, whereas nonlocal interpretations favor superluminal connections in violation of this principle. So, we have strong evidence for indeterminisim in QM, but nothing to favor determinism. But even if we did, these causes are described naturally. If so, why then suggest God as a cause?
  
  More to the point, what does it mean the universe “began to exist”? Are we refering to out local spacetime dimenions, or all of reality? If the former, then the best we can say is that our current universe began to exist, but from a previously existing universe, or perhaps from some quantum mechanical state where time becomes meaningless. If the later, than we simply have not evidence to suggest that the Big Bang was the absolute beginning of all of reality, as we have good argument in inflationary comsology to support multiverse scenarios.
  
  But these two objections aside, the KCA feels for a reason Scott raised earlier. The KCA makes an equivcation fallacy. In P1, Craig uses examples of creation ex materia to defened his argument, whereas he defened creation ex nihilo in P2. In this case we have:
  P1. Whatever begins to exist from pre-existing materials has a cause.
  P2. The universe bagne to exist from nothing.
  C1. The universe has a cause.
  
  Here we find that the KCA equivocates two different senses of “begins to exist” to mean the same thing. More to the point, equivocation aside, the KCA is no longer valid. Now these three objections alone are enough to disconfirm KCA, and this is to say nothing of set theory disputing Craig’s objections to infinites, or how immaterial beings with intelligence seem to contradict our understanding of the pre-requisite conditions for these attributes we find in biology. This also is me ignoring that in no paper, debate or otherwise, has Craig ever attempted to given an account, mechanism or explanation as to how “God caused the universe to begins existing” would work. Where is your explanation? “God did it” is not only useless, it just simply reverts Craig’s KCA to become another God-of-the-gaps argument.
  - Jarrett Cooper
    
    Mason, do you believe that non-existence has potentialities? I’m having a little trouble discerning what you mean with your potential talk. Given the Aristotelean-Thomistic view, only things that have being can be said to have potential. To give potentiality to non-existence is putting the cart in front of the horse.
    
    I think something that hasn’t been noted is the metaphysical principle ex nihilo nihil fit. I don’t see any reason to reject this principle. I don’t believe quantum mechanics allows one to escape (P1). Appealing to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics will not allow one to escape (P1).
    
    “Now, even on the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, subatomic particles do not literally pop into and out of existence without any prior cause, but rather they arise as spontaneous fluctuations in a quantum vacuum. The quantum vacuum is the indeterministic cause of the fluctuation; it cannot be characterized as nothing, but as a vacuum operating under physical laws. In the same turn, universe models that describe the universe’s coming to be as a quantum event are said to arise from a quantum vacuum that is a sea of fluctuating energy subject to physical laws.”[1]
    
    1. Craig, William Lane, and James D. Sinclair. “The Kalam Cosmological Argument.” The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. Ed. James P. Moreland. Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. 183. Print.
    - Mason
      
      No, you missed the point. I am not suggesting that non-existent beings have potentialities, but rather until they exist, they are non-existent. A potential baby is not a non-existent baby with potential, it is a baby which does not exist YET. I already expressed this point in response to Ian Smithers, and I can’t believe now I have to explain it a second time. It’s not that hard to understand. I am not refering to non-existent potentials, potentials here refers to non-things which may exist at a later time. But hey, since you chose the second option and didn’t give my article a full reading, let me remind you how Craig’s response to Scott Cliftion effectuvely destroys his own KCA. Craig defends creatio ex nihilo in P2. But what is he trying to suggest. “Before the universe existed, nothing existed.” Is he suggesting that “nothingness” exists? No, clearly he is not. Neither is Scott trying to suggest that “something which does not exist” refers to existing/non-existing things with potentials.
      
      Okay, so choose your poision Jarrett Cooper; you can:
      1. Drop this ignorant, obviously false, straw man of an objection.
      2. Or you know what, I can say the exact same thing of WLC argument for creatio ex nihilo, in that it is suggests the “nothingness” exists, and easily debunk the KCA by Craig’s OWN logic.
      
      Go ahead, pick one.
      
      Now let’s see about absurd Craig’s rebuttal is to the Copenhagen interpretation.
      
      “Now, even on the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, subatomic particles do not literally pop into and out of existence without any prior cause, but rather they arise as spontaneous fluctuations in a quantum vacuum. The quantum vacuum is the indeterministic cause of the fluctuation.”
      
      Indeterminsitic cause? Spontanoues fluctuations? I would really love to see his justification for give this interpretation of the Copenhagen Interpretation as an indeterministic cause. Or better yet, let’s see what particle physicist Victor Stenger has to say about it:
      
      (Sorry for the large print)
      
      “Craig has retorted that quantum events are still “caused,” just caused in a non-predetermined manner—what he calls “probabilistic causality.” In effect, Craig is thereby admitting that the “cause” in his first premise could be an accidental one, something spontaneous—something not predetermined. By allowing probabilistic cause, he destroys his own case for a predetermined creation.
      We have a highly successful theory of probabilistic causes—quantum mechanics. It does not predict when a given event will occur and, indeed, assumes that individual events are not predetermined. The one exception occurs in the interpretation of quantum mechanics given by David Bohm. 13 This assumes the existence of yet undetected sub-quantum forces. While this interpretation has some supporters, it is not generally accepted because it requires superluminal connections that violate the principles of special relativitiy.14 More important, no evidence for sub-quantum forces has been found.”
      
      -Victor Stenger, The Scientific Case Against a God Who Created the Universe
      - Jarrett Cooper
        
        To cut down on the confusion, is it okay to talk about the view of potential that you’re talking about as “possible” (potential is much more narrower than possible and this would cut down on the confusion). I noted earlier, in the A-T sense, potentials are only applied to things that already have being. An actual rubber ball has the potential to become goo (if one applies heat to the ball). Actual liquid water has the potential to become ice (if one applies cool enough temperatures to the water). So forth and so on. You’ll have to forgive me on the confusion.
        
        You’re right, a Kalam proponent would not defend the existence of nothingness (non-being). This is because the Kalam proponent believes in God–which is a being with attributes. Now, the Kalam proponent can believe in nothing–with regards to materiality. And that’s exactly what creatio ex nihilo refers to: creation out of no material cause. Nonetheless, there was still an efficient cause–namely God.
        
        Do you think it’s rational to accept the metaphysical principle ex nihilo nihil fit? The Kalam proponent does not need to equivocate P! with P2. One can simply affirm P1 by noting ex nihilo nihil fit, and Kalam proponents do use this line of argument.
        
        Mason, the quantum vacuum is not a nothing (non-being). The virtual particles spring forth from the vacuum. The vacuum is the cause of the particle fluctuations.
        
        “According to present-day understanding of what is called the vacuum state or the quantum vacuum, it is “by no means a simple empty space”,[1] and again: “it is a mistake to think of any physical vacuum as some absolutely empty void.”[2] According to quantum mechanics, the vacuum state is not truly empty but instead contains fleeting electromagnetic waves and particles that pop into and out of existence.[3][4][5][6]
        
        “It is, of course, somewhat inappropriate to call the origin of a bubble Universe in a fluctuation of the vacuum ‘creation ex nihilo,’ for the quantum mechanical vacuum state has a rich structure which resides in a previously existing substratum of space-time, either Minkowski or de Sitter space-time. Clearly, a true ‘creation ex nihilo’ would be the spontaneous generation of everything–space-time, the quantum mechanical vacuum, matter–at some time in the past.”
        
        [7]”
        
        1. Astrid Lambrecht (Hartmut Figger, Dieter Meschede, Claus Zimmermann Eds.) (2002).Observing mechanical dissipation in the quantum vacuum: an experimental challenge; in Laser physics at the limits. Berlin/New York: Springer. p. 197. ISBN 3540424180.
        2. Christopher Ray (1991). Time, space and philosophy. London/New York: Routledge. Chapter 10, p. 205. ISBN 0415032210.
        3. AIP Physics News Update,1996
        4. Physical Review Focus Dec. 1998
        5. a b Walter Dittrich & Gies H (2000). Probing the quantum vacuum: perturbative effective action approach. Berlin: Springer. ISBN 3540674284.
        6. Wikipedia. “Vacuum State.” Wed. 1 Jun. 2011. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vacuum_state#cite_note-Ray-1
        7. Narrow, John and Frank Tipler.The Anthropic Cosmological Principle. Oxford, New York, 1986. 441
      - Mason
        
        Okay, well no, I do not mean to say non-existant non-being have potential. On reflection, that was perhaps the wrong word to use. The problem with discussing non-existence si that any way you attempt to describe it, you make the concept to appear as if it is something. In other words, this si not a fault to Scott’s or mine’s positions here, only of language and it’s limits to convey an accurate understanding of this idea. Allow me to use Craig’s example to illustrate my point. “x exists at T, and not before T.” When Scott is reffering to “somethingw hcih does not exist” he is NOT rfering to existent/ non-existent things, only nonexistent nonbeings which will not exist until they begins to exist. To say the universe is “something whic does not exist” si not meant to be read as “an existing, non-existing universe” but rather as a nonbeing which later began something. I used the word “potential” in hopes that might shed light on this issue, but as I see it has led us to some confusion.
        
        However, confusion aside, Craig’s rebuttal to P1 is a misrepresentation. At no point did Scott or myself argue that “something which does not exist” reffering to non-existent things. Only non-beings. The language is tricky, but only bcause we are attempting to explain nonexistence, which si tricky. This not a failure of Scott’s Kalam argument, only a failure of language. Craig seems to have utilized this weakness to his advantage, but sadly this also reveal how little thought he put behind this premise.
        
        “Your right, a propenent of the Kalam argument would not defend nothingness (non-being).
        
        Wait up, Craig does. In every debate and paper he has written on the KCA, he has defended the notion of God creation the universe from nothing (i.e. creation ex nihilo). I have never heard of Craig, or of any informed proponent of this argument dispute this. Craig does assert that before the universe existed God did exist, but that he created the universe from nothing.
        
        What I was trying to suggest is that a proponent of the KCA cannot except creation ex nihilo, not because of their support for KCA, but because 1) creation ex nihilo has not been proven and 2) Scott’s has this objection to creation ex nihilo based on the issue we have with causation, as Craig defends it in P1 of KCA and later argues for P2. But hwo does one makes sense of causation of creation ex nihilo, if we have only understood causation as it occurs in examples of creation ex materia?
        
        I have failed to here of any philosphers dispute creation ex nihilo as strictly against materail causes, and not effeicent causes- but I’ll give you the benefit fo the doubt. problem is, claiming the cause (i.e. God) is an effecient, not a material cause- does not dispute the objection. Effecient cause simple means “to bring something about.” Fine, but how does one bring something about without interacting with something?
        
        Even if we grant that God is the effecient cause, to suggest “God caused the universe to begin existing” suggests that God performs some form of action to initiate this process. If that’s the case, then what did God interact with? According to the KCA, nothing. How does a causal agent, effecient, material or toherwise, cause “nothingness” to do, or become, or produce anything? Craig has never explained this process to us, so I feel Scott’s argument is right to call out this assertion as counter our understanding of causality as we observe in nature, and as Craig defends in examples he uses in P1.
        
        Even if creation ex nihilo is only meant to apply to material causes, I argue this is an unjustfied and limited application. I see no reason why changing the meaning of “cause” makes the concept more cohereht, or explains creatio ex nihilo any better. In fact, they all suffer from the same flaw, no receivers to produce interaction between cause and effectee.
        
        “Equivocation in P1 and P2.”
        I’m surpsied at how many times I have to explain this is the case for Craig’s KCA. Okay, Craigs disputes the equivocation chare in that in P1 and P2, he is referring to begins to exist as “x begins at T, and not before T.” But this misses the rationale behind the equivocation charge. In defense of P1, Craig uses examples of things which “began to exist” to illustrate they have a cause. All of these examples he uses are examples of creation ex materia, NOT creation ex nihilo But in P2 he defend creation ex nihilo for the universe. So, in the case fo the KCA, the phrase “begins to exist” entials both creation ex materia and creation ex nihilo. Even if this were no an equivocation, it nonetheless is a category mistake to suggest that if causation applies to creation ex materia, it must therefore apply to creation ex nihilo. This is an unjustified category mistake and more to the point makes the entire logic of the KCA invalid. Craigs’s reponse to this objection is at best a cover-up and at worst plain dishonesty.
        
        Jarrent, I never tried to suggest that the quantum vacuum is soemthing. In fact, where did I even make that assertion? Nowhere. I actually agree with Dr. William Lane Craig that the quantum vacuum state is not nothing. But Craig is wrong to suggest that since it isn’t nothing, it is therefore the “cause” of virtual particles. Again, quantum mechanics only gives us probabilities as to when things will occur. The vacuum only gives us conditions, not pre-determined causes. Even if we grant these are dterministic, then we can grant the origins fo the universe to a previous quantum vacuum state. Whether or not it began to exist is perhaps a more open question, but if we do not have creation ex nihilo, then Craig has no reason for suggesting the cause coldn’t be natural, and even with creation ex nihilo, there is no reason to assert that causation is valid or meaningful, via Scott’s objection.
      - Jarrett Cooper
        
        Yes, the language can be tricky.
        
        I stand by my statement, “You’re right, a Kalam proponent would not defend the existence of nothingness (non-being).” This is because the sentence that follows directly after the one above reads, “This is because the Kalam proponent believes in God–which is a being with attributes.” No Kalam proponent believes there has ever been a state of non-being (only material non-being). For the Kalam proponent believes God is a being that has always existed. So, even before creation, there was still something–namely God. The Kalam proponent believes the nihilo refers to the fact that there was no material substance (i.e., material non-being). (The Kalam proponent doesn’t believe there was ever a state of non-being, for God is a being that has always existed. Rather the Kalam proponent believes in a state in which you have material non-being.) This should clear up things, hopefully.
        
        One of the main things the Kalam argument is trying to show (P2) is that the universe(s)/cosmos can not be extrapolated infinitely into the past (i.e, it came into being, began to exist, etc.). There are two lines of arguments that try to show this contention. The a priori arguments (philosophical arguments) which could include the impossible of actual infinites: cannot successively add to infinity, absurdities of actual infinities, and others arguments like the grim-reaper arguments ( http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2009/10/from-grim-reaper-paradox-to-kalaam.html ). The other line of arguments are the a posteriori arguments (scientific arguments). This is when the Kalam proponent appeals to contemporary cosmology. For example, in the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, William Lane Craig and James Sinclair argue that none of the cosmologies can be extended infinitely into the past, and in fact that the models even entails the the past is incomplete (i.e, there was a beginning).
        
        Now if any of those arguments work, we’re left with the question what caused the universe(s)/cosmos. The theist can postulate say, a being such as God (after reaching the conclusion of the Kalam, the proponent than deduces as to what the cause could be) caused it–even if they can’t account how a God (a non-material being) could create a material something from materially nothing. Even Craig has said he doesn’t know how this works. The question is is that the theist can postulate an actual cause for the universe. The non-theist options (if the argument()s above work) is to say the universe is uncaused and that it came into existence out of nothing (which would go against the metaphysical principle ex nihilo nihil fit) , or that the universe caused itself into existence (this is what Daniel Dennett argues, but this is simply incoherent, one cannot cause itself into existence. To do so you would have to already exist.) Even though the theist can’t say exactly how the process works, at least the theist can give a cause to the creation of the universe (God is the cause), whereas the non-theist is left with the two options above (as long as the arguments work in showing the universe(s)/cosmos cannot be extended infinitely into the past).
        
        For the Kalam component, it’s not necessary for them to appeal to creation ex materia. All that is needed is the metaphysical principle ex nihilo nihil fit. You apply this principle to both (P1) and (P2). So, there is no equivocation when done this way, therefore the arguments is still valid.
        
        Physicists understand that virtual particle spring forth from the quantum vacuum. If the vacuum wasn’t there, then you wouldn’t get the virtual particles. The vacuum plays an important causal role for virtual particles to come into being. Just some interpretations of QM (Copenhagen interpretation) say there is indeterminacy while not being observed. (So virtual particles are non uncaused).
      - Mason
        
        “Yes, the language can be tricky.”
        Agreed.
        
        “No Kalam proponent believes there has ever been a state of non-being (only material non-being). For the Kalam proponent believes God is a being that has always existed. So, even before creation, there was still something–namely God. The Kalam proponent believes the nihilo refers to the fact that there was no material substance (i.e., material non-being). (The Kalam proponent doesn’t believe there was ever a state of non-being, for God is a being that has always existed. Rather the Kalam proponent believes in a state in which you have material non-being.) This should clear up things, hopefully.”
        
        If you read what I said, I don’t dispute this. Yes, proponents argue that before the universe god existed, but that is irrelevant to the claim a proponent of the KCA defends, namely that God created the universe from nothing.
        
        “One of the main things the Kalam argument is trying to show (P2) is that the universe(s)/cosmos can not be extrapolated infinitely into the past (i.e, it came into being, began to exist, etc.). There are two lines of arguments that try to show this contention. The a priori arguments (philosophical arguments) which could include the impossible of actual infinites: cannot successively add to infinity, absurdities of actual infinities, and others arguments like the grim-reaper arguments (http://alexanderpruss.blogspot… ). The other line of arguments are the a posterioriarguments (scientific arguments). This is when the Kalam proponent appeals to contemporary cosmology. For example, in the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, William Lane Craig and James Sinclair argue that none of the cosmologies can be extended infinitely into the past, and in fact that the models even entails the the past is incomplete (i.e, there was a beginning).
        Now if any of those arguments work, we’re left with the question what caused the universe(s)/cosmos. The theist can postulate say, a being such as God (after reaching the conclusion of the Kalam, the proponent than deduces as to what the cause could be) caused it–even if they can’t account how a God (a non-material being) could create a material something from materially nothing. Even Craig has said he doesn’t know how this works. The question is is that the theist can postulate an actual cause for the universe. The non-theist options (if the argument()s above work) is to say the universe is uncaused and that it came into existence out of nothing (which would go against the metaphysical principle ex nihilo nihil fit) , or that the universe caused itself into existence (this is what Daniel Dennett argues, but this is simply incoherent, one cannot cause itself into existence. To do so you would have to already exist.) Even though the theist can’t say exactly how the process works, at least the theist can give a cause to the creation of the universe (God is the cause), whereas the non-theist is left with the two options above (as long as the arguments work in showing the universe(s)/cosmos cannot be extended infinitely into the past).”
        
        Okay, Craig arguments against actual infinities. Firstly, Craig asserts that infinities lead to self-contradiction, but then again set theory gives us a consistent model of infinities. Infinities as physicist use, are not meant to suggest “a beginning an infinite amount of time ago” (as Craig has wrongly suggested). To say the universe is past-infinite is meant to imply there was no initial beginning, and that one can continue to place one previous states before the current one. Also, Craig’s philosophical arguments aren’t very compelling in that they don’t represent universes. To suggest you cannot have an infinite number of books in a library does not imply that you couldn’t have a past-infinite numbers of books. I’m sorry, the comparison is a false one.
        
        But if an actual infinity cannot exist, then how can an eternally existing God can? None of Craig’s response to this question have been compelling and seem to be ad hoc at best and special pleading at worst. If God has always existed, then he must be infinite in some recognizable sense. Many of the scientific bases of Craig;s argument against an infinite universe, such as thermodynamics, were valid until the inflationary model was developed.
        
        Craig quoted Daniel Dennett completely out of context in his book, which was actually meant to imply that if theists want to argue for a self-caused God, why couldn’t the universe be self-caused? Craig makes no mention that Dennett made this statement only as a rhetorical response. So Craig is again, being misleading. Actually, contra Craig, physicists have shown that given the principles of relativity and universe can in fact create itself. This is based on Einstein’s theory of general relativity, but I must read more up on this point.
        
        I am also aware that Craig and Sinclair have written that none of the models can be past-eternal. Problem is that they have distorted the BGV Theorem to saying that Vilenkin himself has disputed this, as well as two other research papers which Vilenkin excepts. Craig and Sinclair still misuse this theorem to argue for a past-finite universe which began as a singularity, but singularity theorems have long since been discarded by Hawking and Penrose.
        
        Again, Craig is not a cosmologist or a physicist- this is not to say that he is wrong, but when you have top physicists correcting Craig’s error of their theory, you have no choice but to remain skeptical.
        
        Again, the theist cannot just suggest that God created the universe is the only reasonable explanation. Craig defends that the universe was created from nothing. I agree, that Craig has failed to illustrate this, but more to the point, no justification for it exists. Since we have no scientific or mathematical reason to reject infinities, we can still argue for them.
        
        If we want to consider Craig’s theistic explanation, we must challenge his explanation “The Universe was created by God from nothing.” Your evidence and explanation Craig? I’m sorry, theism is not valid if and until Craig can dodge this objection. Causality makes no sense in defense of creation ex nihilo. And yes, Craig does make use of creation ex materia in defense of P1. Any example he gives, such as himself beginning to exist, counts as creation ex materia. Craig does not only make use of ex nihilo nihil fit for P1.
        
        If ex nihilo nihil fit is true, then the universe could not come into being come nothing- caused or otherwise. So if Craig makes use of that principle then his entire argument for a God who created the universe is false. If “from nothing, nothing comes is true” then I fail to see how a cause which doesn’t effect anything would change this logic.
        
        Ex nihilo nihil fit does mean “Something cannot come into being uncaused out of nothing.” Ex nihilo nihil fit says that “nothing can come from nothing…no exceptions” If Craig argues otherwise he need to take his argument back to the drawing board.
        
        No, Craig can’t just say “I don’t know how God did it.” Scott effectively argues, contra Craig, causation ex nihilo is impossible. If Craig defends divine creation ex nihilo, he must defend and explain ex nihilo, not just throw his hands up.
      - Jarrett Cooper
        
        With regards to infinities, a Kalam proponent will note that in transfinite arithmetic (which set theory is a part of) that there are rules that the mathematician must follow when dealing with infinities. For example, you cannot subtract or divide with infinities (the reason is if you do then you’ll get absurdities). The response is that certainly someone can slap the hand of the mathematician while he does his work on paper. But in the real world if I had an actual infinite amount of marbles, who’s to slap my hand if I started given them out (subtracting them)? No one! The books in the library example isn’t the only illustration the Kalam proponent has. The Kalam proponent will note the inability to form an actual infinity by successive addition. [1] There is also the grim-reaper arguments. For example, Alexander Pruss has a grim reaper argument over at his website ( http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2009/10/from-grim-reaper-paradox-to-kalaam.html ). For this argument, you can believe in actual infinities, but you cannot believe in a backwards infinite sequence of events. [2] With regards to God and infinites. The Kalam proponent note that they speak of God as eternal. In this sense God hasn’t existed for a temporally infinite amount of time. You don’t count timelessness. I don’t believe this is ad hoc, especially if one can argue show that all of space, time, and matter–the universe(s)/cosmos–came into being.I don’t believe the Daniel Dennett quote is taken out of context:
        
        “What does need its origin explained is the concrete Universe itself, and as Hume’s Philo long ago asked: Why not stop at the material world? It, we have seen, does perform a version of the ultimate bootstrapping trick; it creates itself ex nihilo, or at any rate out of something that is well-nigh indistinguishable from nothing at all. Unlike the puzzlingly mysterious, timeless self-creation of God, this self-creation is a non-miraculous stunt that has left lots of traces.”[3]
        
        Craig notes that Dennett, “spoils his radical idea by waffling at the end: maybe the universe did not create itself out of nothing but at least out of something well-nigh indistinguishable from nothing. This caveat evinces a lack of appreciation of the metaphysical chasm between being and nothingness. There is no third thing between being and non-being” [4] Either way, the point being is if the Kalam argument works, the only options the non-theist can take is say the universe is self-caused (which is incoherent,) or that the universe is uncaused (which goes against the metaphysical principle ex nihilo nihil fit). I don’t believe Craig or Sinclair distorts the BGV theorem. Criag and Sinclair interacted with more than just singularity models. (Just to note: the Penrose-Hawking Theorem is a singularity theorem.[5] You probably meant the Hartle-Hawking no-boundary proposal.) In the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology Craig and Sinclair go through several cosmological models (both standard and non-standard). It’s important to remember if the argument works, meaning it shows that the universe(s)/cosmos is past incomplete–aka not past infinite. Then the Kalam proponent deduces what the cause is: it would be an immaterial, spaceless, timeless, and enormously powerful being (the Kalam proponent would call this God). The theist can actually give an explanation for the cause of the universe. The non-theist has nothing (as long as the arguments(s) work in showing the universe(s)/cosmos can not be extrapolated into past infinity) except to retort to the two options presented above. As said a few times before, the Kalam proponent does not need to appeal to creatio ex materia. All that is needed is the metaphysical principle ex nihilio nihil fit. The truthfulness of Ex nihilio nihil fit doesn’t hurt the Kalam argument. The Kalam proponent doesn’t believe the universe(s)/cosmos came out of nothing (non-being), because God is a being of which is the cause of the universe(s)/cosmos. The Kalam proponent simply believes that there was no material cause for the universe(s)/cosmos. So, the Kalam proponent stands firm when they state nothing (non-being) cannot give rise to something (being), and that God is the being that gave rise to the being which we call the universe(s)/cosmos.I agree that causation ex nihilo is impossible (non-being cannot give rise to being). But the Kalam proponent believes God is the being (something) that gave rise the the universe(s)/cosmos. Just because you can’t explain a process doesn’t make something invalid. Before we knew about gravitational pulls, we knew that the earth went around the sun. But there was a time that we didn’t know how this happened, but just because there was a time we didn’t know how the earth orbited the sun, didn’t negate the fact that the earth, in fact, orbited the sun. We can hope that we will come to the knowledge of how God caused the universe to come into existence out of no material substance.1. Reasonable Faith Website. “Forming an Actual Infinite by Successive Addition.” Wed 1 Jun 2011. http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=57322. Alexander Pruss’s Blog. “From the Grim Reaper paradox to the Kalaam argument.” Wed 1 Jun 2011 http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2009/10/from-grim-reaper-paradox-to-kalaam.html3. Dennett, Daniel. Breaking the Spell (New York: Viking, 2006), p. 243 – 244 4. Craig, William Lane. Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics Wheaton, Illinois, 2008. p. 151 5. Wikipedia. “Penrose-Hawking Singularity Theorems.” Wed 1 Jun 2011 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penrose%E2%80%93Hawking_singularity_theorems
      - Mason
        
        Okay, all I want to say in response to actual infinite is that you argue that calling God a “timeless being” isn’t ad hoc. how isn’t it? We have no observations of timeless beings, or beings which exist outside of time and space. As I said, to suggest God can posses and does possess these attributes is only special pleading. I would really like to see some form of a justification for it. I mean, for all you know, God could be co-eternal in his own universe of time and space and decided to create another one, right? Just because God is not within this universe, it does not follow that he is therefore timeless and spaceless. The best I can say is this is simply speculation.
        
        Okay, I see where Craig got this quote from. But I still pointed out that despite Craig;s objections, temporal loops allowed by general relativity actually to support a self-creating universe. Craig seems to have no objection to this theory. At least, not any that I have seen yet.
        
        “Either way, the point being is if the Kalam argument works, the only options the non-theist can take is say the universe is self-caused (which is incoherent,) or that the universe is uncaused (which goes against the metaphysical principle ex nihilo nihil fit).”
        
        No, I don’t think Craig has presented a compelling enough case against infinities, but as I said, this is not our only option. A universe could have begun from a previous quantum mechanical state where time is meaningless, and therefore and notion of “begins to exist” is misconceived. That is one option. You seem to think that ex nihilo nihil fit argues against uncaused creation from nothing, which, as I said, is NOT true. Ex nihilo nihil fit argues that nothing can from nothing- and again, causality does nothing to change the logic of ex nihilo nihil fit, at least Craig has failed to present a case otherwise.
        
        “I don’t believe Craig or Sinclair distorts the BGV theorem. Criag and Sinclair interacted with more than just singularity models. (Just to note: the Penrose-Hawking Theorem is a singularity theorem.[5] You probably meant the Hartle-Hawking no-boundary proposal.) In the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology Craig and Sinclair go through several cosmological models (both standard and non-standard).”
        
        I don’t really care what you “believe” I only care what the facts are. In his book “The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning” by Victor Stenger- Stenger, Aquirre, Vilenkin and Carroll are quoted which explicitly explain what Craig and Sinclair mis-represented the BGV theorem. No, I didn’t refer to the Hawking-Hartle model. Craig has utilized the Hawking-Penrose singularity theorem in the past, and YES, I KNEW it was a singularity theorem. Thank you.
        
        “As said a few times before, the Kalam proponent does not need to appeal tocreatio ex materia. All that is needed is the metaphysical principle ex nihilio nihil fit.The truthfulness of Ex nihilio nihil fit doesn’t hurt the Kalam argument. The Kalam proponent doesn’t believe the universe(s)/cosmos came out of nothing (non-being), because God is a being of which is the cause of the universe(s)/cosmos. The Kalam proponent simply believes that there was no material cause for the universe(s)/cosmos. So, the Kalam proponent stands firm when they state nothing (non-being) cannot give rise to something (being), and that God is the being that gave rise to the being which we call the universe(s)/cosmos.I agree that causation ex nihilo is impossible (non-being cannot give rise to being). But the Kalam proponent believes God is the being (something) that gave rise the the universe(s)/cosmos.”
        
        I have responded to these exact same objections of yours previously, and, no offense, but repeating myself is getting annoying, so I’ll make this short.
        
        1. Creation ex materia- Craig uses examples of these to defend P1 of KCA. If creation ex materia was not necessary to defend KCA then I wonder why on earth Craig is using these examples like himself or mountains.
        2. Even if Craig does not make use of creation ex materia in defense of P1, ex nihlo nihil fit does not argue that “Something cannot come into begin- uncaused, out of nothing.” Ex nihilo nihil fit actually argues “From nothing, nothing comes.” Notice that the principle creates no exceptions for notions of causality.
        3. “The truthfulness of ex nihilo nihil fit doesn’t hurt KCA.” Yes it does. For some reason you seem to think ex nihilo nihil fit implies”Something cannot come into begin- uncaused, out of nothing.” But that is not what the principle says at all. If from nothing, nothing comes is true, then to argue for creation ex nihilo and ex nihilo nihil fit is to say “From nothing nothing comes, but the universe came into being from nothing.” That is an obvious contradiction. If ex nihilo nihil fit is true then the universe, since it exists, could not come from nothing- period. Causality is irrelevant.
        4. Again, wrong! True, Craig does argue that before the universe God existed- but he still defends the notion that “God created the universe from nothing.” True, God existed according to the KCA before the universe- but that is irrelevant to the argument against creation ex nihilo! “I agree that causation ex nihilo is impossible (non-being cannot give rise to being). But the Kalam proponent believes God is the being (something) that gave rise the the universe(s)/cosmos.” You’ve missed the point! Craig argues that God (something) caused nothing to become something. Craig argues that God (being) caused non-being to become being.
        5. AS I have already said, Scott’s objection makes no bias against material or efficient causes- Scott’s objection attacks efficient causes!!! Take a better look at Scott’s objections before you try refuting it, because thus far you have ONLY attacked straw men.
        
        “Just because you can’t explain a process doesn’t make something invalid.”
        Well… duh! I wasn’t suggesting that Craig’s failure to explain creation ex nihilo proves it was false. In fact, where did I suggest that, or even HINT at that? (Hint: nowhere.) What I WAS saying that unitl Craig does justify creation ex nihilo, we have no reason to believe him. He might be right, but he has to give us some reason, argument or evidence to support it, because we are not going to just take creation ex nihilo on faith. I still argue that Scott has a strong objection to causation ex nihilo (BOTH MATERIAL AND EFFICIENT) and Craig thus far has been very weak in provided a adequate response.
        
        Now Jarrett, I would like to say that I’ve enjoyed our discussion. But now it looks like your only going to be missing my objections and re-stating previously discussed material. If that the case then my future response will only be: “Re-read my previous responses.”
        
        Now please go back and response to my two questions above where I wanted to focus on 1) Craig’s evidence for the universe being created from nothing, and 2) His explanation for it.
      - Jarrett Cooper
        
        If the grim reaper argument works (an arguments that sets to prove you can not have a backwards infinite sequence of events), or any of the arguments that says you can have an actual infinite, or if the contemporary cosmological models are successful. Then I don’t see how it’s ad hoc in the least bit to say God is timeless. For the universe(s)/cosmos is all of matter, space and time. Using deduction we get to a being (if the Kalam argument succeeds) that is an immaterial, spacless, and timeless being. For in the creation of the universe(s)/cosmos is the creation of all of space and time, then it follows that the cause would have to be spaceless and timeless. There is no special pleading here. These follow given the rules of logic.
        
        You only get temporal loops from an already existing entity. For the universe to cause itself it would have to already exist. It’s an incoherent view. It’s like saying black holes are the cause of matter when to actually have a black hole you need a lot of matter that is very dense. It’s the cart in front of the horse issue. Saying one didn’t give you a compelling case for you to accept the non-existence of infinites isn’t a counter-argument, and it’s certainly no refutation of a claim. For some people it take a lot persuade them of a certain fact and others not so much. None of this has to do with the truth or falsity of any particular claim, but rather the persuasivability of one’s argument. Which are completely different subjects. I thought it was neat that in transfinite arithmetic that one cannot subtract or divide infinity because you get contradictions.In my latest response to you I noted that the primordial state cannot be extrapolated into past infinity (the energy in the vacuum would have decayed). What I take ex nihilio nihil fit to mean is that non being cannot give rise to being. So, you can’t have either caused or uncaused being from non-being, for non-being cannot give rise to being (caused or uncaused). Have you read James Sinclair’s response over at the Reasonable Faith website? Have you read William Lane Craig’s and James Sinclair’s piece in the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology? (I think it would be best if one has issues with the Kalam arguments to read that piece.) Craig and Sinclair’s thesis for their a posteriori don’t all henge on the BGV theorem. They note the exceptions to the theorem. James Sinclair writes, “Nowhere (in our [Criag's and Sinclair's] essay) do we employ a supposed quote from Alex Vilenkin to the effect that his theorem (by itself) demonstrates a beginning to the universe and merely rely on it as some type of argument-from-authority.” [1]I’ve said a few times already that the Kalam proponent only needs to appeal to the metaphysical principle ex nihilio nihil fit and therefore to not equivocate (P1) with (P2). It does not hurt the Kalam argument if one Kalam proponent (i.e., William Lane Craig) notes the metaphysical principle ex nihilio nihil fit and then also adds forth creatio ex materia examples. We need to properly understand ex nihilio nihil fit. I’ve noted what it means. Non being cannot give rise to being. The universe didn’t come into being from nothing (only from non-materiality), because God (which is a being) is the something that gave rise to the universe. There is no Kalam proponent that would ever call God non-being, and therefore they don’t violate the metaphysical principle ex nihilio nihil fit. No Kalam proponent would say the universe came from nothing because it came from God (a being), the Kalam proponent believes the universe came from no material substance. Hopefully, this should clear up the confusion. God existence sans creation is not irrelevant to the claim ex nihilio nihil fit because the Kalam proponent believes creation is done without any material substance and not out of literal non-being, for this would violate the principle. Oh now I see, You’re getting close on the right track when you write, “Craig argues that God (something) caused nothing to become something. Craig argues that God (being) caused non-being to become being.” Now this is where the hammer meets the nail. The above does not violate the metaphysical principle ex nihilio nihil fit. First thing to note is that if God does exist then you don’t have non-being! (For God is a being!) God (being) gave rise to the universe (being). So, the Kalam proponent emphatically agrees with the claim that God did this so out of no material substance (no material being), but there was indeed being (God himself) of which the universe owes its existence to. Hence the principle in not violated. I don’t believe I’ve been attacking straw men. Main thing is getting onto the right page and having proper terminology and definitions for the things we’re discussing.As I said before, it’s important to know the Kalam proponent doesn’t believe in creation out of literally non-being, but only creation of on no material substances. This is a crucial point to understand. The Kalam proponent gives their arguments for accepting that the universe(s)/cosmos cannot be extrapolated into past infinity and that given the metaphysical principle ex nihilio nihil fit that there must be cause, a being, a something that gave rise to the universe(s)/cosmos. The Kalam proponent then deduces what this cause can be. The outcome is an immaterial, spacless, timeless, and enormously powerful being (which they call God). As long as this succeeds, then it doesn’t matter if the Kalam proponent doesn’t know the process of which God creates the universe(s)/cosmos out of no material substance. One can hope we will find out, much like we do with other theories. (The example I gave was that gravitational pulls were at one point not known as to why the earth orbits the sun, but people still knew the earth orbited the sun even with knowing the explanation.)We’re probably at an impasse, and I got that cert to study for. Hopefully I can still get some luck from you. 1. Reasonable Faith Website. “Current Cosmology and the Beginning of the Universe.” Thu 2 Jun 2011. http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=8629
      - Mason
        
        You keep mentioning the grim reaper argument. I apologize in that I never actually responded to this point- but in all honesty, I haven’t read it yet. I will one day when I get off my lazy ass and do it, but I’m kind of busy spending my days reading books for my physics major. (Yes, I know it’s summer, but reading books is what I do.)
        
        You did response to my objection that claiming God is timeless is ad hoc. The problem is, we just have no evidence to support the claim timeless beings exist. Now, I’m not saying it is impossible- but I just feel Craig need to give justification for it. Now to say God, as creator of the universe (containing time and space) must transcend these properties, seems logic, but actually it doesn’t follow. That to me is like claiming “If I built a room in my house from the outside fo that room, I must not be in a house.” No, I can be in a hallway, or in another room, or in the ceiling, or in the floor. It does not follow that if God transcends our universe, that he could not exist in his own universe of space and time. To argue otherwise, as I suggested, is at best speculation.
        
        If you believe in a timeless being, fine, I hold no objection. But if you insist this premise to counter the objection that God is eternal, I feel that two criticisms are valid, three actually. 1. Why God is defined as eternal is never justfied, 2. Timeless beings have never been observed, 3. Even if you exist outside of one notion of time and space, I don’t think it follows that you couldn’t live inside of another.
        
        “In my latest response to you I noted that the primordial state cannot be extrapolated into past infinity (the energy in the vacuum would have decayed). What I take ex nihilio nihil fit to mean is that non being cannot give rise to being. So, you can’t have either caused or uncaused being from non-being, for non-being cannot give rise to being (caused or uncaused).”
        As I have pointed out however, Craig’s objection to past infinity have been shown by the very scientists Craig supposedly is getting this information from, to be misleading. In example to the Hawking-Penrose singularity theorem, this theory has been discard in scienitifc communities in that this failed to consider quantum mechaincs, which does nto support singularities. In relation to the BGV theorem, Vilenkin himself denies that this theorem supports an absolute beginning from nothingness, or non-being.In fact, in Vilenkin’s paper he suggest that the boundary, as predicted by his theory would supprt a “quantum nucleation event”. Clearly, this theorem, even if past-finite, open the universe to be the result of some previous quantum state not true creation ex nihilo. More to this point, take a quote from Carlos I. Calle, “If Aquirre’s mechanism is successfully implemented, the model will describe an eternal universe in the past as well and will solve the problem of the origin of the universe.”
        
        ”We need to properly understand ex nihilio nihil fit. I’ve noted what it means. Non being cannot give rise to being. The universe didn’t come into being from nothing (only from non-materiality), because God (which is a being) is the something that gave rise to the universe. There is no Kalam proponent that would ever call God non-being, and therefore they don’t violate the metaphysical principle ex nihilio nihil fit. No Kalam proponent would say the universe came from nothing because it came from God (a being), the Kalam proponent believes the universe came from no material substance. Hopefully, this should clear up the confusion.”No, again this is missing the point of my objection. “The universe didn’t come from nothing (only from non-materiality). If that’s the case then Craig arguing that is argument is an example of creation ex nihilo would therefore be misleading. But Craig is still defending creation ex nihilo. But again, Craig assert the universe was created from non-being by a being. “God created the universe from nothing.” Craig is in no way is suggesting that God gave rise to the universe in the sense your implying. Craig argues that God gave rise to the universe from non-being. God, took nothing, and made it into something. In other words, God did not simply create the universe from his own being. Nowhere has Craig even suggested that. Rather a being created the universe from nothing.KCA goes something like this:
        God + interactions with nothing (creation ex nihilo) –> universe.
        
        You seem to be thinking Craig is suggesting:God–> universe.
        
        I’m sorry, but in no conext have I heard anythign which even remotely sounds like the second notion even hinted at by Craig. If this is what Craig means, then his entire argument for creation ex nihilo is false in that he is no longer arguing for creation ex nihilo. Creation ex nihilo, literally means “creation from nothing” not “creation from non-materiality.”"We’re getting closer to the point when you write, “Craig argues that God (something) caused nothing to become something. Craig argues that God (being) caused non-being to become being.” Now this is where the hammer meets the nail. The above does not violate the metaphysical principle ex nihilio nihil fit. First thing to note is that if God does exist then you don’t have non-being! (For God is a being!) God (being) gave rise to the universe (being). So, the Kalam proponent emphatically agrees with the claim that God did this so out of no material substance (no material being), but there was indeed being (God himself) of which the universe owes its existence to. Hence the principle in not violated. ”No, I don’t think we are on the same page here. “if God does exist then you don’t have non-being.” Craig agrees, but at the same time, argues that the universe was created from nothing, or as Craig puts it “absolute non-being.” You seem to be thinking that Craig is suggesting and that i am suggesting the creation ex nihilo implies only nothingness existed before the universe. Not so. Only, that in some context we had nothingnes which God supposedly interacted with to create something. If Craig’s notion of the origin fo the universe were what your suggesting the KCa to be Craig would be suggesting “From nothing, nothing comes- therefore the universe could only come from God’s being.” Craig agree that from nothing, nothing comes- but he for some reason only applies this to indeterminism. “Something cannot come into being, uncause, out of nothing.” But notice that Craig is not suggesting that God could not create from nothingness. Craig explicitly claims that God created the universe from nothing. ”As I said before, it’s important to know the Kalam proponent doesn’t believe in creation out of literally non-being, but only creation of no material substance.”
        No, again this is wrong. Yes, Craig argues that universe was created, but God from non-being. This is not to say that Craig is suggesting that God is non-being, or that only non-being existed. But rather there existed God who utilized non-being to create the universe. If your suggesting otherwise the for Craig to assert this is an argument for creation ex nihilo would be very misleading. But since Craig does defned creation ex nihio, I argue that is the position he holds. if you are right about Craig’s notion fo creation ex nihilo, then Craig would have bene saying “the universe was created from God’s own being.” But nowhere has this been hinted at!I agree that we are at an impasse, and don’t really see this discussion going in any further direction other than repeating previous points. As I said I am getting rather busy now-a-days and I’m not sure if I can continue responding to this discussion. So, having said this, I would like to thank you for an interesting debate. I certainly appreciated debting someone who actually knew a fair amount of detail in this argument.
        
        Good luck with your certification! I wish you great luck! Be well.
      - Mason
        
        I gave my response to your statments you made in this post. Feel free to look at it if you want. But I feel your defense of KCA is getting off-track fo our discussion of Scott’s KCAAGE.
        
        So, instead I want to focus our discussion on two simple questions.
        
        Since Craig does defend creation ex nihilo, I would like to ask:
        1. “Where is Dr. Craig’s evidence that the universe did in fact begin to exist from nothing?” If the universe began to exist, it could have come from previous non-universe states, perhaps a quantum vacuum state where time is meanignless (Davies), or from past eternal multiverso or cyclic scenarios. While these are reasonable candidates, i fail to see any evidence the universe was created from nothing. Since this is the option Craig favors, I would like to see his evidence.
        
        2. Okay, aside from creation ex nihilo- where is his evidence the an object which began from nothing requires a case. using examples of creation ex materia does not help Craig here. So he must give some form of an explanation for creation ex nihilo. I await this explanation.
      - Jarrett Cooper
        
        I also responded to your previous post.
        
        As I noted previously there are two paths to defend the contention that the universe(s)/cosmos can not be extrapolated into past infinity. There are the a priori arguments (philosophical arguments). These include impossibility of actual infinites, inability to form an infinity by successive addition, grim reaper arguments (which argues you can not have a backward infinite sequence of events.) Then there are the a posteriori arguments (scientific arguments). These look at contemporary scientific cosmologies and argues that these models can not be extended into past infinity or that the models themselves are past incomplete–meaning they came into being.
        
        There are theories that do argue that there was a primordial state in which the universe (or even multiverse) sprang from. The problem is that physicists know that the quantum vacuum can not be extrapolated into past infinity. This is because over time the vacuum will simply decay and therefore cease to exist. There is not enough energy for it to exist from past infinity. (I know the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology is pricey but Craig and Sinclair go through many cosmological models, and this is where you should go to–especially on the topic of contemporary cosmological models. You can get your local library or university to buy the book for you, and then read it for free.
        
        It is not the case that something coming from non-being requires a cause (I argue this is a metaphysical Impossibility). Rather is is the fact that non-being cannot give rise to being. It is a metaphysical principle–it’s axiomatic. What reasons are there to reject the metaphysical principle ex nihilio nihil fit?
        
        You’ll have to forgive me if I don’t respond back. I got some catching up to do. I got a certification to study for. (Lots of people fail it :-( so wish me luck.)
      - Mason
        
        My apologies Jarrett, In response to your previous post I accidently spelled you name Jarrent. I type fast, so there are probably a few other mistakes as well. My apologies, but my objections still stand.
guest

The charge of equivocation seems misaimed. Causation is a relationship between a cause X and an effect Y where cause X is either necessary for, or sufficient for, the instantiation of Y, and “beginning to exist” has always been the property of having a time T before which the thing did not exist, whether it has been formed through the interactions of substances or through some other necessary/sufficient conditions. Every instance of causation we observe is part of a subset of the more general category, and every beginning of existence that we observe is part of a subset of the general category above. Craig contends that our observation of causation in the everyday world is evidence that such a causal relation holds in every instance that we observe of something beginning to exist. And, since, even though they are members of the general category in addition to the subset, it’s true that for every instance of something beginning to exist, we observe a cause.

You might argue that, since every member of the general set of things beginning to exist also belongs to the subset of things which are caused to begin to exist through the interaction and rearrangement of material substances, and there are no instances of causation outside this subset, Craig has no grounds to generalize the first premise beyond members of that subset, and maybe this might hold water. However, to accuse him of equivocation between two “very different notions” is a bit ridiculous. In all cases, Craig’s more general category contains the more specific category.

Your argument against creatio ex nihilo is pretty silly, equivocating between the specific conceptual subset of causation, “creatio ex materia,” and the general concept of causation, which calls for only one or both of the kinds of causes which we call sufficient and necessary. It amounts to a redefinition of the latter category as the former. This part is particularly egregious:

“ Dr. Craig believes there was literally nothing at all for God to causally influence. This is no different from admitting that God didn’t causally influence anything. And that is no different from admitting that God didn’t cause anything.”

An action simply has to be a sufficient condition for an effect to act as a cause for that effect. “Causal influence” is simply a subset of the greater conceptual category.
- Mason
  
  “The charge of equivocation seems misaimed. Causation is a relationship between a cause X and an effect Y where cause X is either necessary for, or sufficient for, the instantiation of Y, and “beginning to exist” has always been the property of having a time T before which the thing did not exist, whether it has been formed through the interactions of substances or through some other necessary/sufficient conditions. Every instance of causation we observe is part of a subset of the more general category, and every beginning of existence that we observe is part of a subset of the general category above. Craig contends that our observation of causation in the everyday world is evidence that such a causal relation holds in every instance that we observe of something beginning to exist. And, since, even though they are members of the general category in addition to the subset, it’s true that for every instance of something beginning to exist, we observe a cause.”I didn’t charge that Craig eqiuvocated on the causes, but rather on “begins to exist.” Now, yes, Craig implies “begins to exist” to imply that x exists at time T and not before time T. Okay, but that still misses the equivocation charge. Now I don’t dispute that creatio ex materai has a cause on the macroscopic level, but he nonetheless defend P1 with creatio ex materia and P2 with creatio ex nihilo. So say this is not an equivocation ingores the context in which this “begins to exist” occurs.
  
  We only observe creatio ex materia and have never seen an example fo creatio ex nihilo. Until Craig puts forth evidence to support this, we have no reason for excepting his claim that “The universe began to exist from nothing.” Even if begins to exist ex materia has a cause, creatio ex nihilo has not been shwon to have a cause, and Scott’s argument argues that is impossible. At least, Craig has failed to illustrate creatio ex nihilo possibility via evidence or argument.
  
  So to suggest that Craig is not equivocating is to ignore that he is using creatio ex materai to defend causation, and stealth-fully using it to fallaciosu argue the same for creatio ex nihilo. Thsi si nto only an equivocation, it’s an invalid argument. Or at least it’s a category mistake to give these who different subsets the same empirical meaning without justification beyond given examples of creatio ex materia and then somehow proving creatio ex nihilo.
  
  Scott’s argument does nto equiovcate on creatio ex nihilo, it takes the evidence we have of cuasation in creatio ex materia, and in every example in nature and argues that creatio ex nihilo and causation cannot occur because the necessary conditions of causality, as Craig himself defends in P1 of the KCA via creatio ex materia…..wait what? You are saying that Scott is equivocation on creatio ex materia and creatio ex nihilo, but Craig’s argument does not???”CRAIG, YOU DIDN’T THINK THIS ONE OVER!”
  
  Okay, if it is a fallacy to use the logic fo causation we observe in creatio ex matera to illustrate that creatio ex nihilo is impossible, on grounds of causation principles- then why the hell is it NOT a fallacy to suggest that creatio ex materia and creatio ex nihilo argue subject to cuasation? Craig is the own who is using creatio ex materia to sneak in a defense of creatio ex nihilo, the best you can say about Scott’s argument is that it open us to exposing Craig’s category error and fallacy. Craig wants to argue for causation, fine, no objections there. But you can’t use examples of creatio ex materia to illustrate cuasation for creatio ex nihilo!!! Craig does that, Scott only argues against it!So just like the last failed objection to Scott’s argument; we are left with 2 options:
  1. Dismiss your objection that Scott is equivocating on creatio ex materia (he isn’t, he is actually illsutrating how causation works to illustrate creatio ex nihilo’s unexplained flaw.) and creatio ex nihilo.
  2. Or, you can sit back and wtahc as I count Craig’s equivocation fallacy in his OWN argument on Craig’s same logic!
  
  Go ahead…. make my day.
  
  I already responded to the claim that cuasation implyes cause and effect. This is false. Take an example you like and we observe cause, receiver and effect. Your simplifiying causality as we observe and understand it. Now, you can suggest thet creatio ex nihilo does not work this way- okay fine, but by cutting out the “reciever” part fo causation,you left su will the silly notion that some cause which does do fo effect ANYTHING can effect something….doesn’t sound reasoable to me. But since Craig argues for it, I will await his explanation.
  - guest
    
    “So to suggest that Craig is not equivocating is to ignore that he is using creatio ex materai to defend causation, and stealth-fully using it to fallaciosu argue the same for creatio ex nihilo. Or at least it’s a category mistake to give these who different subsets the same empirical meaning without justification beyond given examples of creatio ex materia and then somehow proving creatio ex nihilo.”
    Uh, no, he’s not using “creatio ex materia” to defend causation. As I said, he’s considering “creatio ex materia” as a subset of the greater category of “cause,” just like his notion of beginning to exist is part of the greater category of both beginning ex nihilo and ex materia. It’s true that for every effect that we observe, we observe either a necessary or a sufficient cause. If every instance of causation is part of this greater set as well as the subset, why ought we think that changing the subset is a relevant difference?
    
    In any case, beginning ex nihilo seems to be unavoidable in the case of the universe. If you think that the universe was assembled from previously existent stuff, then why do you draw a distinction between that “stuff” and the universe? Disputing that the universe began to exist ex nihilo is simply disputing that the universe began to exist at all.
    
    Scott’s objection to creatio ex nihilo is simply a redefinition of “cause.” All instances of causes are also rearrangements of matter. cause means the same thing as rearrangement of matter? That seems invalid. One could at least conceive of something being a sufficient condition for something else that isn’t a rearrangement of matter. If one grants that “cause” means something different from the rearrangement of matter, then what’s the conceptual problem with creatio ex nihilo?
    
    “Now, you can suggest thet creatio ex nihilo does not work this way- okay fine, but by cutting out the “reciever” part fo causation,you left su will the silly notion that some cause which does not effect ANYTHING can effect something.”
    
    Why is it a silly notion? God is not effecting anything if He creates ex nihilo. God is creating an effect without effecting anything, yes, but where’s the contradiction in that?
    - Mason
      
      *Sigh*
      “Uh, no, he’s not using “creatio ex materia” to defend causation. As I said, he’s considering “creatio ex materia” as a subset of the greater category of “cause,” just like his notion of beginning to exist is part of the greater category of both beginning ex nihilo and ex materia.”
      
      “Creatio ex materia as a subset of the greater category “cause.” “.
      Yes, and in that greater category he includes causation in creation ex materia and creation ex nihilo. He then uses these examples of observation of ordinary and scientific experiences, but these are all examples of causation ex materia. (Which is ironic, in that Craig tries to suggest this principle (P1, that is) is based on ex nihilo nihil fit, which raises the question of why he uses examples of creation ex materia to illustrate this un-related point?) In P2, however, Craig uses a defense of creation ex nihilo. And then, he throws both creation ex materia and creation ex nihilo and uses them interchangeably (as “begins to exist.”) in his argument and defenses. That is, by definition, a fallacy of equivocation, and until Craig justifies them as having the same logical structure, it is fair to call it a category error. However Craig uses other phrases to “categorize” these principles to dodge this point is irrelevant until he illustrates that these two principles are of logical equivalent.
      
      Under no context has Craig ever justified creation ex nihilo,, and in fact has admitted he does not know how to explain it. More to the point, he has never illustrated that creation ex materia and creation ex nihilo are of the same logical structure. Quite the contrary, they are not. But, your response to this objection has only made the case for the Kalam worse! Now, Craig is using a subset of “causality” and “begins to exist” to argue that the whole category (including all subsets) must follow the same logic. You have just exposed the Kalam argument to now committing a fallacy of composition as well! You can not use fact about subsets to argue something i true for the whole.
      
      To argue that creation ex matera has a cause, therefore any “begins to exist” (including creation ex nihilo) must also have a cause is a fallacy of composition. More to the point, to suggest that “whatever begins to exist has a cause” is true for the category must be true for all subsets (creation ex materia and creation ex nihilo) commits the fallacy of distribution.
      
      So in total, we have an equivocation fallacy, a category mistake, and either a fallacy of composition or a fallacy of distribution and… and invalid argument (via Scott’s exposed factoring back into KCA). Okay, congratulations, I am not even more skeptical of the KCA now then before you made these responses.
      
      “In any case, beginning ex nihilo seems to be unavoidable in the case of the universe. If you think that the universe was assembled from previously existent stuff, then why do you draw a distinction between that “stuff” and the universe? Disputing that the universe began to exist ex nihilo is simply disputing that the universe began to exist at all.”
      
      How exactly does disputing creation ex nihilo dispute a beginning to the universe? I would love to hear your explanation for this, but I won’t hold my breath. None of our models in cosmology suggest any true notion of “creation ex nihilo.” It seems that modern physicis supports these, but in actuality, these have also shown to not be the case. thsi si true of the now-discarded Hawking- Penrsoe singularity theorem, as well as the BGV Theorem which proposes a quantum nucleation event in the past-fininte, not a “creation from nothingness.” How do we differentiate a universe from the “stuff”…. uh well because the stuff is a subset of the universe which by themselves do not count as the whole, namely the universe.
      
      See, that is how subsets are used properly in logic. Not to use two principles to become equivalent (without justification) and used interchangeably (again, without justification) to mean the same thing. The later here only is a stealthy fallacy being wrapped up in obscurantism.
      
      “Scott’s objection to creatio ex nihilo is simply a redefinition of “cause.” All instances of causes are also rearrangements of matter. cause means the same thing as rearrangement of matter? That seems invalid. One could at least conceive of something being a sufficient condition for something else that isn’t a rearrangement of matter. If one grants that “cause” means something different from the rearrangement of matter, then what’s the conceptual problem with creatio ex nihilo?”
      
      Straw man, straw man, straw man! No, Scott is not arguing that “causes” are rearrangements of matter. You know, typically I would dedicate a whole paragraph or two to digging your objection a lovely grave, but you know what- this kind of dishonesty isn’t even worthy of that! One quote is all I will use to debunk this sad straw man of yours.
      
      “The only way we’ve ever seen causality work is in the form of actions and reactions between stuff which already exists.”
      
      Causality produces a rearrangement of matter, NOT causality *is* a rearrangement of matter. LEARN WHAT YOUR OPPONENT IS SAYING BEFORE YOU ATTEMPT A REBUTTAL!
      
      Scott is argues that creation ex materia is the only context we observe causality in the form of a cause interacting with an effectee which produces a change in things. Since creation ex nihilo argues that nothing exists which can serve as an effectte, you would have a cause affect nothing and still produce something. I’m sorry, but causality is no longer coherent, let alone proven to ever act in this way. But, as that is the basis of creation ex nihilo, then to suggest “God caused the universe to begin existing from nothing.” is false on metaphysical grounds. Since nothing is being interacted with by a cause, nothing should come about from that nothingness, or change within that nothingness, or produce something from that nothingness.
      
      “God is not effecting anything if He creates ex nihilo. God is creating an effect without effecting anything, yes, but where’s the contradiction in that?”
      
      Just looking at those sentences says all that really needs to be said.
      - Mason
        
        “I am not even more skeptical,” change to: “I am now even more skeptical.”
- Mason
  
  Sorry, I type very fast and made a few spelling errors. To save myself from further embarrassment allow em to corret them:Paragraph 1, Change:”So say” to “To say.”Paragraph 2, Change:
  “example fo” to “example of.”
  “not been shwon” to “not been shown.”
  
  Paragraph 3, Change:
  “stealth-fully” to “stealthfully”
  “fallaciosu” to “fallaciously”
  “Thsi si nto” to “This is not”
  
  Paragraph 4, Change:
  “nto” to “not”
  
  Paragraph 5, Change:
  “fo” to “of”
  “argue to subject to cuasation.” to “are both subjection to similar causation principle.” (material added)
  “Craig is the own” to “Craig is the one”
  “cuasation” to “causation”
  
  Paragraph 6, Change:
  “cuasation implyes” to “causation implies”
  “fo causation, you left su will.” to “of causation, you left us with”
  “does do fo.” to “does not effect…”
  “reasoable” to “reasonable”
  
  So many silly mistakes, so little time. Well laugh that off and you still have my same objections. Thanks!
http://www.facebook.com/seraphino Roberto Antonio Valenzuela

How might the anti-Kalam be affected by panentheistic theology, in your opinion, Scott? It seems that would be an effective rebuttal.
http://www.facebook.com/larsen.thomas.h Tom Larsen

Just noticed the following at the bottom of the page:

“The website owner asserts full copyright over the contents of all comments. This means the website owner is permitted to reprint, delete, edit, or otherwise use your comment in any lawful capacity, with or without your knowledge or consent. By submitting a comment on this website, you expressly agree to these terms.”
- http://godlessons.com Godlessons
  
  I think I’ll use that comment.
http://pulse.yahoo.com/_4G55ZVD5EBOUABOIPIUQBSPMYM Christian

Beautiful way of flipping Kalam on its head. Although, I liked the first one better, probably because I understood it from the get go.
Stretmediq

Much better. Congratulations!
http://www.facebook.com/larsen.thomas.h Tom Larsen

Here’s my response.
- Mason
  
  Most of the point your rasied are the exact same straw man attacks Craig raised.
  - http://www.facebook.com/larsen.thomas.h Tom Larsen
    
    Please deal with the actual arguments. What contentions of mine, specifically, do you disagree with, and why?
    - Mason
      
      “Please deal with actual arguments.”Don’t start lying to me, you made that point in response to Scott’s first premise, and I explained why it’s a straw man attack. Don’t tell me that wasn’t an actual argument, you said it- it’s fair game.
      Here’s what you said:
      ”I contest the validity of the first premise, P1, in Clifton’s argument. It states, “Nothing which exists can cause something which does not exist to begin existing ex nihilo,” and seems to be referring to things which do not exist in “actual” reality (as opposed to the metaphysical world of ideas and concepts). Indeed, he seems to affirm that something may “exist” metaphysically without existing in “actual” reality—otherwise it would be meaningless to talk of “something which does not exist”. ”
      
      As I already pointed out to you, this was NOT, REPEAT NOT, Scott’s position at all! Scott is arguing about non-existence, not about metaphysical ideas which do not exist yet are things. You and Craig are making a very opprotunistic attack on Scott’s premise as it uses tricky language to illustrate it’s point and for some reason, after being corrected nobody seems to withdraw their previous objection and still pretend that this was Scott’s point all along. Bullshit!Perhaps Scott’s presmise could be re-fomrulated to say this:”Nothing which exists can cause non-being to become being.”
      
      Hopefully that clears things up.Well Godlessons raised your formulation of an argument for causation ex nihilo. So that will be a good place to start. But there are a few obvious responses to that.
      1. Okay, well first, you have to prove creation ex nihilo is actually possible, before you can make your argument as to what a state of nothingness can or cannot do. Everything you said sounds perfectly reasonable, I’ll give you that much, except you have presented zero evidence that creation ex nihilo is actually possible. So you argument is at best speculation.You even made this straw man attack, totally misrepresenting Scott’s position on the matter of creation ex nihilo. Here’s what you said:”If Clifton affirms P3, then he must abandon P1 on the basis of my earlier argument”*Sigh*, If there is one thing I hate, it’s dishonesty about your opponent’s argument.
      
      Here’s a quote from Scott Cliftion: “For example, a lot of people thought my third premise was a personal endorsement of P2 in original Kalam argument, and it’s not. It’s about forcing the theist into a position of having to choose their battles. So I strongly recommend checking that video out, especially if you have any intention of responding to this.”Clearly, Scott does not believe in creation ex nihilo, as evident in his claim that it’s a “mythical phenomena”, but you and Craig seem to support it, thus he is forcing you to choose whether or not creation ex nihilo is a rational option. I’m curious as to why you didn’t factor in these quotes when you were considering your response above I quoted. So until you provide some sort of evidence that creation ex nihilo is how the universe came into being, i don’t think your argument prove’s your point. And your argument isn’t any solid either. “3. If any thing would begin to exist ex nihilo, wooden tables (for example) would begin to exist ex nihilo.”You later argue that wooden tables do not come into being from nothingnes, to which you conclude that therefore something coming into being from nothing must have a cause? Well your right that tables don’t come into being from nothing, but I think your interpretation that this as proof that therefore creation from nothingness requires a cause is faulty. I don’t see how that follows. I think I could just as easily point out: “Well, maybe that’s because creation ex nihilo is impossible, or it just doesn’t occur.”
      
      So, your entire argument rests on the assumption that creation ex nihio is possible, which you’ve yet to support. 2. Another quote:”Clifton writes that any possible causal interaction must necessarily have three elements: something that exerts causal influence (A); something that is influenced (B); and the result of the interaction between A and B—the effect (C). While we constantly see the A–B–C causal trio in reality, B does not seem to be logically necessary; it is at least possible to conceive of a consistent, coherent A–C world in which, say, a person could think of something and it would appear instantaneously in reality.” Okay, two things: you have not established that B isn’t logically necessary. And yes, again, take any example fo causation in the universe you like and to get an A-B-C relationship, this much we observe in reality. We have zero evidence for this A-C relationship. What connects A to C? If you argue nothing then I can just point out that you’ve then only shown a correlation between A and the effect C, but without B, you haven’t shown the connection necessary to establish causation.But you then said, “It is at least possible to conceive of a consistent, coherent A–C world in which, say, a person could think of something and it would appear instantaneously in reality.” Okay, just because we can conceive of such a version of causality, that does not suggest that it is therefore possible. I can conceive of flying like Superman, does that mean it’s possible for me to fly like Superman? I’d argue, as I’m sure you would, that that is a silly conclusion.3. Okay, last point I want to bring up.
      “On the Christian view, God exerted causal influence on his (metaphysical) conception of the universe, with the resultant effect that the universe began to exist in “actual” reality (externally to the mind), so that:
      A = GodB = God’s conception of the universeC = the universe began to exist in “actual” reality.”
      
      Okay, well that’s nice but two problems. First, your A-B-C relationship seems to argue that God interacted with his concept which then brought about the universe. Yes, I would argue this is silly. Under no contexts have we found this to ever occur, and to suggest God could is at best special pleading. PLus, I don’t seel how C is connected to B. Did God’s concept affect nothingness at all? If no, then why does the Christain worldview defend creation ex nihilo?Craig’s KCA told me in premsie 2 that the universe came into being from nothigness. So is that true of false? If so, then how did God affect nothingness? If no, then why does Craig suggest that it is?
      
      More to the point, what would happen fi we factored that into the KCA?
      
      1. Whatever begins to exist from pre-existing materials has a cause. (Given Craig’s examples of himself beginning to exist and other creation ex matera examples.)
      2. the universe came into being from God’s being.3. Therefore the universe has a cause.4. That cause is God.
      Not only is that argument invalid, but we seen then that P2 begs the question by assuming God exists to later prove God exists.
      - http://www.facebook.com/larsen.thomas.h Tom Larsen
        
        “We’ve only ever seen things begin to exist ex materia–from previous stuff,” Clifton wrote, “so how do we know that if anything ever began to exist ex nihilo, it have a cause? We don’t, we know that things that begin to exit ex materia have a cause. And that’s all we know…. The point I am making is that even if the universe began to exist ex nihilo and God was present for this change in states of affairs, God cannot have been the efficient cause in any logically intelligible way.”
        
        Now, I’ve presented a deductive argument for impossibility of something coming into existence ex nihilo without a cause. The point of my response to Clifton was not to defend the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, but rather to show that it is absurd to claim that something could come into existence—out of nothing—without a cause.
        
        I’m not sure why Clifton chose to present such a complex argument in his attempt to disprove God. If he rejects the possibility of creation ex nihilo, why didn’t he just develop and support the following syllogism?
        
        (1) It is impossible for something to begin to exist ex nihilo.
        (2) God is defined as a being who caused the universe to begin to exist ex nihilo.
        (3) Therefore, the definition of God as a being who caused the universe to begin to exist ex nihilo is incorrect.
        
        Well, why didn’t he? Because if he presented such an argument, he would have to bear the burden of proof in defending the incoherency of creation ex nihilo. But there’s no way he could do so; simply because we’ve never seen it happen within our universe does not mean it could not happen outside the universe, if caused to do so.
      - Mason
        
        Tom, I already pointed out your argument is not compelling, not in the least. You argued that since tables don’t begin to exist ex nihilo that therefore anything which begins to exist ex nihilo must be caused to do so. No, that doesn’t follow. Another, equally valid conclusion could be that creation ex nihilo does not occur. You have so far failed to present evidence that the universe was created from nothing, or anything else for that matter- so why should I accept your argument that creation ex nihilo requires a cause, when you haven’t even proven creation ex nihilo is possible!
        
        Now, if your not trying to defend creation ex nihilo, then your argument is without empirical or philosophical support. You can’t make conclusions from premsies you haven’t defended as valid or even possible. I need at least some reason to think creation ex nihilo is possible before I can accept your logic as to what creation ex nihilo would or woudl not entail.You have to load the gun before you can fire it. If you don’t prove creation ex nihilo, then I have no reason for accepting your conclusion of causality. More to the point, you again, failed to explain hwo this causality would work. How can a cause produce an effectw ithout effecting anything? The best I can say is that, AT BEST, you’ve given us a paradox. Creation ex nihilo doesn’t make much intuitive sense without causality (given your argument), and causality seems to be completely impossible given our understand of non-being and causality (given Scott’s argument). You haven’t debunked his argument, you’ve only made the whole notion paradoxical, at best.If you believe in determined creation ex nihilo, here si what you believe in a nutshell:That a being, God, created the universe from non-being by exerting causal influence on nothing. Indeed, God literally effected nothing and still produced an effect… somehow. How can causality possibly apply without somethign receiving the causal influence? That is the basis of the objection to caused createion ex nihilo.
        “Well, why didn’t he? Because if he presented such an argument, he would have to bear the burden of proof in defending the incoherency of creation ex nihilo. But there’s no way he could do so; simply because we’ve never seen it happen within our universe does not mean it could not happen outside the universe, if caused to do so.”Shifting the burden of proof? Scott is making the case that creation ex nihilo is incoherent- if you disagree by affirming it’s possiblity, you must provide the evidence. Just with the God question, I don’t have to proove God doesn’t exist, you have to prove he does. If creation ex nihilo could occur outside our universe (whatever that means), you must give us some reason to argue that case. Thus far, I fail to see any evidence from you or Craig this is the case. Perhaps we should start there. What evidence do you have for creation ex nihilo?
      - http://www.facebook.com/larsen.thomas.h Tom Larsen
        
        Let me cite Clifton’s argument again.
        
        So remember that syllogism I mentioned in the beginning? The one Dr.
        Craig called “another hopelessly bad objection to the Kalam Argument”?
        Let me wrap this up by taking another look at that with fresh eyes, and
        this time I’ll amend some of my language, just so certain
        satirically-challenged people can’t run a muck with it like last time.
        I’ve already spent this entire video arguing for the first premise. So
        let’s go from there:
        
        P1: Nothing which exists can cause something which does not exist to begin existing ex nihilo.
        P2: Given (1), Anything which begins to exist ex nihilo was not caused to do so by something which exists.
        P3: The universe began to exist ex nihilo.
        P4: Given (2) and (3), the universe was not caused to exist by anything which exists.
        P5: God is defined as a being which caused the universe to begin to exist ex nihilo.
        C1: Given (4) and (5), God does not exist by definition.
        
        Clifton’s argument depends on the premise that “the universe began to exist ex nihilo”. I’m aware that he doesn’t affirm that premise, in which case P4 and C1 collapse. But if he were to affirm (for the sake of argument) P3, his argument still would not follow if my argument—that, if creation ex nihilo were possible, it would have to be caused—is valid. I don’t need to defend the concept of creation out of nothing.
        
        Now, Mason, how would you restate Clifton’s argument so that you agree with it?
      - Mason
        
        “Clifton’s argument depends on the premise that the universe began to exist ex nihilo.”No, really? I failed to notice. (Sarcasm)”I’m aware that he doesn’t affirm that premise, in which case P4 and C1 collapse.”So, if you don’t persoanlly believe in one of your premises, that somehow proves the rest of your argument fails??? Exactly where did you learn logic? You don’t have to believe the universe began ex nihilo to argue that IF it did, this rest of the argment would follow. P4 follows from P2 and P3. Just because I and Scott don’t agree with P3 that does not mean the argument is unsound. It just means that we’ve taken the theists argument for creation ex nihilo and spinned them around.For example, I don’t have to believe the Bible is the worg of God to use fundamentalists own Bible against them, Do I? if you say otherwise, you’d might as well admit your response is utter nonsense.
        
        “But if he were to affirm (for the sake of argument) P3, his argument still would not follow if my argument—that, if creation ex nihilo were possible, it would have to be caused—is valid.”Do you make a habit of wasting my time? Did I not just point out two you, TWICE, you argument’s conclusion si a complete non sequitor? Yes, I did. Just because something does not begin to exist uncaused out of nothing, it does not follow that therefore it is required that something coming from nothing must have a cause. As I pointed out, a better conclusion to your argument is that creation ex nihilo just doesn’t occur, not that it requires a cause.And again, you didn’t respond to my explanation as to why causality could not apply to nothingness. If you defend creation ex nihilo requiring causality, you believe- by definition, that a cause can produce an effect without interacting with or causally effecting anything. We have zero evidence for such a strage sort of causality, yet you for some reason defend this, re-definition of causality despite lacking empirical support, a logical explanatory framework. Sorry, the ball is in your court. Again, you have to defened creation ex nihilo, otherwise your argument’s conclusion does not follow. You argue that since we don’t oberseve uncaused begins to exist from non-being, that therefore we must have caused begisn to exist from non-being. No, again, a better conclusion is that we simply do not have creation from non-being.Stop wasting my time with these repetitive comments that do not respond to my points at or, nor advance your argument any further, and Stop pretending that Scott’s refusal to personally believe in creation ex nihilo somehow negates his whole argument.
      - http://www.facebook.com/larsen.thomas.h Tom Larsen
        
        Check out my clarification above (or here). I’m arguing that there’s a logical contradiction between P1 and P3 in Clifton’s argument.
      - Mason
        
        *Sigh*P1. Nothign which exists can cause somethign which does not exist to begin existing ex nihilo.P3. The universe began to exist ex nihilo.There is not contradicton here. P1 simply states that, if something did begin to exist ex nihilo (just for the sake of argument) it would not be causally determined. Scott’s video explains the metaphysics beind it. P3 simply agrees with P2 of Craig’s KCA (ONLY for the sake of argument, not as a personaly endorsement of that claim).
        
        Now, I must ask where you find this invisble contradiction.Is it because of your argument for a causally determined creation ex nihilo. Please, as I already pointed out, your argument’s conclusion is a non sequitor. why are you still parading your argument around when it’s cocnlusion does not even follow from the premises? How exactly does the fact that tables not beginning to exist from nothing uncaused prove that other things can begin to exist from nothing and were caused to do so? We could also point out a better conclusion is that creation ex nihilo is impossible within our universe.You have yet to respond to my responses. if you believe in causally determing, creation ex nihilo- you beleive in this: “god caused the universe to begin to exist without effecting anything, literally nothing was effected yet an effect was prodcued.”Please explain how cause and effect relationships would be applicable to nothingness. Are you trying to tell me nothingness has “things” which can be effected? Can nothingness be effected??? You have yet to explain how causation ex nihilo would occur, you’ve ignored how causation empirically observed to work, and then you just claim,”:causation must apply to ex nihilo.”If I may, bold statements coming from someone who has yet to present evidence creation ex nihilo is possible, or occurs, that the universe began from nothingness (if you believe in the KCA), adn failed to give any explanatory accounts for your argument.
        
        I’ve said these responses time and times again. Please stop wasting my time by repeating yourself.
      - http://www.facebook.com/larsen.thomas.h Tom Larsen
        
        Mason, I don’t have to show that creation ex nihilo happened. I simply need to show that Clifton’s argument is logically contradictory.
        
        Let’s take P1 and P3 of his argument:
        
        P3: The universe began to exist ex nihilo.
        P1: Nothing which exists can cause something which does not exist to begin existing ex nihilo.
        
        Now, if we accept P3 for the sake of argument, then, by P1, the universe cannot have been caused to exist by something that exists. But I think such a conclusion is absurd: if something could begin to exist out of nothing, I argued, it would require a cause. So either P1 or P3 must be invalid; but the conclusion of Clifton’s argument, C1, depends on these premises. If P1 is valid, C1 does not follow from the premises, because P3 must be false; or, if P3 is valid, C1 does not follow from the premises, because P1 must be false.
        
        Does that clarify?
      - Mason
        
        And I have already responded to your argument by pointing out that your conclusion is a non sequitor. Are you seriously telling me that the mere fact that we do not observe thting coming into being, uncaused out of nothing proves that things must come into being, caused, out of nothing? That’s an absurd conclusion! A better conclusion would be that creation ex nihilo does not occur.You insist that you do not have to defend creation ex nihilo. Okay, then your argument is entirely without empirical or philosophical support.
        
        Your have failed to point out tany flaws in Scott’s argument because your argument fails. More to the point, you still have yet to respond to my demand for an explanation. If you argue that creation ex nihilo must require a cause, then you must accept this burden: proving this, your problem is that the entire notion of causation, as empirically observed, is contrary to your belief in causation ex nihilo. You believe, that God created the universe, WITHOUT causally effecting anything. Literally nothing was effected and yet an effect still occured. HOW? That’s completely and utterly absurd. i would argue it’s a contradiction for a cause to produce and effectw ithout anything being causally influenced.Please stop repeating your inadequate objection to Scott’s argument. I can’t stand reading your repritive argument I don’t need explained again and agian. i get your point, problem is, your argument rests on two unexplained points.1. Creation ex nihilo as physically possible.
        2. Causality remains unexplained in creation ex nihilo situations.
        
        Sorry, until you respond to these two points, Scott’s objection mainatins empirical support and no inconsistencies (despite your mis-use of a contradiction). Please, STOP WASTING MY TIME!!!!
      - http://www.facebook.com/larsen.thomas.h Tom Larsen
        
        (1) Clifton’s argument depends on P3, “The universe began to exist ex nihilo.”
        
        (2) He is granting, for the sake of argument, that creation ex nihilo is possible.
        
        (3) I don’t need to defend Clifton’s contention.
        
        (4) It is inconceivable, and logically impossible, that something could begin to exist out of nothing without a cause: if P3 is true, and creation ex nihilo is possible, then P1 would fail. (If something could begin to exist ex nihilo, it would have to be caused to do so.) As a consequence, C1 would not follow from the premises.
        
        (5) If it is not possible for something to begin to exist ex nihilo, then C1 would not follow from the premises: P3 would be incorrect.
        
        Feel free not to reply.
      - Anonymous
        
        “It is inconceivable, and logically impossible, that something could begin to exist out of nothing without a cause”
        I assume that your original response to Scott justifies this statement? I haven’t read it because I am not qualified to argue logic, and so would be unlikely to fully understand it, I’m just trying to make sure that you aren’t just assuming that this is a self-evident truth, as I believe the whole point of Scott’s essay was that it isn’t.
      - Mason
        
        1. No, really? When did you just realize?
        2. Yes, but only for the sake of argument.
        3. Bullshit, if you don’t then your OWN argument lacks any sort fo empirical support.
        4. NO! Your argument’s conclsuion does not follow from the premises. You still refuse to explain causation ex nihilo, despite the contradiction in causation as empirically observed and “nothingness.”
        5. Yes!, but then, so would P2 of the KCA!!!
        
        But hey, good job repeating yourself for the fifth time, wasting my time with your already debunked objections. You know, your argument, in all honesty, are really bad ones, and contiunally repeating them will not magically make your arguments true.
      - http://www.facebook.com/larsen.thomas.h Tom Larsen
        
        To clarify, I’m not arguing that creation ex nihilo is possible (although I don’t think we have any good reasons to deny its possibility: to do so would be a fallacy of composition). Rather, I’m arguing that Clifton’s P1 and P3 are logically contradictory. If P3 is true, and the universe did begin to exist out of nothing, then P1 must be false: everything that begins to exist ex nihilo must be caused to do so. But if P1 is true, then P3 cannot be true: no thing could possibly begin to exist ex nihilo without a cause. Clifton’s argument depends on the validity of P1 and P3.
        
        As evidence in favour of creation ex nihilo, I would cite the impossibility of an actually infinite causal chain: but the contention that creation ex nihilo is possible is not really part of my original argument.
      - http://www.facebook.com/larsen.thomas.h Tom Larsen
        
        Note that if Clifton fails to affirm P3, his whole argument tumbles down! Or am I just wasting my time dealing with a syllogism that he doesn’t really support?
      - Mason
        
        Tom, Clifton does not PERSONALLY affirm P3, but his argument does. As he said, he is forcing theists to choose whether or not creation ex nihilo is a viable option.
        
        Scott does not affirm creation ex nihilo, he only defend it to spin Craig’s argument around.
        
        If you want to keep this straw man objection alive, by all means go ahead. Your not going to convince anyone who actually understands what Scott is saying here.
  - http://www.facebook.com/larsen.thomas.h Tom Larsen
    
    What arguments of mine do you disagree with, and why?
  - Mason
    
    Scott isn’t arguing that there existing non-existing beings, he is only refering to non-being.
- http://godlessons.com Godlessons
  
  1. If some thing could begin to exist ex nihilo without a cause, any thing could begin to exist ex nihilo without a cause. (“Nothing” cannot discriminate between objects.)
  
  2. If any thing could begin to exist ex nihilo without a cause, any thing would begin to exist ex nihilo. (“Nothing” cannot discriminate between times or places.)
  
  3. If any thing would begin to exist ex nihilo, wooden tables (for example) would begin to exist ex nihilo.But wooden tables (for example) do not begin to exist ex nihilo.
  
  4. Therefore, it cannot be true that some thing could begin to exist ex nihilo without a cause.
  
  5. Therefore, if some thing were to begin to exist ex nihilo, it would have a cause.
  
  I don’t have the time right now to do a more in depth dissection, but I wouldn’t say this is an argument against Scott, since he also suggests that nothing has begun to exist ex nihilo.
  
  Add to your argument his premise 1, which in essence says that something can’t be affected unless it exists, so if nothing existed it wouldn’t be able to be affected in order to start to exist in the first place. When you do that, you have created a very good argument that nothing began to exist ex nihilo.
- http://godlessons.com Godlessons
  
  Okay, I have a little time now to deal with this better.
  
  1. If some thing could begin to exist ex nihilo without a cause, any thing could begin to exist ex nihilo without a cause. (“Nothing” cannot discriminate between objects.)
  
  Scott nowhere suggests that anything can begin to exist ex nihilo. In fact, that’s essentially his argument that nothing can begin to exist ex nihilo, although he’s specifically attacking creation ex nihilo.
  
  2. If any thing could begin to exist ex nihilo without a cause, any thing would begin to exist ex nihilo. (“Nothing” cannot discriminate between times or places.)
  
  I don’t see how this works. Even if something could begin to exist ex nihilo without cause, it doesn’t follow that anything could begin to exist without cause. Tables are complex objects that require matter in a certain form. As an example, if only simple forms of matter can begin to exist without cause, tables would be impossible. There is no way to know what could possibly begin to exist without cause, if anything.
  
  3. If any thing would begin to exist ex nihilo, wooden tables (for example) would begin to exist ex nihilo.But wooden tables (for example) do not begin to exist ex nihilo.
  
  See the objection to 2.
  
  Needless to say, your argument is extremely porous. I imagine that you find it somewhat compelling, but without meaning to offend, I find it worthless.
  - http://www.facebook.com/larsen.thomas.h Tom Larsen
    
    I don’t buy your point about simple things beginning to exist out of nothing without a cause, for three reasons. First, true “Nothing”, because it is (by definition) the lack of all properties, could not possibly discriminate between simple objects and complex objects. Second, your distinction between simple objects and complex objects seems to be arbitrary. Third, the universe is far more complex than a mere table.
    
    Now, it’s important to note that the primary thrust of my response to Clifton was not that creation ex nihilo is possible, but rather than creation ex nihilo, if it could occur, would require a cause in the same way that we know creation ex materia does. Let’s be clear: Clifton’s argument, as he presented it, relies on the possibility of creation ex nihilo. If he denies the very possibility of creation out of nothing (and I don’t think he has good reasons to do so), why did he not present the following argument?
    
    (1) It is impossible for something to begin to exist ex nihilo.
    (2) God is defined as a being who caused the universe to begin to exist ex nihilo.
    (3) Therefore, the definition of God as a being who caused the universe to begin to exist ex nihilo is incorrect.
    - http://godlessons.com Godlessons
      
      Don’t buy it all you want. I’m not married to it. I’m simply saying that if something began to exist out of nothing, it wouldn’t be anything complex. Further, even if it were possible for it to be complex, it wouldn’t be likely that something complex would come to exist out of nothing.
      
      Let’s put it this way. If there were an infinite number of possibilities that something could exist, that doesn’t make it likely. If an infinite number of possibilities existed, that means that an infinite number of simple possibilities is just as possible as an infinite number of complex possibilities. Infinites are never equal though. I could have an infinite number of infinite possibilities, and you could have 2 infinite numbers of infinite possibilities and there would still be an infinite number of possibilities between the two.
      
      The chances of any single possibility happening is infinite to one, which means that there are an infinite number of ways you could be wrong, but only one that you could be right.
      
      In other words, the chances of a table coming out of nothing are infinitesimal.
      
      To give you an idea of what infinitesimal means, 1 – 0.999… (9 repeating) is an infinitesimal. 0.333…(3 repeating) is 1/3 of 0.999… That means that 1/’3 * 3 is the same number as 0.999… So, 1/3 * 3 = 1. 1 – 1 = 0. Therefore, infinitesimally small is the same as zero. That is the chances of a table being created out of nothing.
      - http://www.facebook.com/larsen.thomas.h Tom Larsen
        
        I’m not sure where you’re getting these probabilities from. You asserted, “Even if something could begin to exist ex nihilo without cause, it doesn’t follow that anything could begin to exist without cause.” Yes, it does follow. “Nothing” can’t discriminate between objects. You haven’t dealt with that issue.
      - http://godlessons.com Godlessons
        
        Okay, I get hydrogen and oxygen existing without cause. At that point, the only thing that exists is water. Suddenly, metalic sodium tries to exist. Well, in a universe with only water, sodium can’t exist in metalic form. That means that even as simple as sodium is, it can’t exist in a universe where only water exists.
        
        Let’s say that the only place that something comes from nothing is in a black hole. No matter can exist as matter in a black hole, which means that tables can’t begin to exist in a black hole.
        
        What if the creation of the matter we have in the universe plugged a hole, and no further matter can be created? That means that even if something could be created from nothing, there is no possibility that tables can come into existence.
        
        There are an infinite number of ways to show your argument isn’t a proof of any sort. All you have done is create a complicated way to be wrong.
      - http://www.facebook.com/larsen.thomas.h Tom Larsen
        
        “Godlessons”, you haven’t refuted my argument. You seem to be of the opinion that “Nothing” has certain laws and properties; but philosophers recognise that true “Nothing” is, by definition, the lack of all laws and properties. Since “Nothing” can’t discriminate between objects, times, or places, it seems plausible to me that, if something could come uncaused out of nothing, all kinds of things (indeed, all possible things) would come uncaused out of nothing all the time. But this is plainly absurd. Ironically, if this were the case, then God (if it is even possible for him to exist) would have come uncaused out of nothing an eternity ago. Frankly, I think you’re defending an impossible and implausible contention.
      - http://godlessons.com Godlessons
        
        No, I am of the opinion that once nothing becomes something the something has certain laws. Once something exists, there is no longer nothing from which your tables could spring forth.
        
        Further, you don’t understand infinities. You seem to think that given an infinite number of possibilities that a table would eventually come out of nowhere. The problem with infinites is that they are infinite. You could limit the field of things that can come out of nothing to just pieces of wood, and there are an infinite number of ways that wood can be arranged that would not be a table.
        
        You seem to think I am putting this out as a probability. I am and I’m not. I’m simply saying that you could arrange matter in different configurations infinitely and you would still be able to never come up with something remotely resembling anything man made. The numbers were mostly to show you that infinitesimals are equal to the nearest number to them. In the case of any particular thing happening, the chances are exactly zero if you consider infinite possibilities.
        
        it seems plausible to me that, if something could come uncaused out of nothing, all kinds of things (indeed, all possible things) would come uncaused out of nothing all the time.
        
        This is the exact kind of thinking I have been showing you is wrong. Let’s imagine a random number generator that chooses a number from the set of all real numbers. How would you calculate the probability that the random number generator would spit out a 1 at any given time? You would take 1 and divide it by the numbers that are not 1. Since the number of numbers that are not 1 is infinite, we are speaking about an infinitesimally small number. Since infinitesimals are equal to the nearest integer to them, the chance of that random number spittng out a 1 is zero.
        
        You probably say that we’re not talking about a single instance though, so the chances, instead of being infinitesimally small are actually 1 to 1. You would be wrong though. Let’s say our random number generator could never generate the same number twice, and it sits there generating these numbers infinitely. Are the chances now absolute that eventually a 1 will come out? No. The reason is because every time you generate a number you never lessen the number of possibilities other than 1. That means that the chances are always infinitely small that a 1 will be created, which means that the chances are actually zero that a 1 will be created.
        
        I’m not sure how to better explain it to you.
      - http://www.facebook.com/larsen.thomas.h Tom Larsen
        
        “Further, you don’t understand infinities. You seem to think that
        given an infinite number of possibilities that a table would eventually
        come out of nowhere.”
        
        On your view, “Godlessons”, it’s infinitely more probable that
        something other than the universe would have come into existence
        uncaused out of nothing, forever “plugging” “Nothing” and preventing the
        universe from ever being created.
        
        Now, to present my original argument: if some thing could begin to exist out of nothing without a cause, then any thing could begin to exist out of nothing without a cause. But if some thing could begin to exist out of nothing without a cause, that would imply that Pr (“some thing beginning to exist out of nothing without a cause”) > 0. Now, I think that Pr (“some thing beginning to exist out of nothing without a cause”) = 0; I’m not sure whether you agree with me on that or not. Perhaps we are not dealing with the same definition of “Nothing” here; could you please explain what you mean by it?
        
        If the universe did begin to exist out of nothing without a cause, that would imply that Pr (“some thing—the universe—beginning to exist out of nothing without a cause”) > 0. And, since “Nothing” can’t discriminate between objects, the necessarily implication would be that Pr (“any thing beginning to exist out of nothing without a cause”) > 0.
        
        Out of interest, do you defend creation out of nothing, by nothing, and for nothing, or an eternal universe? If you don’t affirm a beginning of the universe ex nihilo, we might as well stop beating a dead horse.
      - http://godlessons.com Godlessons
        
        I’ll go at your last thing first. I don’t affirm a beginning of the universe ex nihilo, and neither does Scott. I thought that was stated clearly in my first objection to your argument. I don’t think that means you can dismiss what I’m saying simply because I don’t accept ex nihilo beginnings. I am fully willing to assume, for the sake of argument, that things can pop into existence caused or uncaused, which is what I have been doing.
        
        If things can come into existence out of nothing, any particular thing coming into existence out of nothing has a probability of zero if there are an infinite number of possibilities. That means even universes. So, yes, the probability of a universe coming from nothing is zero, but since one exists, if it came out of nothing, the probability of it happening becomes 1:1.
        
        Now, if there were a finite number of things that could pop into existence, let’s say 10, the chances of each one of those things popping into existence over an infinite number of iterations is 1:1. This is actually for the same reason as I use for the probability of any specific thing out of an infinite number of things popping into existence being zero. Infinitesimals.
        
        To explain it closer to your terms, if something can come from nothing without a cause, its possibility is greater than zero. Any thing beginning to exist out of nothing without a cause could possibly be greater than zero as well, although that part of things seems a bit hard to support, since nothing has no properties by which to say something is and isn’t possible.
        
        My issue is mainly with two things you have said. First of all, saying that tables should just pop into existence randomly in essence has a problem. Once something exists, nothing no longer exists. Tables randomly popping into existence could not ever be truly ex nihilo subsequent to existence of anything. That means that the idea of any thing beginning to exist without cause is mitigated by the fact that only certain types of things can exist in the universe once it exists. So, although nothing may not be able to discriminate, the universe can discriminate by not allowing incompatible things to be injected into it out of nothing.
        
        This creates an interesting problem for us in probability land. If nothing can’t discriminate, but something can, that means that we no longer have an infinite number of iterations of what can possibly come out of nothing. We have 1 possibility. That means that beginning to exist out of nothing can only happen once, and whatever arises has a possibility of 100%, since it is what exists.
        
        Second, I’m not sure you have caught on to the fact that an infinite number of possibilities doesn’t necessarily cover all possibilities. There are an infinite number of numbers between 1 and 2 for example. The possibilities could extend from 1 to 100, but if the infinite increment only extends between 1 and 2, you will never ever produce a 3. Because of this, the idea of tables, or any other specific thing popping into existence is basically impossible, which means that you can’t use the lack of tables popping into existence as evidence that things can’t come from nothing without cause.
        
        Anyway, I hope I’m being clear.
- Greg Kuhlmann
  
  The main problem with your response is point #4:
  
  “But wooden tables (for example) do not begin to exist ex nihilo.”
  
  Your counter-argument is based on a statement of fact about reality. But facts can only be used to refute the premises of an argument. That approach could never do any damage to the logical soundness of the argument.
  
  Consider the following argument:
  
  1. If frogs are green, then vampires like coffee.
  2. Frogs are green.
  3. From (1) and (2) vampires like coffee.
  
  This argument is logically sound. The observation that vampires don’t actually exist is irrelevant to the soundness. It could, however, be used to refute premise 1.
  
  So, if you want to take down Scott’s argument, you need to point out the flaw in the logic without appealing to observations of reality. Or you need to pick a premise that you think is false and refute that.
  
  Otherwise, all you’re saying is that Scott’s premises are inconsistent with reality. And Scott would have no problem agreeing with you.
  - http://www.facebook.com/larsen.thomas.h Tom Larsen
    
    The trouble with the argument:
    
    1. If frogs are green, then vampires like coffee.
    2. Frogs are green.
    3. From (1) and (2) vampires like coffee.
    
    is that “vampires like coffee” does not follow logically from “frogs are green”. But I contend that my statement about reality—”But wooden tables (for example) do not begin to exist ex nihilo”—contradicts something that we necessarily would expect to observe in reality if things could, indeed, pop uncaused out of nothing: namely, that anything and everything would pop uncaused out of nothing in every place and every time.
    
    Out of interest, do you think I’ve made a fallacious assumption in my argument? If so, let me know, and I’ll try to address it.
    - Greg Kuhlmann
      
      Your attack on my frog argument is good. You cite evidence to take down premise 1. That is perfectly acceptable. However, notice what you didn’t do. You didn’t call into question the logical structure of the argument, which is:
      
      1. If X then Y
      2. X
      3. From (1) and (2), Y
      
      Nothing you can say about X’s or Y’s would ever make this argument logically unsound. It could only ever make one or more of the premises false. The logic works regardless of what you substitute for X or Y.
      
      Now your problem is that you don’t follow these rules in your attack on Scott’s argument.
      
      You have two choices:
      1) Show that Scott’s argument is logically unsound (using logic alone)
      2) Show that that one or more of his premises is false (using evidence)
      
      Scott is saying that his argument is logically valid, and challenges you to try approach (1). At the same time, he’ll grant you that approach (2) will probably work, but to do so, you will have to take down a premise which is required by the original KCA, in which case Scott is perfectly happy to see that happen.
      
      But rather than taking either of those approaches, you’re breaking the rules. You’re trying to achieve goal #1 using evidence, which could only ever achieve goal #2.
      
      More specifically, you are trying to show that the set (P1, P3) is logically inconsistent. And if you succeeded at that, you would achieve goal #1, and Scott would be in trouble. However, your argument just shows that the set (P1,P3,P*) is logically inconsistent, where P* is “wooden tables don’t magically appeat”. That’s not the same thing! You can’t just introduce new premises to an argument, show that it is now inconsistent, and declare the original argument logically unsound.
      
      To show that this is the case, imagine that you observed that “If Y then not X” is true in reality. You then add that to the argument at the top, and suddenly the argument is no longer logically sound. So what? That says nothing about the logically soundness of the original argument (which we already established is sound).
      
      Do you think Scott’s argument is logically unsound? If so, show where the logical symbol manipulation fails. Or do you think that one or more of his premises is incorrect? If so, state which ones are incorrect and provide evidence. Just don’t try mixing the two together, because it doesn’t work.
      - http://www.facebook.com/larsen.thomas.h Tom Larsen
        
        You’re right – I wasn’t very clear. I think it’s impossible that, if something could begin to exist out of nothing, it could do so without a cause: call this premise P*; and then {P1, P3, P*} is a logically inconsistent set. If something could begin to exist out of nothing, P1 would be false; if not, P3 would be false. In other words, I am arguing that either premise P1 or P3 of Clifton’s argument is invalid.
      - Greg Kuhlmann
        
        In that case, you can probably see why your response isn’t threatening. Sure, P1 or P3 is false. Another way to say that is: if P1 is true then P3 is false. And yet another way to say it is: if P1 is true, then the original KCA fails. P1 looks true to me, so I guess that the original KCA fails.
      - http://www.facebook.com/larsen.thomas.h Tom Larsen
        
        I think P1 must be false if an infinite causal chain cannot exist in reality and something cannot come uncaused out of nothing. To discuss the topic fully, however, we’d need to agree on definitions of the universe, time, and so on.
      - http://godlessons.com Godlessons
        
        If the universe began to exist, that means time and space began to exist at one point. If time began to exist at the beginning of the universe, how would there be the possibility of a cause, since it must logically exist prior in time, but to exist prior in time, time must have existed.
        
        It would seem like your reasoning behind requiring P1 to be false is false, therefore you can accept P1.
John C.

I still don’t see the problem here.

Craig is saying:

1. WHATEVER begins to exist… be it ex nihilo or ex materia….,will have a cause.

2. The universe began to exist (ex nihilo, according to Craigs scientific evidence)

3. Therefore it has a cause.

How is he conflating when the premise allows for BOTH kinds of beginnings?
- John C.
  
  Here’s what I think is going on..
  
  Craig has an ARGUMENT. (The Kalam)
  
  And Craig has a RESPONSE. (“I began to exist”)
  
  So, it’s up to us to figure out which one Scott is actually addressing.
  
  In the Kalam ARGUMENT, nowhere do we find a premise about how “Craig began to exist”, or anything like that.
  
  However, in Craigs RESPONSE to the claim, “Nothing begins to exist.” we DO find Craig saying that HE began to exist, as a counter example. But this is not the Kalam argument itself. This is just an off the cuff response that Craig made to a claim.
  
  So, in his RESPONSE he is conflating. But in his ARGUMENT he is not.
  
  This is because if by the claim, “Nothing begins to exist”, what the atheist id actually meaning is that nothing has begun to exist in the literal sense ex nihilo, then Craigs response doesn’t suffice. Craig is offering up a rearrangement ex materia as a counter example to a demand for an example of creatio ex nihilo. It is there that we find the conflation.
  
  But again, does Scott wish to seek victory by camping out on an off the cuff RESPONSE by Craig, or by dealing with Craig’s actual ARGUMENT?
  
  One of these is the Kalam argument. And one is not.
  
  Let’s not CONFLATE the two, and call it a victory.
  
  And I wanted to make a quick point in how Craig *justifies*
  P1.
  
  He justifies it by invoking the metaphysical first principle, “Out of nothing, nothing comes”. He DOESN’T justify P1 by saying that “He began to exist”, although that example is certainly harmonious with the principle.
  
  If you REALLY want to attack P1, take the intellectual risk of attacking his uncontroversial first principle, not his statement about how he began to exist. Make up your own metaphysical principle that says something like, things CAN come from literal nothingness, without a cause, and without an explanation.
- Ian L.
  
  If that’s how you word P1, then the argument does indeed become valid again. However, you then no longer have any justification for P1. This is because, in justifying P1, Dr. Craig always–whether in his book or in his lectures and debates–refer to things that begin to exist ex materia, not ex nihilo. His own existence is one of the examples he often gives. So, while you could justify the premise that everything that begins to exist ex materia has a cause, you have no such justification for the premise that everything that begins to exist ex nihilo has a cause; in fact, Scott explicitly argues that the opposite is the case; nothing which begins to exist ex nihilo can possibly have a cause. Now, do you have a justification of P1? Because you’d be the first.
  
  In any case, P1 is shaky even when it talks about ex materia. After all, causality does not apply at the quantum level, at least not that we’ve seen. We don’t know whether quantum transitions qualify as anything beginning to exist ex nihilo or ex materia, but I can anticipate what Scott would say: If they do begin to exist ex nihilo, they therefore cannot have been caused to do so.
  
  As for P2, you claim that Dr. Craig has “scientific evidence” that the universe began to exist ex nihilo. But there’s no evidence the “universe” (in the sense of all there is) began to exist, period, much less that it began to exist ex nihilo. When challenged on this, Dr. Craig always falls back on Zeno’s Paradox. Ignoring how riddled with fallacy that is, he still continues to present the Big Bang theory as his first line of justification, then to abandon it when challenged. I, for one, find that remarkably disingenuous.
  
  ~Ian
  - John C.
    
    Justification? I dont understand this. Basically youre saying, “Prove it.”
    
    Well, its certainly more PLAUSIBLE than its negation, especially if we arent in a position of being able to “prove” things.Plus, what good reason do we have to abandon it, on the “ex nihilo” level?To win an argument?
    - Ian L.
      
      Actually, yeah, I was saying “Prove it,” with the proviso that “prove” in this case is in the sense of “demonstrate” rather than the sense of “demonstrate with 100% certainty.”
      
      However, let’s examine the plausibility of P1, when applied to ex nihilo causation. In fact, Scott’s argument seeks to demonstrate exactly the opposite; that, although everything that begins to exist ex materia has a cause (and that’s not necessarily true anyway), when applying it to ex nihilo causation, the game has changed.
      
      The argument is essentially this: in any definition of causality extant in philosophy, and in every instance of causation observed, we have three things:
      
      i: That which is “doing the causing,” or the “affecter;”
      ii: That which is “being caused,” or the “affected”, and;
      iii: That which results from the causal interaction, or the “effect”.
      
      Now, in ex nihilo causation, we–by definition–are lacking (ii), which is an essential part of any causal interaction (you know, the part where something gets causally influenced?).
      
      I’m assuming, of course, that you’ve read the article, and therefore already know that this is Scott’s line of reasoning. You seem less concerned, however, with how that undermines your claim of having the more plausible premise. Given that ex nihilo causation is self-contradictory (insofar as no extant definition of causality exists which lacks (ii)), P1 of Kalam is actually *less* plausible than its negation, when applied to ex nihilo beginnings.
      
      ~Ian
      
      P.S. Neither the justification of P1 when it comes to ex nihilo causation, nor even its justification when it comes to causality, period, were the only point I made in my post. While I’m perfectly willing to focus on this point, I did make two other juicy points in my post, and you’re more than welcome to respond to them, if you so desire.

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