The Future Discussion of Causation

by Noah Congelliere, Guest Blogger on July 16, 2011

In my last blog post, entitled “Addressing Scott Clifton’s Response to the Kalam Argument”, I presented what I felt were problematic issues with Scott’s response to William Lane Craig on the first premise of the Kalam Cosmological Argument. However, after submitting the blog post I realized that there were a couple things I misunderstood about what exactly Scott was arguing. After speaking with Scott privately, I felt like we clarified much of where I went wrong in my response. My fellow Tuesday Afternooners also felt compelled to persuade me of my errors in the comment section of my blog post; however there was ironically just as much confusion as to what I was arguing. Because of this, I want to take a few moments to clarify some things and move forward into a specific set of issues that Scott and I feel are more central to our disagreement.

The goal of the initial portion of my last blog post was to show that even on an ex materia view of causality, things still begin to exist. I used the example of a cell phone being produced and I did so under the assumption that Scott’s belief was that things do not begin to exist on an ex materia view of causality and instead, matter is simply rearranged. However, Scott conveyed to me that this is not his view. He actually does believe that things begin to exist on an ex materia view of causality and so I was essentially arguing about something he already agreed with. Before I discuss what Scott and I agreed should be the main topics of disagreement between us, I want to better explain what my goal was in my last blog post. I was attempting to undercut Scott’s position by pointing to flaws like his conflating of physics with metaphysics, the contradictory nature of taking the phrase “things which don’t exist” literally, and what I felt was too large of an investment in induction. Essentially, my aim was to undercut his conclusion by showing that there were problems with how he got there. That was all. My goal was not to provide an overarching rebuttal of his view, but rather to simply cast doubt on it.

I would now like to discuss two pivotal issues concerning causality. The first is to ponder the question “what is a cause?” and then apply that explanation to God when we speak of God “causing” the universe to begin to exist ex nihilo. What I would like to do is see if there’s coherence there. I want to offer a description of what it means to say God caused the universe to begin to exist. There are many ways we can talk about this and before I offer a somewhat mediocre conception, I want to say that this is all somewhat tentative for me. What I’m about to offer, I’m fairly tentative about so if it ends up being the case that what I offer here fails in some way, I take it as my responsibility to go back to the drawing board and try again. I leave it all up to you to decide if that needs to be the case.

In thinking about this issue, I found myself wanting to travel one of two roads. A part of me felt that what I needed to do was offer an extremely nuanced, airbrushed conception of what it is to be a cause of something; something similar to an Aristotelian model, where layers of definition are laid out and exhausted. In trying to do this, I realized very quickly that I’m no Aristotle! So instead, what I would like to do is offer a more flatfooted proposal of what it means for God to cause the universe to begin to exist. What I mean when I say “God caused the universe to begin existing” is something like “God actualized his will for there to be a universe” (given the universe to mean the sum total of all space-time). God in this case would be the affector, God’s will would be the affected, and the universe would be the effect. So God affects his will in such a way that it becomes actualized and that actualization produces the universe as the effect. Going back to Aristotle, God in this case would be the efficient cause, God’s will is the material cause (because remember a material cause does not have to literally be matter, it just has to be the factor or constituent that creates the whole). So the efficient cause is God, the material cause is God’s will and the result is the universe. This is just a rough idea. I know this is going to be heavily critiqued; I welcome it and hope that I can work with this conception in a way that is satisfying. If it doesn’t cut it, I’ll start over and see if I can bring to the table something that does.

The second topic that Scott and I agreed to build a conversation on concerns two conflicting models of causality. Namely, the notions of “beginning to exist uncaused” and “beginning to exist ex nihilo”. The first premise of the Kalam Cosmological Argument is generally supported by highlighting the absurdity of something beginning to exist uncaused and in its place is the idea of something coming into existence and being caused to do so, albeit from nothing (or ex nihilo). Now Scott believes that “begins to exist uncaused” is less problematic, more parsimonious and less ad hoc than “begins to exist ex nihilo”. I disagree. Something beginning to exist uncaused is not in my view illogical or incoherent per se but I do think it’s absurd. It’s absurd because a necessary component for something beginning to exist, a metaphysical requirement insofar as I can intuit, (whether it be via ex materia or ex nihilo means) is in fact a cause. At least some form of a cause. Without it, one can’t even ask what the initiating circumstances look like for a thing to come into existence on this view because there are no initiating circumstances. There are no causal antecedents of any form. I fail to see how acausal beginnings could ever be less problematic than ex nihilo causality because at least with ex nihilo causality you still have something there doing the causing. You still have the igniting of a causal chain of events from which we can discuss a possible break in the chain as a liability. We still have something that begins a causal chain.

What ex nihilo causality potentially lacks is a material component, something affected to bring about an effect (I say potentially because I just put forth a model of ex nihilo causality that consists of a material cause). So with “begins to exist ex nihilo”, you still have a cause; you just lack perhaps a material constituent that is being affected. But with “begins to exist uncaused” you lack not only a material constituent that plays a causal part in the production of an effect, but you lack any antecedent that does any work at all. You lack all causal potentiality so on this view you lack not only what is lacking on an ex nihilo model of causation but you lack further things, like the very idea of any antecedent conditions. So the criticism lodged at the proponent of ex nihilo causality is equally applicable to the proponent of the acausal model, except much worse. .

I look forward to Scott’s response.

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Tagged as: Apologetics, argument, atheism, atheism vs. theism, Big Bang Cosmology, Christianity, Debate, more

Andy

Wouldn’t any materialist simply deny the fact that efficient causes are capable of causing anything at all? Or, I suppose, a materialist could deny that efficient causes exist at all. (though perhaps “deny” is too strong a word – I’d say that we lack any reason to think that efficient causes exist).

That might be a pretty major issue in this argument.
theowarner

Felt compelled?
- Noah Congelliere
  
  felt inspired!
IzzyFalco

In the discussion of parsimony, I think you’re assuming that efficient and material causes can occur separately, or that one can occur without the other. We have no reason to assume this. Indeed if we hold that everything with an efficient cause has a material cause and think the universe has no material cause, we get a lack of an efficient cause. We need a positive reason to think these two can occur independently otherwise parsimony dictates their constant conjunction.
- Bjørn
  
  As Gralgrathor said above, we do actually have an example of material causes existing without an efficient cause, namely in quantum fluctuations and quantum particles arising from quantum vacuum. This stuff happens uncaused, and by that I mean, without an “efficient” cause. So if you were to suggest that the universe came about in a similar fashion, we would actually have supporting evidence for that.Of course, that’s not truly “creation ex nihilo”, but rather “uncaused stuff happening”, and it’s good that Noah drew a distinction between the two.
  - IzzyFalco
    
    The distinction is important, sure, but it’s questionable whether quantum mechanics actually supports a wholesale lack of an efficient cause. For example, there is indeterminism in QM concerning positions and momenta of particles, but the time-evolution of the wavefunction is entirely determined. Further, wavefunction collapse can be taken to be an efficient cause. When we ask, “Why did we observe the particle by the left slit?”, the cause can plausibly be taken to be, “The wavefunction collapsed in such a way as to put the particle by the left slit.” Now, it’s true that if we ask instead, “Why did we observe the particle by the left slit rather than the right slit?”, or, “What necessitated that the particle go through the left rather than the right?”, QM has no real causal story here, but this is indeed a quite different question. It appears that QM exemplifies a form of indeterministic (or probabilistic) causation, not a lack of efficient causation, so the degree to which it can support the independence of efficient and material causation is rather small.
    - Bjørn
      
      First, I have to correct myself, I meant to refer to virtual particles rather than quantum particles. Nonetheless, I agree with a lot of what you said, bar your conclusion.
      
      It seems obvious to me, and indeed other physicists that virtual particles are an example of “things happening uncaused” which you agree with (QM has no real causal story here). Now you can label this causation as whatever you like, but it doesn’t change the fact that in this instance there can only, and must only be material causation for those particles to exist. Thus material causation can be shown to occur without an efficient cause. The reverse has of course not been demonstrated.
      - IzzyFalco
        
        I think that there’s an equivocation occurring here in your discussion on virtual particles. I point out a form of causation (indeterministic causation) which, while not a necessitating efficient cause, is nonetheless efficient. When physicists claim that virtual particles come into and out of existence without any cause, they’re speaking in terms of a necessitating efficient cause which would answer the question, “Why did the quantum fluctuations produce this particle rather than not?” QM, again, has no causal story here. But this is a different question from, “Why did the quantum fluctuations produce this particle?” This question can indeed be answered within QM, “The particle was caused by the wavefunction collapsing in a particular way,” even though there is no necessitating causal story to be told about why the wavefunction collapsed that way rather than another. This isn’t to say that there is *no* cause, but rather that the cause isn’t necessitating. Physicists are known for talking loosely like this, especially on the more obscure topics in their fields.
      - Bjørn
        
        Equivocation? What did you feel I was equivocating with what?
        
        I’ll clarify: There are classes of events, in terms of efficient and material causes. When we say “uncaused” and “caused” we are referring to the efficient cause, the affecter. Things that happens “ex materio” or “ex nihilo” refers the presence or lack of a material cause, the effected. So as we use the word “uncaused”, it would be fine to say that uncaused events may or may not have a material cause, but what is known is that they lack an efficient cause. To say that events without an efficient cause are in fact caused, because they have a material cause, is the real equivocation concerning the matter. Do we agree on that?
        
        While I can work with the label of “material cause” as a placeholder for “affected” that is not to say that a material cause is a “cause”. It isn’t, because what we mean when we say “cause” is the affecter, the source, the efficient cause. Hence, stuff that happens without an “efficient cause” (affecter), like virtual particles, are examples of uncaused events.
        
        If that wasn’t the case then talking about uncaused events (no affecter) and creation ex nihilo (no affected) wouldn’t have any meaning whatsoever, since you would be equivocating material and efficient cause to both mean the colloquial “cause” i.e. efficient. The faulty argument would run as such: Event X has a material “cause”, therefore it is “caused”, therefore it has an efficient cause. That just doesn’t follow, yet is something that Craig has actually said.
        
        The correct question (I think) is to ask: “What caused this particle to exist”. For virtual particles, the answer is that it is a uncaused event. Or more precisely that the associated quantum fluctuation is a uncaused event that can lead to the creation of the virtual particles, which itself is an uncaused process, subject only to the uncertainty principle.
        
        Essentially, virtual particles are examples that a material cause is causally sufficient to produce an event.
        
        “Why did the quantum fluctuations produce this particle?” This question can indeed be answered within QM, “The particle was caused by the wave function collapsing in a particular way,” even though there is no necessitating causal story to be told about why the wave function collapsed that way rather than another. This isn’t to say that there is *no* cause, but rather that the cause isn’t necessitating.
        
        I’m sorry, but “wave function collapse” (I assume you’re talking about quantum superposition) is not responsible for the production of virtual particles. I mean, sure, the uncertainty principle governs a lot of stuff about the virtual particles, but a quantum fluctuation isn’t a probability wave function.
        
        necessitating efficient cause
        
        Eh, ok, at this point I think you’ll have to define what a necessitating efficient cause is, as opposed to just an efficient cause.
        
        Also, how is indeterministic (probabilistic) causation itself an efficient cause? That seems to be what you are implying in this sentence: “I point out a form of causation (indeterministic causation) which, while not a necessitating efficient cause, is nonetheless efficient”.
        How? Is indeterministic causation a thing ? Can it be a cause for anything? Of course not. It’s a tool used to explore certain kinds of causal relationships, not an agent.
        
        Lastly, I think you’re making a mistake trying to shoehorn quantum fluctuations (or indeed probabilistic causation) into the role of some kind of acting agent that “produce virtual particles”. They aren’t, and they don’t. A quantum fluctuation makes it possible for virtual particles to pop into existence, but are not “responsible” in a causal way as the affecter (efficient cause). It feels like you are talking about “quantum mechanics” as if it is a thing. It really isn’t, in a similar way that mathematics isn’t a thing, and doesn’t “cause” numbers to exist or equations to be true. In short, quantum mechanics and it’s various concepts are not efficient causes, nor material causes.
        
        Or we could class them as efficient causes, but to hold that position would completely remove the need for god in the creation of the universe since whatever law/process that we discover to govern that event can stand in as an efficient cause. I don’t think a theist would be comfortable with that, since the existence of the universe would in no way be proof of god because it would reduce it to a god-of-the-gaps argument, unless the theist could demonstrate that there is no such overarching law/process (good luck proving a negative).
      - IzzyFalco
        
        I agree with most of your post, Bjørn, sans your conclusions about efficient causes generally. I agree that the Craig et al’s equivocation between efficient and material causes is an error. I further agree that the notion of “material cause” as “the affected” should be taken in such a way that doesn’t imply that it is, in fact, affected by something else (that is, an efficient cause). So it looks like we agree on the meanings of terms.
        
        However, I think you’re missing the distinction that I’m making, which is not a particularly original distinction. An efficient cause is a cause which explains why X comes about. There are at least two ways we can mean this. The first is to have an efficient cause which explains why X comes about, simpliciter. The second is to have an efficient cause which also explains why X comes about rather than Y. The second sort of efficient cause is stronger, having a linear relationship from cause to its particular effect. This is what I mean by necessitating efficient causes. The first sort of efficient cause is weaker, but still fits the definition of an efficient cause. This weaker notion allows for a non-linear relationship between a cause and its potential effects. It is this weaker notion that I’m calling, for the sake of discussion, indeterministic/probabilistic causation. Based upon this distinction that it looks like you’re equivocating between a necessitating efficient cause and an efficient cause, simpliciter. (This is, however, a very natural mistake to make especially given that our common notion of cause supposes this stronger notion and that many pre-20th century philosophers have not appreciated the difference.)
        
        It is agreed on both sides that quantum mechanics doesn’t allow for efficient causes of the necessitating sort (in most cases). That is, when a particle shows up through the left slit rather than the right, there is, at bottom, no causal story to be told as far as QM is concerned. However, we can’t assume that just because there are no necessitating efficient causes that there are no efficient causes whatsoever. Indeed, in the case of two slits, there is an indeterministic causal story to be told: the particle showed up on the left because it was in a given state [Psi] which provides a nonzero probability of appearing there when we observed it. Both the observation and the state of the particle are indeterministic efficient causes of the particle’s appearing on the left. (Note again, this does not explain why the particle appeared on the left rather than the right.)
        
        As far as virtual particles, again it is agreed on both sides that there is no necessitating efficient cause as to why a particular particle exists rather than not, at that time rather than another, etc. But, again, we cannot thus conclude that there are no efficient causes. Like the double-slit, there is a potential indeterministic causal story to be told here. The vacuum or fields which are the material causes of the particles (in that the particles borrow from these fields and vacuua) can be taken to be indeterministic efficient causes of these particles. That is, the vacuum can be seen as both providing the borrowed energy which forms the particles as well as being the efficient producer of these particles, even if the production is indeterministic.
        
        Of course, this isn’t to say that this IS so, but rather that the mere observation of virtual particles isn’t going to provide a demonstration against the constant conjunction I’m proposing. In order to demonstrate against the principle I’m proposing, we’re going to need a material cause which gives rise to an object (or particle) where there is absolutely no causal story (indeterministic or necessitating) to be told. I can’t think of a potential way for this to happen without violating current physical theory, and would likely be on par with a supernatural miracle. Not impossible in principle (as far as I know), but it looks like that would be one hell of a burden to bear against an otherwise natural generalization of general causal principles (and one which, as you point out, has unwelcome consequences for the Kalam proponent).
        
        In your third-to-last paragraph, I think you’re reading far too much into a typo, which leads to confusion for two paragraphs. I am proposing two classes of efficient causation: indeterministic/probabilistic efficient causation and necessitating causation. I misspoke slightly when I said that “I point out a form of causation… while not a necessitating efficient cause, is nonetheless efficient.” What I should have said was, “I point out a form of causation… while not necessitating efficient causation, is nonetheless efficient.” This distinction is certainly not my own, but it is one which is important to the philosophy of quantum mechanics, free will, etc. I certainly do not want to imply anything quite as weird as QM or mathematics as efficient causes in themselves. However, something that exists, such as a potential well, certainly could act as an efficient cause, or at least the notion is not as obviously absurd as saying that the number two could be an efficient cause.
        
        In your last paragraph, you point out some of the consequences of the view I’m proposing and it doesn’t look well for the theist. The constant conjunction of efficient and material causes is incompatible with the notion of a genuine creation ex nihilo. That leaves Noah, above, proposing to explain how material substance can come from non-material (or mental) substance alone (from God, God’s will, etc), which strikes me as implausible on its face. That is unless he were to propose that both material and mental substance had a more fundamental, common substrate (as in a sort of neutral monism). This would make God a composed being, which should continue to make the theist uncomfortable.
      - Bjørn
        
        Nice post. I enjoyed reading that, even if my head did start to ache a little
        
        In your third-to-last paragraph, I think you’re reading far too much into a typo, which leads to confusion for two paragraphs
        
        You’re right, I did. Thanks for the clarification.
        
        Well, we seem to agree on a lot of the points. And with your introduction of the distinction between necessitating efficient cause and an efficient cause, simpliciter, I guess I was equivocating there. The thing that gets me tho, is that this distinction feels… meh… iffy. But I’ll back up a step to explain:
        
        An efficient cause is a cause which explains why X comes about. There are at least two ways we can mean this. The first is to have an efficient cause which explains why X comes about, simpliciter. The second is to have an efficient cause which also explains why X comes about rather than Y.
        
        This distinction is fine, essentially accommodating random/indeterminist stuff into efficient cause, simpliciter (right?). Combined with necessitating efficient causes they make up what is “efficient causes”. No problem, I can live with that. The thing I struggle with is the first bit there. See, I don’t think “efficient causes” do explain “why” X comes about. “Why” is answered by both efficient and material causes, not efficient alone. You can’t fully answer these why questions without referring to a material cause. “Why” is the wrong question, imo. Efficient causes explain “what caused the change that produced X”. “What caused” is the right question.
        With that in mind I would propose that virtual particles have no efficient cause since “what caused…?” isn’t a meaningful question wrt virtual particles. Whatever goes on when virtual particles form is “passive”. And by passive I mean like a vacuum is passive. Under water what causes you to suffocate? The presence of the water, or basically the lack of oxygen. In a vacuum what causes you to suffocate? Again, the lack of oxygen, but unlike the water case you couldn’t really attribute the suffocation to the “presence” of the vacuum, since the term doesn’t seem meaningful when applied to vacuum. I feel that the same “passiveness” is true in the case of the efficient cause of virtual particles. We’re asking “what caused the change that results in virtual particles?” and trying to answer with something that doesn’t have properties that allows it to “cause change”. That’s why I object… I think.
        
        Introducing indeterministic/probabilistic causation doesn’t answer “what caused the change” either. At best indeterministic causation could be the “formal” cause of virtual particles, but I don’t see how it could be an efficient cause, even an efficient cause, simpliciter (but this rests heavily on the argument of the previous paragraph). If virtual particles are IKEA furniture, indeterministic causation (or whatever “rules” of QM we are looking at) would be more analogous to the instruction booklet (like a formal cause) than the person assembling it (very much an efficient cause). Quantum vacuum energy would be the pieces in the box (the material cause). And since virtual particles apparently assemble without the person, that’s why I think it’s an example of “uncaused” events.
        
        However, we can’t assume that just because there are no necessitating efficient causes that there are no efficient causes whatsoever. Indeed, in the case of two slits, there is an indeterministic causal story to be told: the particle showed up on the left because it was in a given state [Psi] which provides a nonzero probability of appearing there when we observed it. Both the observation and the state of the particle are indeterministic efficient causes of the particle’s appearing on the left.
        
        That’s very well put. But, here’s where that distinction becomes a little sour for me. It’s almost like efficient cause has been split into two, in order to afterwards argue that just because there doesn’t seem to be an efficient cause of the one type, it’s all of a sudden reasonable to assume there would be an efficient cause of the other instead. I don’t think that is reasonable. I feel that unless one could point to a demonstrable efficient cause one can’t say that there is one.
        The second part is right on. If the state Psi is “responsible” for the particle appearing on the left then I would accept that as an efficient cause, simpliciter. But how do you demonstrate that link when the state Psi is not measurable (as I’ve understood my QM) until after it’s appeared on the left? Indeed how would you demonstrate the link when the very thing you are investigating is indeterminate to begin with? More importantly: Wouldn’t you’d need an efficient cause for state Psi being the state as opposed to something else? And how would you do the same for the quantum fluctuations?
        
        And is it even meaningful to label what’s essentially a state of the material cause as the efficient cause? Why not just include that as part of the material cause?
        
        As far as virtual particles, again it is agreed on both sides that there is no necessitating efficient cause as to why a particular particle exists rather than not, at that time rather than another, etc. But, again, we cannot thus conclude that there are no efficient causes
        
        I think you’re asking me to demonstrate a negative here. It should be the other way around, that one shouldn’t assume an efficient cause unless you can actually identify one, for the same reason that you can’t assume a particular material cause without actually demonstrating that it is the material cause.
        
        I just feel there are a lot of outs for me here. I could just declare that “uncaused” refers to stuff without necessitating efficient causes. That would allow us to talk about all sorts of events that could be classed as having efficient causes simpliciter, as uncaused, while still exploring those efficient causes simpliciter. Perhaps in due time it turns out that the actual cause of an event is one that can be seen as a necessitating efficient cause, thus earning “caused”-status for that event.
        
        Or, I could grant efficient cause simpliciter as “caused”, but argue that QM doesn’t allow you to class anything related to virtual particles even as efficient cause simpliciter. With reference to the whole “doesn’t have properties that allows it to “cause change”" line of thought.
        
        Or, I could point out that until we find a specific efficient cause, necessitating or simpliciter we can’t assume that there is one. I’m really not comfortable with this tho, since it’s sorta like a weird “uncaused-of-the-gaps” argument, if you get my drift.
        
        Your last paragraph: I agree completely. And I gotta say that I really had to work to write this down like I wanted to, but your well-written reply demanded it tbh!
      - IzzyFalco
        
        Thanks for the positive feedback on my post as well as continued intelligent replies. I’ll try to keep this reply less than book length to save from unnecessary headaches, but this discussion has covered quite a lot of ground!
        
        I think your refinement of the question answered by efficient causation as presented in your first few paragraphs is spot on. The reason I didn’t want to talk about “what caused” is that it runs the risk of becoming circular, or at least it almost looks circular to me. But I think we both get what we’re getting at.
        
        I particularly like the fact that you brought in an active/passive distinction, and I think it’s helpful to see where it is where our contentions differ.
        
        We both seem to agree that efficient causes are active. You argue that the “production” of virtual particles is passive, and thus cannot have an efficient cause. In order to do this, you first discuss a difference between suffocation by water and suffocation by a vacuum. In the first case, we have we have the water as an efficient cause of suffocation as water actively displaces the oxygen in your lungs. In the second case, however, a vacuum is passive as far as the oxygen in your lungs goes. The vacuum is not an efficient cause of your suffocation. This second case does have an efficient cause, though, namely the oxygen molecules themselves which move from high pressure to low pressure due to their mutual interactions. So, in both cases we still have efficient causes, even if in the second case the cause is misidentified.
        
        The main issue here is that the analogy above relies on the notion of a vacuum as, effectively, nothingness. In the previous case, a vacuum cannot be active because it isn’t anything to begin with. It’s a lack of something. However in QM, the vacuum isn’t nothingness. Current interpretations, I believe, hold that spacetime is a quantum foam with measurable vacuum energy. If this is the case, then the quantum vacuum does have a positive character and seems perfectly capable of standing in active, causal relations (in a way that a lack of something, such as a classical vacuum, cannot).
        
        As far as the slit experiment goes, we are able to prepare electrons in a completely defined quantum state, [Psi]. So we can know this and know how it will deterministically change in time, even though the measurement itself is indeterministic, via the time-dependent Schrodinger equation. While we can’t know whether or not the particle will go left or right, we are capable of producing electrons in the same state so that they will go left and right with the same probability as others. So, I think that your concern about measurement and indeterminacy in this particular point isn’t quite right.
        
        You ask at the end of that paragraph, “More importantly: Wouldn’t you’d need an efficient cause for state Psi being the state as opposed to something else? And how would you do the same for the quantum fluctuations?” First, note how the question about an efficient cause presupposes a necessitating cause rather than an indeterministic one. Secondly, in the case of prepared electrons there is such an efficient cause of the particular states. However, this need not be true generally, especially since quantum states are modified by measurement (or anything which causes collapse). So, while the quantum state of a prepared electron has a necessitating efficient cause, once the wavefunction indeterministically collapses the state of the electron is different. The collapse is responsible for the new state, but it does not necessitate which particular new state it should be in. If this is the case, there is no requirement for there to be a necessitating cause for quantum states, even for a vacuum.
        
        Now, if the question is whether there should be an indeterministic efficient cause for the state of the vacuum (following the chain backward), I would say no. The reason for this is that my contention is that efficient and material causes are conjoined, and “material cause”, for this discussion, is some sort of originating substance. Current theory, as far as I understand it, doesn’t posit that the quantum vacuum had its material origin in something else, so its state wouldn’t require an efficient cause because it doesn’t have a material one.
        
        As far as “outs” go, I don’t think any of the ones presented work. The first out is a matter of changing semantics which is generally unhelpful. I admitted already that I think our commonsense notion of cause is stronger than mere efficient cause, so if we were to define “efficient cause” to simply be this stronger notion, no real work has been done to solve the issue. The second out would be interesting if I could see it worked out. I would imagine that we would need either a logical demonstration from the postulates of QM that efficient causation doesn’t apply to virtual particles or perhaps an experiment which determines that nothing can play an active role in the production of virtual particles. The previous discussion about properties is in line with the first strategy here, but given that the quantum vacuum does actually have properties (and isn’t a mere lack of something), a different line of thought will have to go here (perhaps a deduction from QM’s postulates?). For the third out, you pretty much hit it on the head. I think we can inductively establish a presumption in favor of causation until we establish that something likely does, in fact, lack any sort of efficient cause whatsoever. I’ve already outlined what this would look like, but it doesn’t look promising. Perhaps there’s a better way, though.
        
        I’m not sure that I completely agree with what I’m defending. I suppose I’m more curious than serious about the implications of this idea. Thanks for continuing to help me out with that, challenging my points, and providing me with much to think about with your comments. (And perhaps I should chip in for a bottle of Tylenol to help with the length of these posts, lol.)
      - Bjørn
        
        I do apologise, but I probably won’t be able to make any more sensible replies to this. I live in downtown Oslo… so things are a little hectic at the minute.
        
        I would say that I agree with a lot, and disagree with a little. Basically we’d need a proper quantum physicist to get to the core of the QM aspect, and then we could go and hammer out the philosophy.
        
        In the end I feel that we are talking about two things: Properties that allow something to cause change vs propeties that allow for the possibility of change. The former can be said to “cause” things, I’d argue that the latter can’t, and I think virtual particles fall into this category. But I write this without really thinking about it…
        
        Regards,
        Bjørn
Gralgrathor

« So God affects his will in such a way »

What you’re saying here is that God wanted his will to want something be actualised.

I believe it’s been said before, although I cannot remember by whom, but wanting something to be actual and actually actualising it are still two separate things. By simply wanting to respond to your post, I still have not written the response: that requires manipulation of existing objects.

I am not (not here, in any case) claiming that “ex-nihilo causation” is a null-concept or impossible, only that your statement that “God affects his will” does not serve to clarify anything.

« It’s absurd because a necessary component for something beginning to exist, a metaphysical requirement insofar as I can intuit, (whether it be via ex materia or ex nihilo means) is in fact a cause. At least some form of a cause. »

But we’ve already established that it is in fact possible for events to occur (at least apparently!) uncaused. Quantum mechanics shows us that it is in the nature of voids to be uncertain about being voids. And while one might argue that the existence of the behavioural properties of existence itself is cause for the behaviour of quantum fluctuations, there is still no (apparent!) immediate cause for any single quantum fluctuation to occur.

Again, I am not proclaiming that this is an explanation for how the universe originated, or that it’s even relevant. It just goes to demonstrate that it cannot be absurd for something to occur uncaused if something is observed to occur uncaused.

Boy, this stuff is confusing.
Clayjames

Noah,

A material cause as described by Aristotle must be actual matter, not simply the constituents that make up a thing. However, there are plenty of things that have no material cause. Ideas, songs, stories have efficient causes but no material causes (at least as Aristotle would describe it). The problem lies in the fact that all material things have material causes.

To validate the first premise, you must do so metaphysically (the first premise being “everything that begins to exist has an Effective cause”). If you try to validate the first premise through induction you run into a problem. While it seems to be inductibly true that “everything that begins to exist has an Effective cause” this inductive principle also applies to the premise “every material thing that begins to exist has a material cause.”

The key to this premise lies in foundational epistemology, and as you probably know, these are the hardest things to agree on.
- http://godlessons.com Godlessons
  
  I can’t agree that “ideas, songs, stories have efficient causes but no material causes”, although I understand Aristotle didn’t see it that way.
  
  I’m not making the assumption that you believe they have no material cause, since you seemed to try and distance yourself from the claim by attributing it to Aristotle. The reason I bring it up is that it would seem, according to modern psychology and neurology, etc., that thoughts are physical in nature. The neurons in our minds store the information and process it, similar to how a computer stores and manipulates information in that there is still a physical component. It makes me wonder what Aristotle’s thoughts on mind/body duality were.
  - Clayjames
    
    But our thoughts, even though physical in nature, cannot possibly be a material cause. If anything, you can argue that they are the effective cause, since they bring about the song or idea about.. Even if you take a non material definition of a material cause, physical neurological responses happen when listening to an idea as it does when experiencing a chair. Are we to claim that the material cause of the chair is not the wood and nails but instead the nuerological response?
    - http://godlessons.com Godlessons
      
      If I create a web crawler that is designed to look for patterns of words, and store those websites in a database, is that program not the material cause of the data being inserted in the database? If you can attribute a physical cause to a computer, why can’t it be attributed to the human mind? There is no reason to believe that the human mind is anything more than a more complicated computer after all.
      - Clayjames
        
        Great example and no, the program is not the material cause. Many people think that the material cause is “a material thing that brings something about”, this is not was aristotle meant. What he means is the composition of an object. A hammer is not the material cause of a chair, the wood is. In your example, the programer is the efficient cause of the program and the program is the efficient cause of the database. So once again, you can argue that the physical proceses that take place in our brain are the efficient cause of a song, not its material cause.
      - http://godlessons.com Godlessons
        
        That’s right. I get confused sometimes. I knew this last week. Forgot it already.
        
        Okay, here’s the issue. I would say the program is the efficient cause, because when you make a web crawler, generally it is made to learn from what it finds and then get new information based on what it has learned. Because of that, a computer program can do things that the programmer never intended, and possibly never envisioned.
        
        As for the material cause, the hard drive, the electricity, etc. would therefore fit the bill.
        
        Anyway, this is what I’m talking about.
    - John C.
      
      Thoughts aren’t made of material “stuff”, yet they are caused events. They only have an efficient cause since they are t composed of anything physical, as you illustrated with Aristotle.
- Andy
  
  Yeah, like godlessons said “Ideas, songs, stories have efficient causes but no material causes” is wrong.
  
  Firstly, “songs” and “stories” are material in nature. They are vibrations in the air and ink printed on a page. Of course, I think your probably talking about the concept of the song or story (not it’s physical makeup of vibrations or ink)… in which case your *only* talking about ideas, and you should rewrite your sentence “Ideas, ideas, ideas have efficient causes but no material causes.”
  
  But do ideas have efficient causes? Any materialist would say no because ideas are simply brain-states which are causes by earlier brain-states and environmental stimuli (which are both material). … but I’m sure you’d disagree.
  - http://godlessons.com Godlessons
    
    Thanks Andy. I should have said I was going from a materialist point of view, but that would have made things too easy.
  - John C.
    
    Ideas are not physical in nature. They are *mental* states. A *brain* state, which is what youre talking about, would be something like neurons firing, chemical reactions and such. All of those things are physical in nature. But ideas are non-physical. But they are just as real.
    
    There is only an efficient cause for ideas, since they aren’t physical in make-up.
    - Anonymous
      
      What do you mean “ideas are not physical”? Do you mean they don’t have a physical basis? Or do you mean that they do have a basis in physicality, but ideas themselves are not reducible to the underlying patterns of neurons firing, ect.
      
      I bring it up because it’s interesting to note that Kalam, the way WLC presents it, seems to rely on this thing called an immaterial mind. A view that seems to take a really radical stance in that it requires a mind that can operate without the underlying material – since it is the source of all material. It doesn’t seem to me likely that he’s talking about an immaterial mind that’s made of a physical brain. It’s an objection I’ve never really seen anyone put forward – maybe for good reason.
    - Andy
      
      I think we may just have different understandings of what it means to be “physical in nature.” When (as you put it) neurons fire and brain chemicals react, I’d say that is the process of thinking and producing thoughts. So if we can talk about one specific brain process corresponding to one specific idea (though I’m sure the reality is less clear-cut), then I’d say that specific brain process is equivalent to that idea.
      
      Of course, a specific idea may correspond to two different brain processes in two different people, but I think that’s just an issue of translation.
      - John C.
        
        But what are thoughts exactly?
        
        If those physical processes are the conditions that produce thoughts as effects, and thoughts *themselves* aren’t constituted material, then it seems to me we have an example of an efficient cause (neurons, chemicals, the brain) producing an effect (thoughts). The effect has no material cause, since it isn’t composed of any sort of matter.
      - Clayjames
        
        Exactly, Andy is making the same mistake godlessons made. If X brings about Y and X is material, then X is an effective cause that happens to also be material, X is NOT the material cause. The material cause is determined by the material composition of Y. If Y does not have a material composition, it has no material cause.
      - John C.
        
        Yeah, that’s definitely how it seems to me, and what we typically refer to as a “material cause”.
        
        There’s definitely a distinction to be made between a cause that’s made of material, and a material cause. The two aren’t the same. I am made of matter. If I design and start up an assembly line that builds cars, I could be considered an efficient cause for the existence of the car. But just because I am made of matter, this doesn’t make me the *material* cause for the cars.
      - John C.
        
        And this to me, if we reduce things…might be a sketch of causality that at least makes it feasible that God can cause an effect without having to act upon anything, or, make Him able to create the materials of the universe as an effect.
        
        With the brain, we have an example of a cause that produces an effect. It’s effect doesn’t have a material cause. So who’s to say that God can’t produce His effect without a material cause? It at least casts doubt about how cut and dry causality is.
      - Andy
        
        I guess I don’t see what your objection is. The same point, as far as I can tell, could be made about computer programs. At it’s base, any computer program is the output of a bunch of binary switches combined in logic gates which interact with eachother…Would you then say that computer programs are non-material?
        
        If so, then we agree because on a materialist view thoughts work the same way (except that the brain functions in a much different way); we’re just using different language to describe the same thing.
        
        If not – if you think there is something fundamentally different that makes computer programs material and thoughts non-material – then our disagreement probably goes much deeper than this particular issue.
      - John C.
        
        Well, I’m not so much making an objection as I am making a point.
        
        Let me pose this question again: What are thoughts? It’s important to think about the answer to this question. I don’t think it’s safe to say that thoughts themselves are made of chemicals, or electricity. We can probably agree that all of those things give rise to thoughts. But certainly, those things AREN’T thoughts themselves.
        
        Why is that important?
        
        Well, because we have a brain (made of matter) causing an effect to occur (thoughts. Not made of matter)
        
        That’s an efficient cause bringing about an effect that has no material cause. That’s my point.
        
        As far as a computer program goes, it seems we can trace every aspect to how a program works, and reduce it to some physical component. As far as I know, there’s no ghost in the shell, or mystery to how computer operations work.
        
        But with consciousness however, there is a severe disconnect. How is it that the chemicals in our brains, and electrical impulses can carry consciousness, but a puddle of oil on the ground with an electric shock, CANT? If we magnify the chemicals in our brains, or analyze the electrical currents that travel, there’s nothing physically significant in it’s make-up that shows it can carry information. It’s a complete mystery how chemicals and electricity can carry images, scents, and memories of my childhood. Why are the chemicals in our brains any more special than chemicals we find anywhere else?
      - http://godlessons.com Godlessons
        
        John, why is it that everywhere there is difficulty in human understanding, suddenly it’s a place for magic. Consciousness is getting better and better understood all the time. It seems that our best bet to get it in computers is multiple processors working against each other. This dichotomy gives the ability to recognize there are other processes all in control while none are in complete control.
      - John C.
        
        Well most of my comment is irrelevant then, except for my main point.
        
        Thoughts themselves are an effect. They aren’t composed of chemicals or electrical surge. So to me, we have an effect that has no material cause, but has an efficient cause.
        
        That was my point.
      - John C.
        
        Are you on Facebook btw? Do I know you on there?
  - Finney Raju
    
    Ideas are not simply brainstates, for brainstates lack the capability to be about, to refer to, to represent anything, or be true or false, and yet ideas are about things, refer to and represent things and can be true or false.
    
    Materialists all have to agree at one point or another that interactions between brainstates somehow caused something totally unique to come into existence. They have to believe that non-intentional brain-matter caused the existence of intentional states, that non-qualitative and non-subjective stuff caused the existence of qualitative and subjective states like conscious experiences. This can make sense in terms of efficient causality, (the original source of the effect was a brain event), but not in terms of material causality (the effect is not of the same kind or constitution as the cause).
    - Andy
      
      I think that’s all nonsense, of course.
      
      Sure, brain-states can be about something – memories, feelings, calculations, etc. etc. And these things (some of them anyway) can be true or false (e.g. is it an accurate memory? a calculation which works?). And surely “intention” can be understood in a purely materialistic universe. What do you make of those machines which are built to turn themselves off? Though it’s certainly no perfect analogy, it’s essentially an example of the type of “intention” the brain has (except on a much, much more simplified level).
      
      But I don’t expect you to agree with any of this. Unfortunately neurology has overturned a lot of philosophy, unfortunately philosophy has difficulty catching up.
      - Finney Raju
        
        “brain-states can be about something – memories, feelings, calculations, etc. etc.”
        Well, how so? Do brain-states contort themselves into the shapes of the thing they represent? For example, if I am thinking of a tree, is there a corresponding neural state that is resembling (or otherwise representing) a tree? Where is such a neural state? One thing is clear – brain states are highly involved and depended upon for the actualization of memories, feelings, and so on. In other words, cognitive scientists are well on their way to identifying the neural correlates to consciousness. But this is much different from saying that brain states are identical to conscious states. For when you count up all the physical inputs and outputs of a brain event, you’re left without a single clue as to where the subject, the point of view, and the thought is. (By intentional states, I mean states that exhibit “aboutness”, not just intentions http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/).
        
        Here’s another consideration I find persuasive: Suppose mind-brain identity were true. Then if I knew that I was experiencing a particular mental state, I would, by definition, know that I am experiencing a particular brain state. But I often know that I’m mad, for example, even when I do not know any of the brain-states that constitute and are identical to the feeling of being mad. So, at the very least, I have an epistemic access to my own thoughts that is different from the access I have to my brain states. Hence the “first-person perspective”. This form access is itself a conscious state, so mental states are not merely reducible to brain states.
      - Andy
        
        Yes, when you think of a tree there is a neural state corresponding to
        that image. Though, no, this state doesn’t “resemble” a tree… you wont
        open up somebody’s head and find neurons arranged as a tree or anything
        silly like that. Even a CD can contain an image of a tree stored as 1s
        and 0s, similarly you can have an image of a tree in your head stored in
        neural pathways. There are differences, of course: a CD is much more
        exact and can easily be translated into pixels on a screen so that you
        can see them. But the concept is the same.
        
        So where’s the
        subject? In the neural pathways. Where is the point of view? defer to
        the previous answer. Where is the thought? Defer to the previous answer.
        
        I
        feel that we are simply beginning to talk past each other because I
        can’t see how your second argument even makes sense. My understanding is
        that introspection of your “anger” will only allow you to understand
        how this emotion (i.e. the neural pathways which constitute it)
        interacts with your other thoughts and feelings. That’s it… that’s
        what your “direct access” is. So what else are you expecting to know?
        Are you expecting to be able to visual a map of your brain and what
        neurons are firing and when? If so, why?
Piprod01

So is the criticism lodged at the proponent of ex nihilo causality
equally applicable to the proponent of the acausal model, except much
worse?
Well I’m not sure it is. If you think of the purpose of a causer, what exactly do they do? Let’s take the example of a potter, a potter is someone who creates pottery. We can see when a potter makes a pot we have 3 things; the base material out of which the pot is to be made, the causer (the potter), and eventually, the finished pot (an effect). What I think Scott is hinting at, is that like in the example of a pot, the causers are responsible for making alterations to the base material, after a sufficient number, we can call the product a “pot”. The relevance of the cause is merely to make changes to starting material. But with the words “ex nihilo”, we have no starting stuff with which to make some change. Without some change, we have no need for a cause of that change. And the idea is that to introduce a causer into this “event”, is to posit a being with nothing to alter and is unparsimonious.

Well from there we can go in a couple of directions; we could say that god is ether not the cause of the universe, or what we could say that what we mean by the causation of the universe from nothing is nothing like our everyday meaning of the term.
John C.

Very nice treatment, Noah. I’m still having an issue with where Craig is conflating though, according to Scott. How exactly is Craig conflating ex-materia and ex-nihilo when his premise 1 allows for both?

Some more thoughts… I’m still not convinced by Scott’s A,B, and C requirement as being necessary. It seems you’re going to take that route, but I don’t think it’s necessary. It seems to me that some being X can simply “act”, thereby producing an effect, without having to “act upon” in order to do so.

Also, I think that Scott’s claim implicitly eliminates even the *possibility* of there being a cause of the universe. Because, if there is a cause to the universe, it would had to have done so without any materials, in order to create the materials the universe is made from. Now, thats a bit hard to swallow. A claim that removes even the possibility of there being a cause of the universe makes me extremely skeptical, as should anyone else.
- Scott Clifton
  
  “How exactly is Craig conflating ex-materia and ex-nihilo when his premise 1 allows for both?”
  Any time Craig points to any example of ex materia in order to make any point, at all, about the metaphysics of ex nihilo causality… he is conflating the two. As it happens, Craig does this A LOT.
  
  “I think that Scott’s claim implicitly eliminates even the *possibility* of there being a cause of the universe”
  
  It does, as long as you assume the universe began to exist ex nihilo.
  - John C.
    
    “Any time Craig points to any example of ex materia in order to make any point, at all, about the metaphysics of ex nihilo causality… he is conflating the two. As it happens, Craig does this A LOT.,”
    
    The Kalam *argument* itself contains no such conflation. You’re mistaking one particular off the cuff quote of his with the actual Kalam argument. The Kalam itself doesn’t mention how “He began to exist” as a justification for premise 1. The way he justifies premise 1 is through the principle, “Ex nihil, ex nihilo fit”, out of nothing, nothing comes. Which, his example is certainly harmonious with. But the principle itself applies to ALL causality, not just ex materia examples. Besides, all Craig has to say is that the universe began to exist to suffice your demand for an example.
    
    But what’s important is that that principle is uncontroversial in philosophy. It’s a metaphysical first principal. Craig didn’t just sit there and make it up. Why do you think we should doubt it in favor of believing that something CAN come from nothing, without any cause, without any explanation? That to me, is absurdity in it’s highest form.
    
    “It does, as long as you assume the universe began to exist ex nihilo”
    
    Scott, that is the ONLY way the universe CAN have a cause. You eliminate ex-nihilo, you eliminate any chance for a cause. Are you sure you want everyone to believe that you’ve proven beyond reasonable doubt, that theres even remotely a chance the universe has a cause? I mean, physicists wouldn’t even be so bold.
- Paul
  
  “It seems to me that some being X can simply “act”, thereby producing an effect, without having to “act upon” in order to do so.”
  
  What examples do we have of this other than the one we’re trying to prove?
Mike Norman

“God affects his will in such a way that it becomes actualized and that actualization produces the universe as the effect. Going back to Aristotle, God in this case would be the efficient cause,
God’s will is the material cause (because remember a material cause
does not have to literally be matter, it just has to be the
factor or constituent that creates the whole). So the efficient cause
is God, the material cause is God’s will and the result is the
universe. This is just a rough idea.”

Maybe I’m barking up the wrong tree, but the confusion seems to stem, ultimately, from a certain kind of advocate trying to preserve a certain kind of magical realm outside of the Physical Universe. This realm is a place where God can live and do his “Godly things,” like binding us to His moral will through (the frankly magical means of) “Obligation.” This realm, where God operates and from where He does His stuff, always seems to get excluded, by a certain kind of advocate, from “The Universe” when these advocates actually talk as if they’re merely trying to exclude it from the Physical Universe, or the stuff we can see. Simply put, if God lives in a place, then that place is a universe. If God does not live in a place, if He is somehow self-existent and self-sustaining, then God was the Universe.

Even the quote I extracted above hints at this problem. It describes God as a universe, as a supposedly all-encompassing bag of things with causal relationships between them. We have [God | God's will], not to mention Aristotle and the Physical Universe. All of these enjoy causal entanglements with each other.

My point is, I think, basically to ask, “Can you shoot pool in Heaven?” That is, is God’s abode a regular place–regardless of whether He is embedded in that abode or is that abode or both–where there are orderly laws that govern how things interact? If it is regular, and if it has regular laws, it’s not just a universe but a part of the Physical Universe, a part of the set of all orderable things, so to speak. If so, I have trouble thinking of God as anything other than some dude in some place. I also would have trouble conceiving of the act of “creation” that spawned our neighborhood of the Physical Universe as anything other than a plain old ex materia event, as a rearrangement of preexisting things.

This is all to say that I don’t see the distinction between God’s realm, where he does His magic, and our realm, the realm of atoms and quarks. To be clear, I don’t think there’s any especial magic where this hypothetical God is, either. God can say “Thou Shalt Not…” until he’s blue in the face, as some other humans who write particularly bothersome books would actually have us believe He does, and it doesn’t carry any more weight than if you’d said it. I like shellfish, fornication, and pork. I’m keeping them.

So much for what I feel is often the motivation for this effort to separate God’s realm from the Universe. On to the implications of its failure to causality and Kalam. One of the premises of the argument is, “The Universe began to exist.” Well, as hinted at before, there are, at least, two Universes that must be considered: the physical–more properly “visible”–one and the Everything One. If we’re talking about the Everything Universe, then even the proponents of Kalam don’t believe the premise that it began, since they presumably believe that God has no beginning, and He is, at least, some component of the Universe.. If we’re talking about the Physical/Visible Universe, then there’s no reason to suppose the premise is true, either. Even the marginally more sophisticated proponents of the argument, e.g. Dr. Craig, love to point to the Big Bang as the moment of “creation.” While this event marks the genesis of all the things we can see, that doesn’t strike me as in any way indicative that it was the genesis of everything that exists, even in the merest physical sense. It seems to mean only that we are ignorant of any physical things “before” or outside of that event horizon.

“If it doesn’t cut it, I’ll start over and see if I can bring to the table something that does.”

I think that you’re not going to be able to bring anything to the table that cuts it, not because you won’t be able to hypothesize a mechanism for God’s creation of the Physical Universe, but because you will. You will have thus regularized God and the Place Where He Lives so that They become a part of the Universe. You will have argued for the creation of the Universe not “ex nihilo,” but “ex Deus quod Suus Universum” (from God and His Universe). You will have moved from philosophy to geography.
- http://12tuesday.com Spencer Daniel
  
  Hi Mike,
  
  I don’t get how your argument about God in his own universe is really anything more than a quibble about terminology. If you want to say that God existing by himself counts as a universe, that’s fine. But calling God’s existence a universe is not sufficient to show that it is the same universe as the thing whose existence is in question. Whether or not there is a universe called “God” that created our universe from no pre-existing matter still remains a sensible question.
  
  Am I missing something in your response here?
Finney Raju

*Silent applause*
Andy

Yes, when you think of a tree there is a neural state corresponding to that image. Though, no, this state doesn’t “resemble” a tree… you wont open up somebody’s head and find neurons arranged as a tree or anything silly like that. Even a CD can contain an image of a tree stored as 1s and 0s, similarly you can have an image of a tree in your head stored in neural pathways. There are differences, of course: a CD is much more exact and can easily be translated into pixels on a screen so that you can see them. But the concept is the same.

So where’s the subject? In the neural pathways. Where is the point of view? defer to the previous answer. Where is the thought? Defer to the previous answer.

I feel that we are simply beginning to talk past each other because I can’t see how your second argument even makes sense. My understanding is that introspection of your “anger” will only allow you to understand how this emotion (i.e. the neural pathways which constitute it) interacts with your other thoughts and feelings. That’s it… that’s what your “direct access” is. So what else are you expecting to know? Are you expecting to be able to visual a map of your brain and what neurons are firing and when? If so, why?
Bjørn

If I could just ask for a clarification:
When you say that “god’s will is the material cause” are you claiming that the creation of the universe (the effect of god acting on his will, as I understand your argument) is still “creation ex nihilo”?

Because it seems to me that there is a problem here. As a jumping off point we can either accept metaphysics or reject it by saying that only physics is “real”.

If we accept metaphysics (why should we tho?) then I guess that god’s will would actually be material in a real sense, but then the creation of the universe would no longer be “ex nihilo” in the way that you would want it to be, it would have to be the rearrangement of metaphysical energy/matter. It would also give future (meta)physicists (or wizards) a lot of research to do into how that process is supposed to work…

Or, we could reject metaphysics, in which case “god’s will” ain’t real and not really a material cause (unless you can demonstrate it’s existence and properties and then show how it is affected to produce the universe). Without said demonstration, god’s will cannot be a material cause since causality is limited to “reality”. Now you could still claim that “god’s will” is what’s being effected, but you can’t lean on examples of “creation ex materio” to support that argument, since “god’s will” is not material. In this case it would be “creation ex nihilo”, but without any supporting evidence, and it would still suffer the problems that Scott has outlined.

From your argument it seems like the creation of the universe can only be “ex nihilo” if you reject metaphysics (and hence god).

I also wanna nit-pick and say that we do have examples of “beginning to exist uncaused”, namely the spookiness of quantum particles springing from quantum vacuum. Absurd it may be, but it is still observed. So yeah, ““begins to exist uncaused” is less problematic, more parsimonious and less ad hoc than “begins to exist ex nihilo””.
Markisleme

welcome back noah
Markisleme

welcome back noah
Cowboycoco

Let me preface this by saying, I am certainly no philosopher. That being said, I have trouble wrapping my head around a
statement like,

“What I mean when I say “God caused the universe to begin existing” is something like “God actualized his will for there to be a universe” (given the universe to mean the sum total of all space-time). God in this case would be the affector, God’s will would be the affected, and the universe would be the effect.”

My problem arises when we follow this to God must be outside of time since this very act is what creates time. It is especially problematic for me when we start talking about causality, because, isn’t there another element of causality we’re not talking about here? Specifically time? I mean to say, doesn’t the affector have to affect the affected BEFORE there can be an effect? Maybe I’m missing something. But if God is outside of time, and the aforementioned is true, what does it even mean to say ‘God does anything’? With time not being a factor, couldn’t the universe have existed before God willed it to be? Obviously not but that’s the wall I keep hitting. Heck, what does it even mean to say before in this context? God, timelessness, and causality just seems to me to be peanut butter and jelly on a pepporoni pizza. (My apologies to anyone who might actually enjoy PB&J on pizza)
John C.

Oh, just realized…

Isn’t Ex-nihilo causation that contains a material cause a contradiction in terms, Noah?

Or, by ex-nihilo, do you simply mean God didn’t have the “stuff” out of which the universe was made, even though He acted upon “something”, namely, His will?

Does His will count as “something”, thereby contradicting ex-nihilo? Or does only the stuff out of which the universe is made, count as something in this sense?
- John C.
  
  Creatio ex-nihio is creation out of nothing. I mean, if acted upon His will, that’s something, not nothing. But…it still seems consistent to say that the “stuff” from which the universe is made wasn’t there, even if He acts upon His will. His will =/= the stuff the universe is made from.
  
  So…just thinking out loud.
Balanceseeker

In order for God’s Will being the affected in the statement “God caused the Universe to exist” to make sense, I am going to need a definition of what God’s Will is. At first, I tried going with the colloquial definition of the term “one’s will” — namely one’s intention.

Anyone who does actively does something is actualizing his or her will, and yet doing so still requires something to actualize a will upon. All this move has done is to take the act of causation, “actualizing his will,” and turned it into the affected component while maintaining the same as the means. Further, as God’s will is itself part of God, then what you are asking us to accept is the following:

– God wills God’s Will, transforming God’s Will into the universe.

So, God left Will-less? This might do well to answer the problem of evil, but it does not likely fit into your theological belief system, and as such, I would need a lot more on this before I would accept this as coherent idea.

Finally, regardless of the reasoning, this is not creation out of nothing. This would be creation out of Will. To create out of nothing, nothing must be effected. Once you introduce an affected entity, it is creation out of that entity.
Anonymous

“God in this case would be the efficient cause, God’s will is the material cause”

Wouldn’t that imply that God’s will also needs a cause? If God’s will is an aspect of God it can’t be the cause of anything. To be the material cause of something it would have to be itself caused, either ex materia or ex nihilo. This begs the question “who created God’s will?”. Probably God. This sounds rather un-parsimonious to me.

“It’s absurd because a necessary component for something beginning to exist, a metaphysical requirement insofar as I can intuit, (whether it be via ex materia or ex nihilo means) is in fact a cause.”

The same exact thing can be said about God. If God is necessary, the way in which he is necessary could be viewed as a cause. Then you are left with the question of explaining the background in which God is necessary and, again, you just have pushed the problem further again.
http://www.facebook.com/djarm67 Djarm Sixtyseven

Hi Noah,

I’m going to copy most of my previous response to your previous post as that went unanswered but is still relevant to this.

Proponents of the Kalam need to provide a valid example of any
“physical” thing being created ex nihilo? I understand that the goal is
to journey back to the big bang and go “shazam”, the universe had a
beginning ex nihilo so therefore….(insert your particular version of
supernaturalism here). The relabelling of a new configuration of existing matter and energy is not something “beginning to exist” it is simply a new label. The Kalam needs
to address the problem of an example of something “physical” being
created “ex-nihilo” with a criteria of “not by any natural cause”.

Unfortunately, even the use of big bang
cosmology for this exercise is useless. The big bang was simply a rapid
expansion of space time from something pre-existing. Whilst all the
evidence points to this space time expansion occurring approximately
13.7 billion years ago, the concept of time itself is useless prior to
this. What it expanded from, why or how long all the matter and energy
in the universe were in this particular configuration are unknown, and
possibly unknowable. It is possible that in a few decades and scores,
the bulk of intellectual theistic discourse will retreat to the safe
confines of those small pockets of unknowables from which to attempt to
remain relevant (or eek out a profitable niche).

Until this issue of a lack of ANY example of something “physical” being created “ex-nihilo” (not simply a new label applied to a reconfiguration of already existing matter and energy) with a criteria of causation “not by any natural cause”, the Kalam Cosmological Argument is completely unsupported and is nothing but philosophical masturbation.

DJ
Wimsweden

Isn’t God, as classically defined, eternally fully actualized? When he wills his will to become actualized, does that somehow mean he’s becoming more actualized than he already is?

If he’s eternally fully actualized and outside spacetime how can God even move from non-universe to universe? They would have eternally co-existed, wouldn’t they have?
http://12tuesday.com Spencer Daniel

Hi Noah,

Interesting stuff! I would suggest, however, not to travel too far down the path of dividing God from his will. As Aquinas points out, if God is a composite, then we need to explain what caused its components to come together. But if we do that, then we are back to the situation of having to figure out what caused the Creator.
SouthernMiss78

To bad I have no clue what “ex nihilo” means…
- Xamarmm
  
  ex nihilo means “out of nothing”. I.e. “creation ex nihilo” means there is nothing (material) and then magic happens and something material exists. This appearantly happens all the time in the weird world of quantum mechanics where small particles appear and disappear all the time. However, we have never experienced it happen in the big world around us and so we are kinda sceptic when we hear this as the explanation as to hwo the universe came to be. Of course, scientists thinks the universe was very small when it was young (smaller than an hydrogen atom) so it is quite possible that it really did happen that way though – if so it desn’t need a god to cause it as the quantum mechanical creation ex nihilo is uncaused – it just happens all the time.
Jason Collins

…
Jason Collins

The conception I have arrived at over years of consideration is that the material universe is itself an “attribute” of God, while “a timeline having an absolute beginning” is an attribute of that universe. Thus, the universe is eternal as an object, yet it has a purely subjective beginning in time which one might call “creation”. On this conception all these pages of discussion become unnecessary, since the universe is understood to be both eternal and finite–it becomes “eternally finite”, as it were.
Jason Collins

This is, by the way, a concept of my own creation which I arrived at while considering arguments different from those being discussed; but since it successfully renders those being discussed unnecessary, I thought I’d mention it.

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