The Hiddenness of God

by Tuesday Afternoon on March 8, 2011

In this, the first a three-part bi-weekly point/counterpoint-style debate, James W. Iman and John Forcey begin their debate in the hiddenness of God. In two weeks, they will continue their debate and respond to each other’s articles from this week. Your comments are appreciated.

The question of hiddenness is one that must be framed within a specific context. That is, for the hiddenness of God to really be a problem there must be a problem which it creates. Framed as it has been “classically,” this problem is a moral one. At its root, then, the problem of so-called “divine hiddenness” is one that calls into question the moral conduct of the deity it indicts.

The existence of God is not apparent to me in the same sense that my own existence is apparent to me. The mere fact of introspection makes my awareness of my own existence inevitable. Introspection does not, however, lead necessarily to the same conclusion about the existence of God. So, we say, God is hidden. This, though, is not sufficient to indict God for his hiddenness; taken singly, this fact is inert.

Belief in a God is hardly exceptional; likewise, adhering to the teachings of a particular person is barely remarkable. What makes Christianity of particular note (a noteworthiness it shares with the current, predominant monotheisms) is the imperative of belief. Christianity proposes that the existence of God (along with limited other theological claims) must be affirmed to avoid a negative consequence.

Plainly put, Christianity suggests that if we do not believe God exists that we will go to hell for not believing. For our purposes it does not matter just what is meant by “hell,” it only matters that “not hell” is preferable. This imperative is one part of the problem.

Clearly, one can only believe in God and more importantly only believe the Christian conception of God if one has been presented with it. Obviously, we can only affirm propositions which have been proposed. What, then, are we to make of those who have lived and died and not been in a position to affirm Christianity?

Here we have an (apparently) important distinction to make. There is (arguably) a difference between someone whose non-affirmation of Christianity is resistant—that is, they’ve been presented with the proposition and rejected it—and someone whose non-affirmation is non-resistant. As a category, the latter group is far larger than the former.

Is it morally good to condemn a person for not affirming a proposition that has never been proposed to them? We can come up with any number of analogous thought experiments and (with rare exception) we all agree: it is not morally good to condemn a person for not affirming a proposition that has never been proposed.

God is supposed to be good—all good in fact. The sheer act of creation is an act borne out of this goodness. So we have the rest of the problem.

If God is all good, if there is an imperative to affirm his existence, then the occurrence of non-resistant non-belief is in direct opposition to the nature of God. Either this problem must be rectified or it stands as evidence against the existence of the God proposed by Christianity.

There are only so many responses to this problem. Unfortunately, the words of Jesus have made the responses limited in their scope: “I am the way the truth and the life, no one comes unto the father except through me” (John 14:6). The Christian’s hands are tied—they cannot simply suggest that there are other ways to avoid the consequences of non-belief.

The responses that remain are confined to some variation of somehow serving a greater good. That is, yes it’s bad that God is hidden and non-resistant non-belief persists, but there is a greater good served by God’s remaining hidden that could not be achieved through his revelation.

I don’t want to anticipate any of these responses from my opponent, but I will say that such justifications for the continued hiddenness of God have proven to be unconvincing at least and flawed at most.

Given the Christian conception of God it is my position that hiddenness is inconsistent with God’s character.

Suppose the hiddenness of God is the phenomena wherein people take it not to be the case that they’re in position meriting belief in God. And suppose God is correctly characterized by the major Christian creeds, as well as Anselmian theology. Herein I support the claim that these are together consistent by first considering two propositions that are entirely different – ones that aren’t about hiddenness and aren’t about God. In Stage 1, where 1 = obviously inconsistent and 10 = obviously consistent, I present the reader with two propositions at level 4 (slightly inconsistent in appearance). In Stage 2, I tell a story wherein each proposition seems to fit. I take this to be support for consistency, moving us to from a 4 to a 5 or 6. My goal in Stages 1 and 2 is for the reader to approve of my methodology in supporting consistency. Next, I apply said methodology to the propositions and, that is, I tell a story wherein each proposition seems to fit.

Stage 1. Consider the following propositions: ‘Matt runs a 2-minute mile’ and ‘Matt is a human being of average athletic prowess’. Stage 2. Now consider the following story: Matt, a human being of average athletic prowess, owns some special shoes. These special shoes, designed by NASA, allow the stride of a human being to be doubled. Strides turn into leaps and bounds! Matt’s mile, without the special NASA shoes, is right at 4 minutes. Matt goes to the track and runs a 2-minute mile.

*Notice: Even if both propositions and the story were false, still: the story would support their consistency. Our concern is just whether the propositions conflict, supposing them to be true. The story helps see that there is no conflict.

Stage 1 hiddenness. Consider the following propositions: “people take it not to be the case that they’re in position meriting belief in God” and “God, characterized by the major Christian creeds, as well as Anselmian theology, exists” and Stage 2 hiddenness. Now consider the following story: God wanted many things of a certain kind to exist, and he created them. Let’s call them ‘people’. People were marked out by their capacity to choose a process wherein they increased in their love for him (and others) and increased in ability to be loved by him (and others). The process was to begin with choices and end with habits. That is, as choices were made, again and again, eventually, the choices would become less and less choice and more and more determined. People would choose, via the necessitated process, not to have a choice about love – a habituated existence of perfect lover, perfectly loved. People choose opposite of this. They choose thus over and over. At times, trusting the power of Christ in his resurrection, they choose the way of love. But more often, they did not. Habits were formed in the opposite direction. They were hurt by their choice of habit formation. (In our jargon: bullet wounds, a cheating husband, mental defects, and death.) They drew away from God. They knew he existed, but they esteemed him not. Knowing God existed and knowing his good and holy character was a pesky problem. Generations dealt with this problem but couldn’t find a way of eliminating it. After a while, they found the distractions and explanatory resources sufficient enough not to merit belief in God.

*Notice: Even if both propositions and the story were false, still: the story would support their consistency, and consistency is all that is at issue.

The only way to object is by saying, “Ah, but you forgot another (implied) proposition you’re required, by the propositions in question, to suppose true. If you suppose that proposition true, inconsistency results.” In that vein, allow me to say that much is left out of the story. What of responsibility? Were later generations really responsible for the distractions and explanatory resources? And what of other doctrines, such as hell? What if hell is the necessary ingredient for inconsistency? I’ll leave these and other objections to James, but let me point out, in closing, that there are two lines to take regarding hell. First, it’s not a doctrine supported by any of the major Christian creeds. Insofar as consistency is required of the two propositions above, I’m free to ignore this difficulty. Second, my view of hell is that it’s the ultimate gathering of people who have chosen a habituated existence of the anti-thesis of love. Such a gathering would be awful, yes. But such a gathering would be consistent with the two propositions stated above plus the doctrine of hell.

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http://12tuesday.com Spencer Daniel

This looks to be an interesting argument, though I have to say that I’m somewhat confused by how jargony John’s is. Not that using jargon means you’re wrong – it just makes it harder to follow. I’ll have to come back to this.

Second, John says that Hell is not a concept that is “supported” by any of the major Christian creeds. What do you mean by “supported” here? After all, the Nicene Creed affirms that Christ will return to judge the living and the dead and that there will be a resurrection of the dead and life in a world to come. None of that is inconsistent with the idea of hell, and the ideas of judgment and resurrection seem to point towards it indirectly.
- Anonymous
  
  I’m curious about that myself. It seems to me that if there isn’t *any* sort of imperative for belief that the entire prospect of evangelism is moot and belief is an utterly irrelevant component of existence.
  - theowarner
    
    What about Heaven?
    - Anonymous
      
      If “heaven” is preferable to “not heaven” then my argument still stands.
      - sellout
        
        But that’s not the point. Not all theists believe that belief is necessary–only that living a moral life is necessary. “Heaven” is preferable to “not-heaven,” but the dichotomy that separates people going to “heaven” from those going to “not-heaven” is not one of belief, but of one’s moral character. And anyone can live the moral life, regardless of whether religion has been proposed to them and regardless of whether or not they believe in a God.
      - Anonymous
        
        As I stated above, most Christians would affirm that a loving relationship with God is something that would be good for its own sake. I’d add to that that God, as conceived by the vast majority of Christians, strongly desires such a relationship.
      - Wimsweden
        
        I can imagine certain Christians holding that “belief in God” is having a certain reverence for existence and the utter “mystery” it presents and that “belief in Jesus” is merely an ethical way of being in that larger existence.
        For those Christians, I think “I am the way the truth and the life, no one comes unto the father except through me” (John 14:6) would be highly symbolic and could just as easily be expressed in other (purely secular) statements along the lines of “A person who lives a compassionate life will come to full harmony with (their) existence”. For those people, the important thing would not be the linguistic markers “Jesus”, “God”, “belief”, etc. but the kind of life that is lived. They would put such a life in Christian terms, but if someone lives a comparable life using completely different language to express it with, those Christians would see that as equivalent.
        
        I guess I just said in a really roundabout way that millions of Christians believe in good works, independent of belief in a god or Jesus.
      - http://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=655079441 David Gibson
        
        Then in what way is God even relevant, other than a literary device to explore what an ethical life may be?
        
        I’m not even sure to what extent such a view is actually Christian, theologically rather than culturally. A distinction I’ve seen blurred by several posters on this article.
        
        To me the distinction seems necessary and crucial if one is to think divine hiddenness can be addressed. To a cultural Christian it would be irrelevant because theology and scripture do not make claims about spiritual reality, at least no more than a good play or a Dan Brown novel. To a theological Christian (for example, someone who affirms the Nicean Creed) this is a problem as far as I’m concerned.
      - Wimsweden
        
        “Then in what way is God even relevant, other than a literary device to explore what an ethical life may be?”
        I think these Christians just see Christianity as a particular expression and/or experience of the “divine”. It’s the narrative they grew up with and/or most connect with, so it serves as a superior catalyst for experiencing the “divine” than, say, Hinduism.
        
        “To me the distinction seems necessary and crucial if one is to think divine hiddenness can be addressed.”
        I guess in the above type of Christians, hiddenness would probably not be experienced as much of a problem, since they are most likely also universalists.
      - http://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=655079441 David Gibson
        
        Are Christians still debating whether good works alone can earn one a place in heaven?
Jay Mclaughlin

Is it a typo in the first paragraph or do they actually plan to eat articles?

sorry… couldn’t resist.
sellout

“Christianity proposes that the existence of God (along with limited other theological claims) must be affirmed to avoid a negative consequence.”

While this is obviously true for some and possibly most denominations of Christianity, James, I want to cite something from the Catechism of the Catholic Church:

“Those who, through no fault of their own, do not know the Gospel of Christ or his Church, but who nevertheless seek God with a sincere heart, and, moved by grace, try in their actions to do his will as they know it through the dictates of their conscience—those too may achieve eternal salvation” (847)

I don’t mean to be a bible-thumper–I actually don’t consider myself Catholic–but I wanted to point out that your statement is a bit of a generalization. There’s nothing about atheism mandating a negative consequence, at least in Catholicism.
- http://12tuesday.com Spencer Daniel
  
  Yeah, thanks for pointing this out sellout. I’m wondering, James, how it affects your argument if one were to deny the idea that there is an automatic link between unbelief and damnation?
  - theowarner
    
    A denial that I make.
    - Anonymous
      
      But I don’t think John does. He equated the purpose of humans with love, and love with “trusting in the resurrection of Jesus.”
      
      In any case, the hiddenness argument can be made strong even without reference to salvation and damnation. I’ll get into this some if James doesn’t.
      - http://12tuesday.com Spencer Daniel
        
        You’re right. It seems like James’ argument would work just fine with nothing more than the claim that it would be better to know God than not. That can mean all sorts of things and doesn’t have to get as drastic as damnation or salvation to get the argument going.
      - Drsuessre
        
        I agree that the hiddenness argument would be stronger without reference to “things of eternity”. I plan to make a point along these lines in my response.
      - Anonymous
        
        If by “things of eternity” you mean heaven and hell, I didn’t say it would be made stronger without those. I said it can still be strong without those.
- Anonymous
  
  In the first place, that passage does not cohere with John 14:6 and several similar passages. In the second place, the “negative consequence” James spoke up need not be damnation — he did explicitly bring up hell, and it may be what he had in mind, but most Christians would affirm that a loving relationship with God is rewarding not just for salvation, but also for its own sake.
  - sellout
    
    I quoted the Catechism of the Catholic Church, which is the most extensive summation of all Catholic beliefs. Frankly, I feel this must lead us to one of two conclusions:
    
    a) That you are correct, and that the Church’s teachings contradict the Bible. In my personal opinion, if this is true, it simply means that the Church’s moral sensibilities have transcended their origins, which are rooted in a beautiful book that has been corrupted by human error.
    b) That you are incorrect, and that the Church’s teachings do NOT contradict the Bible; after all, the verse you quote says that Jesus is the way to the Father, not that belief or religion is the way to the Father. I have always seen Jesus as the inspiration of a worldview and lifestyle prior to the context of any specific religion or belief.
    
    In any case, *I* do not believe that unbelief implies damnation. And I am not arguing that others do not believe this, I was simply pointing out that it is a bit of a generalization.
    - Anonymous
      
      I think that most non-Catholics (and, indeed, a few Catholics) would find the premise underlying (a) to be not only true, but non-controversially so.
      - Anonymous
        
        Ignore the above; it was based on a misreading of what you wrote.
    - Anonymous
      
      It would be an interesting experiment to present both the catechism passage and the bible verses used to support the exclusivist position to Catholics, and ask them what they thought. I suspect that many would side with the church.
      
      Which is strange, because in most other respects, I have viewed Catholicism as the antithesis of progress.
      
      But in any case, the idea that the Catholic Church’s teachings contradict the Bible (for good or for ill) is one that I think most non-Catholics would find not only true, but non-controversial.
- http://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=655079441 David Gibson
  
  It is worth noting that the Catholic Church is a doctrine driven Christianity and it does not necessarily depend on scripture in the same manner of protestant denominations. In fact this was the reason for the split, no?
  
  So while it may be representative of Catholic doctrine (assuming official Catholic doctrine reflects the actual beliefs of Catholic believers) it is a question of how justifiable this is theologically. That is what the argument is against because it would be impossible to formulate an argument against the existence of everyone’s individual conception of God.
  - Nicholas
    
    “It is worth noting that the Catholic Church is a doctrine driven Christianity and it does not necessarily depend on scripture in the same manner of protestant denominations. In fact this was the reason for the split, no?”
    
    That’s not true at all. At least that was not the case for St. Augustine. The Catholic Church claims to champion a balance of “Faith and Reason” more than any other institution around. Whether you agree them compatible or not, the Catholics try to use Reason along with the scriptures, just as much as any other Christian, and according to the Catholics, nothing will contradict.
    
    The protestant reformation was more concerned with a theological dispute regarding Faith and Good works. Scripture did come into it (Luther’s notion of Sola scriptura) but that was a minor complaint compared to his other “Theses”. The idea that Catholics don’t follow scripture comes from (I think) either St. Augustine’s or St. Aquinas’s 4 fold interpretation of biblical texts: literally, allegorical, moral, anagogical. I think Luther wanted a more “strict” interpretation regarding the scripture, but I would hardly call that reason for the protestant reformation.
    
    Its also important to note that Protestant bibles have less scripture in them, which, depending on what preconceptions you bring, determines whether that is correct or not.
    
    But I didn’t mean to go on this boring digression while the topic is so interesting…
Anonymous

So if I understand John’s argument, there was a time when hiddenness did not exist, but people wanted to reject God, and this wanting turned over time to hiddenness — they became, in a literal sense, blind because they wanted to be blind.

We “blind” ones, then, are blind because we have a hereditary trait — not in the genetic sense, but rather in the memetic sense.

But in the first place, genetic or memetic, hereditary traits can be corrected by a being with sufficient power. And in the second, people cannot make choices that they are not aware exist.

Oh, they can choose to love people and be kind-hearted — you’ll find a great many non-Christians who fit that description. There’s no problem with that if you define love in temporal terms. But John does not; to him, love is part and parcel with “trusting the power of Christ in his resurrection” — something which cannot be done if one does not believe that Christ existed and that the resurrection occurred.

In addition, not the most fervent desire in the world will create sound arguments on metaphysical matters where before there were none. John’s position necessitates that there is not a single sound logical or evidential argument for the nonexistence of God. This would be rather trivial, except that James is now free to defeat John’s scenario by bringing other such arguments into the picture.
- http://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=655079441 David Gibson
  
  I’m glad someone else found that reading in John’s piece.
  
  I find it hard to see why he would advocate such a scenario which necessarily places God in the position of having remained unresponsive and inactive on the growing nonbelief in his existence (or non-acceptance of his love, whatever).
  
  This is specifically the issue with divine hiddenness; the Christian God, theologically speaking, is capable of demonstrating himself to any and all who lack belief but he does not. James eluded to the usual defenses of this and John gave none pre-emptively.
  - Nicholas
    
    “This is specifically the issue with divine hiddenness; the Christian God, theologically speaking, is capable of demonstrating himself to any and all who lack belief but he does not.”
    
    I don’t think that’s true at all. I explained this in my first comment, but I’m not sure it is as apparent as I would like, so I’ll try again here.
    
    If God is pure act, and we are limited by our matter (potential) then we can never come to fully know God. I use an example of a brick and a person in my first comment. The brick could “know” you if you hit it hard enough. If you were able to make an impression into it. Yet, since it has more potential than you (because you have more act, shown by virtue of your consciousness) it can never come to know you in the same way that you know it. That brick can never fully understand you like you can the brick.
    
    Why would the same not be true for us in relation to God? There isn’t any indication that we are capable of understanding. A sort of Kantian, limiting Pure Reason approach.
    - http://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=655079441 David Gibson
      
      We don’t need to ‘fully know god’ we just need to know enough. However, I think your conception of God seems a little more esoteric and amorphous than common Christian (and other theistic) conceptions.
      - http://12tuesday.com Spencer Daniel
        
        Actually, if I’m reading Nicholas right, his conception of God is the dominant one in the Christian tradition. It was held by pretty much all the Early Church Fathers and the Medievals.
- Nicholasr
  
  “love is part and parcel with “trusting the power of Christ in his resurrection”"
  
  I can’t help but reply to this, and I really don’t need to name drop Plato, but I’m going to anyways. XD
  
  In Plato’s Symposium, there are many different “stages” or “rungs” on the ladder of Love, which ultimately leads to The Good. Now, I don’t mean to be putting any words into John’s mouth, but it seems that he is referring to that relative conception of Love and not an absolute conception of it as you seem to be indicating.
  
  Is it not possible for the Christian to say that all love emanates from God, even if they don’t understand it? That is exactly what Plato thought, and he’s much smarter than I am, but maybe not smarter than you.
  - Anonymous
    
    Loving without trusting in a certain religious doctrine might be consistent with Plato, but it’s not consistent with a plain reading of John’s argument. In any case, I’m not much of a Platonist.
    - Nicholas
      
      A “plain” reading of the Bible is ALWAYS limited. I think the Bible is written in such a way that EVERYONE can understand, but that is PRECISELY why so many intelligent people have problems with it. There is virtually nothing in Platonic / Aristotelian philosophy that can’t be reconciled with Christianity. If you think so, then you are putting too many limits on Christianity.
http://www.bromei.nl/natusaurus Jonathan

“Introspection does not, however, lead necessarily to the same conclusion about the existence of God.”

I think this needs more explication, because it seems an a priori dismissal of Descartes’ proof of the existence of God. If Descartes was right we’d be logically inclined to assume God exists because we are capable of introspection as well as the opposite (what’s the term? I’m not a philosopher). So there may be some tidying up to do, at the very least.

In fact, I think Descartes has a point, in a spiritual or inspirational sense. The fact that we are overwhelmed by this immense ‘otherness’ of the physical world and that we are capable of grasping it intellectually, yes even imagine more, surely that instills a sense that there must be an all-encompassing rational system to the world. It is not by any measure a stretch of the imagination to personify this rational system, evolving to a pantheistic God and from there to a personal one, each step being justified by the fact that we are able to transcend our minds and think outside ourselves of what bigger things there might be.

The problem of the moral hiddenness of God might be joined, through Descartes’ proof, by the problem of the overwhelming metaphysical presence of God.
theowarner

I disagree with this phrase “imperative of belief.” Although I appreciate the idea.

Your right that many Christians adopt this tone in the rhetoric and that’s why I can’t stand them. I prefer something like an “invitation to Love” or something like that. God “calls” rather than “is pissed off when you don’t show up on time.”
- John
  
  Jesus Himself laid out the imperative of belief.
  
  “Repent, for the kingdom of God is at hand..”
  
  “Unless you believe that I am He, you will die in your sins..”
  
  Etc…
  
  Why are you tagging this to some group you don’t like, when scripture itself makes it clear?
theowarner

I think there are ways to come to God through Jesus and necessarily believe in Jesus.

Let’s suppose that 100 people all say “I believe in Jesus.” I would say that we have 100 different utterances, all of which are probably different. Do they all count? Are they all the same in that they all save the speaker? Or do some of them not count? Do all of them not count?
cjc813

I can’t be the only one thinking this: John needs to learn how to construct a coherent sentence.

That first sentence is a winding mess of words that goes the long way about saying very little. There’s a difference between using smart words and complex sentences and presenting nuanced and complex ideas. One needs more of the latter and less of the former, regardless of what they’re arguing.

I pity James, who has to read John’s writing for (what is it, eight?) weeks.

PS: “Phenomena” is plural.
- Drsuessre
  
  Sorry, cjc813f, for not writing as well as (maybe) I could have. It’s probably a mix of my own writing style as well as the fact that we were limited to a max of 1,000 words. Fortunately for James, the debate will only have two other “rounds”.
Kevron

I think it’s cool that atheists are seemingly giving at least SOME credence to the idea that there’s a Mind behind “it all.”
Also, I’d say James was more convincing w/ his take than the “Cat In The Hat” was.

However, James pointing to the dude out in “Deity knows where” — you know, the dude that hasn’t heard about Jesus –
does NOTHING but merely take the burden off James himself, and then try and place it back on that poor unsuspecting bastard out in the middle of “Deity knows where.”

We’re all a bunch of retards.
Deal with it.
John

Hmm…James.

I don’t think the occurrence of non-resistant *ignorance* puts God’s goodness into question.

What’s going on is not just unbelief. It’s ignorance.

Didn’t Jesus also speak about IF Sodom and Gomorrah saw His coming in their day, they wouldve repented? This seems to imply an that the awareness of Jesus had potency.
- http://12tuesday.com Spencer Daniel
  
  John, can you elaborate on what you see as the difference between “unbelief” and “ignorance”? Are you using the former to mean something willed and the latter something unwilled?
  - John
    
    Well, the type of “unbelief” that someone has who’s never been presented with a proposition, isn’t very meaningful. If people have lived and died without ever being exposed to the proposition of Jesus Christ, I wouldn’t call them “unbelieving”. I’d call them ignorant. I don’t know where James gets the idea that that sort of ignorance is punishable by God, which, is what his entire argument rests upon.
    
    Back to what I was saying before, and this is crucial. Jesus made distinctions about the WEIGHT of His revelation with a series of ”ifs”.
    
    Paraphrasing:
    
    “IF Sodom and Gomorrah saw My works, they wouldve repented long ago.
    
    Therefore, it will be more TOLERABLE for them in the day of judgement, then for this generation.”
    
    See, this destroys any notion that “unbelief” (non-resistant in the sense James laid out) will be met with the maximum punishment of being cast into Hell.
    
    Someone apparently, hasn’t been reading their bible.
    
    Thanks for the question:)
    
    Spencer also, would you consider yourself a fideist? I’ve asked you this on Facebook.
Haysoos

So, does that mean that if I get rid of my “distractions and explanatory resources sufficient enough not to merit belief in God” then God’s existence will no longer be hidden to me? In the natural state, God is not hidden, and the fact that God plays no obvious role in daily life, and that nothing I experience must be attributed to God is not true, but rather a false perception founded in distractions? I must ask then, in what way is God’s existence apparent? Many Christians say he shows himself to those who pray, or who open their heart, or whatnot, but to me, that is like putting his existence behind a secret door. In that case, he’s still hidden unless you know where to look. Is his existence apparent to non-believers in any way?
- John
  
  Belief in God isn’t necessitated by evidence. It can be. But it doesn’t have to be.
  
  You’ll have to haggle with God, about whether nature spoke about His existence or not (I think it does). Or whether you *understood* what the gospels were telling you about believing in Him.
  
  The question is, are you really ignorant?
  - Anonymous
    
    What do you mean by ignorant?
AVK

A couple problems with James’ side here. First, your criterion for hiddenness seems bizarre to me. You seem to imply that anything that we cannot be sure of through pure introspection (Descartes’ “clear and distinct ideas ” perhaps?) is hidden. Introspection similarly yields no conclusions about, say, the existence of other minds, physical objects, or an external reality of any kind. Are these things all, then, hidden in the same way you want to claim that God is hidden? That just doesn’t seem right. You need to do a couple things, I think. First you have to explain what you mean, exactly, by “hidden” and what the criteria for being the opposite (revealed?) are; “apparent on introspection” ain’t cuttin it. Secondly, you need to argue that we have good reasons for thinking that God would make himself not hidden in the way you specify in your answer to the first problem. As it stands, it is not at all obvious why we should expect God’s existence to be some a priori piece of knowledge that we have available to us if we just sit down and think about it for a while. Obviously how you deal with this problem will depend heavily on how you specify “hidden” and “revealed” etc. (I should note here that you seem to hint at the idea that non-resistant non-belief is something we would not expect if God were revealed, but even on your own flawed criterion of “apparent on introspection” this isn’t true. Some people just haven’t sat and thought about it yet [Keep in mind here that Christians can just appeal to free will on this point]. Whether or not it’s still problematic on your revised criterion remains to be seen I guess).

Secondly, I think you get slippery when you start hinting at the claim that, since one line from the Bible suggests that all people who lived before Christ and all who have simply never been exposed to Christianity are going to Hell, and that this is inconsistent with God’s nature because he is supposed to be morally perfect. I mean why can’t I (or a Christian) simply say something like “I don’t know why you would go do that conclusion. It makes much more sense to simply infer that, given God’s moral perfection (which you, James, have already accepted for the sake of argument [since you can't make an inconsistency argument without stipulating the set of propositions that you want to show are inconsistent]), he does not punish those who have not been exposed to the Christian proposition.” Does it make more sense, given that God is morally perfect, to insist on an absolutist and literal reading of the quote you cited or to assume that there are implicit qualifications (likely suggested elsewhere in the text [Obviously more exegesis is needed here but I don't have the time at the moment])? I think that the answer is obviously the latter. If you disagree, you need to motivate your position further (including, perhaps, a justification of Biblical literalism [Good luck with that]) since you seem to be opting for the prima facie less plausible of two possible options.
- AVK
  
  I wish I could edit. Go *TO that conclusion (2nd paragraph, 4th line).
Mordred

first of all I would say that the last comments of John on hell seem irrelevant since the alternative he mentions to there being a hell would still suffice under James’ discription of hell and thus is merly a contestion of terms.

Second if I follow John’s method, he’s uses a piece of prose to apply a Qualifier on the claim of inconsistanty. in that the first two propositions in stage one would be consistant if he indeed had those shoes. So if we indeed perform this method on the story in stage 2 then we are left to ask; are we warrented for using this qualifier on the claim leading from the given propositions? And how does this change the debate.

Since refution of the story given would require knowledge about the development and history of the belief in that time I leave that to others more qualified then me. But I think I can awnser the second question posed in that this would not be a valid qualifier on the claim James proposed, since the propositions differ to much from one another to be talking about the exact same claim.

Let me explain for ease of reading I’ll quote the propositions from John’s claim of hiddeness.
1. “people take it not to be the case that they’re in position meriting belief in God”
2. “God, characterized by the major Christian creeds, as well as Anselmian theology, exists”

now I think the second proposition here is equall on both sides but James used a different first propostion namely;
3. “Clearly, one can only believe in God and more importantly only believe the Christian conception of God if one has been presented with it. Obviously, we can only affirm propositions which have been proposed.”

clearly 1 and 3 are not equall, one who doesn’t see merit in believing a propostion is different from one never being proposed the proposition.

From this I’d say The ball is still in John’s court, and no real refutation has been made

ps. the main theory I use here is the Toulmin model I hope I didn’t make to many mistakes or assumptions using this since I only learned it quet recently
- http://12tuesday.com Spencer Daniel
  
  I agree Mordred. I’m not at all sure that John and James are talking about the same thing when they say “hiddenness.” John’s definition talks about “meriting belief in God” whereas James talks about something more like “the apparent absence of God in situations where God’s presence would be expected.”
  - AVK
    
    Just curious, but where is that definition anywhere in James’ piece? How can it even be inferred?
    - Mordred
      
      what I give as James’ definition of hiddenness at 3. is a direct quote from him (5th paragraph, first line) and this seems to be what he refers to as hidden looking at the rest of his argument, he makes no other definition of hidenness, or even any argument not using this definition.
      - AVK
        
        So you think, by “hidden” James means something like “an unproposed proposition”?
      - Mordred
        
        yes, it would be a quet literal meaning of hidden, although the wording my seem a bit unconventional, something you haven’t seen or encountered is unable to let you decide what to do with it, therefor some people simply never encountered christianety thus have never had the chance of converting thus sparing them from a life without god.( going with the most basic assumption that life with god is prefferable to life without god)
        
        an example would be the original habitants of north and south america before western colonization. this is atleast my interpretation of what James said.
  - cartbeforehorse
    
    see my comment above…
- Nicholas
  
  I think you are misunderstanding John here (he even says it does not matter if the story is actually true or false).
  
  I actually think he’s making a kind of Kantian point, that something like God is beyond the limits of our reason, and for every argument I make against God, you can make in favor of him, or vice versa. In the end, the one with the last word wins. The very basis of the Antiniomes of Pure Reason.
http://twitter.com/studip101 Ethan Resnick

James’ argument strikes me simply as an extension of the Problem of Evil. Basically, it’s saying: the Christian God is omnibenevolent and His hiddenness would be malicious, so there can’t be the Christian God.

But holding aside how we define hiddenness and what its negative consequences would be, if this really is a Problem of Evil argument, can’t we find way better examples of evil than God’s hiddenness?

(I should admit that I haven’t read all the comments yet, so excuse me if these issues have already been raised or responded to.)
- Mordred
  
  I think it’s in some way relted to it yes, but I think thee is a crucial difference that makes hiddenness stand out in that hiddenness has nothing to do with free will, a commen defence for the problem of evil.
  
  and since many christian eliigions make reference to the need, or goodness, of knowing god it would seem to merit it’s own investigation.
  - AVK
    
    That’s actually not entirely the case. In my first comment I mention that I think James’ understanding of hiddenness actually opens the door for a free will response.
http://www.logosfera.ro/ Logosfera.ro

The title of the article and James’ presentation on YouTube is misleading; it should be the “The Hiddenness of the Christian God”. As James presented the article on YouTube the purpose of the debate is to show if there are any inconsistencies between the hidenness of the christian god and it’s nature. The 2 debaters should have tried to come up with aspects of god’s nature that contradict the hiddenness (James’ thesis) or apparently contradict it but they actually don’t (John’s thesis).

I’m not as a sophisticated thinker as James is but the Christian God that is advertised in my country has the following attributes that make it incompatible with his hiddeness:
1. He wants something from us
2. Most specifically he wants to worship him (I don’t know why but theists and atheists alike sometimes equate belief with worship)
3. He revealed himself to others in order to his wish done. For example he revealed himself to Moses to get the israelites out of Egipt (I know the story contradicts history but that’s how this god is portrayed). Another example would be Jesus who revealed himself to others after the resurrection.

So the Christian God has no issue revealing himself in a satisfactory manner whenever his goals require it. And one of the goals of the god of christianity is have people worshiping him.

In this context the verdict is simple. At least for me.
http://www.facebook.com/SonicWavesTM Nate Kindell

My problem with John Forcey’s proposition is that in my eyes, the logic does not line up on this line: “They were hurt by their choice of habit formation.” In order to propose this as part of a segue from the first two statements to the last, there needs to be an explanation of it’s origins seeing as up to this point, and after it, outside forces are not taken into account. From whence does that hurt come? If from god, then, following the assumed propose presented by Christianity, then it would seem to go against his nature of being good. Good is not equal to hurting according to the modernly Christian accepted viewpoint of the concept. This would seem to point out that this is against his nature. If his nature of being good goes against the proposed justification for also being hidden, then the argument is invalid. Therefore, this statement, for it to achieve it’s purpose, must be modified.
- http://12tuesday.com Spencer Daniel
  
  If it comes from God, perhaps you’re right. But what if the hurt just follows from the habit naturally? If I form the habit of unkindness, I don’t need to appeal to any supernatural explanation of why I don’t have any friends.
Nicholas

James, the real problem I have with your “hiddeness” argument lies with a blatant misunderstanding of the relationship of potency and act (matter and form).

If I use the Aristotelian (Which everyone should, because it is the only real way to make sense out of matter. Not to mention that Aristotle is credited being the only one who understood indeterminacy, and that’s 2000+ years before Quantum Physics.), then matter and form will always be relative to one another. In other words, matter is potentiality and form is actuality. If you understand this fully you will see where I’m going, but its very complicated (perhaps even bizarre given our preconceptions of what knowledge is), so I’ll give an example.

A brick is almost the most potential “thing” I can think of at the moment so I’ll start with that. The only thing the brick can know, is itself. This is because existence, or being, is the foundation of all knowledge. Even though we think of a brick as an inanimate object, it still remains in act because of its form. The form of a “thing” is what is known because that is what act is, which validates its own existence. (Nothing can be pure potential, or matter, because it would lack any actuality, or form. I think that it is apparent from this that existence requires act and non-existence is the opposite.) The brick cannot come to know a person purely by being in your presence, yet you CAN come to know the brick by virtue of being in its presence. The only way a brick can come to know you is if, should your hand be hard enough, punch it to make an indent into it, and thereby changing its being and its form. However, it should still be noted that even though the brick is changed in this way, it still does not know you like you know it. The brick can never come to know you fully, yet you can come to know virtually every aspect of the brick, given time and resources. I’m not sure it is at all apparent what this example has to do with your “hiddeness” argument, so I’ll do my best to tie it all together.

Consider what I said earlier, that matter and form are relative. Now also consider that I said matter is potency; form, act. I doubt anyone deny that God is pure act, since most talk of God as omnipotent, ect, and you even refer to his perfection of “good” I think we are on the same page. Now, if God is pure act that means that he is the form of forms: absolute existence. In other words, God is the only absolute and all things are relative to him (see? Spinoza was right!) Since he is the highest (even unlimited) actuality, then we are the bricks in relation to him. He can “impress” on us, like we the brick, but we can never come to know Him fully, like the brick to us. This may open up other “problems” such as, “Well why did God make us imperfect”, or something to that effect. The answer is simple, if God were to make us perfect, then he would have made us Himself (which if we go biblical then there is *some* foundation in that, but remember it is still just in the image), and would have created “more being” which makes no sense given that God is already pure act, there is no more being to be made.

However, this still doesn’t get around the problem that you are proposing to Christians, namely the doctrine of Hell. Yet, if we further examine the relationship of potency and act, we would soon arrive at something very similar to what your opponent, John Forcey, argued: “my view of hell is that it’s the ultimate gathering of people who have chosen a habituated existence of the anti-thesis of love.” If we see the rejection of God as the rejection of existence or act then we see it as not moving forward, but rather backwards. Now you can take Plato’s view of Love in Symposium, or you can take St. Augustine’s nothingness = evil understanding. Either way, once you start looking at it in relation to matter and form, potency and act, then the problem just seems to fade away. In fact, most all problems seem to fade away (with the exception of some very intricate and technical philosophical problems, most which, for me anyways, does not pose any real threat to the relative notion of matter and form compared to any other view, say Nominalism.
- cartbeforehorse
  
  Aristotle didn’t even believe that the earth went around the sun. I think it’s a bit misguided (to put it mildly) to suggest that he saw quantum physics coming!
Drsuessre

I’m currently working on my response to James. As soon as I started thinking about his argument, I realized his version of the hiddenness argument was much more “to the point”. Specifically, his pinpointing those who aren’t in a position to believe in Christian doctrines is much more what hiddenness is about than what my essay admitted. So, although I probably won’t include this acknowledgment in my next essay responding to James, I did want to make it public that I now consider my intended target (in my first essay) far too easy of a thing to hit.

This is why these sorts of interactions are so good! : )
- cartbeforehorse
  
  I think your point goes to the heart of what my thoughts are about this “debate”.
  
  “The hiddenness of God” is not a debating topic. It’s just a sentence, and as you have noticed, it allows both participants to go too far down their own train of thought without actually addressing the same point as the other. It ends up not really being a debate at all, but just the musings of a couple of guys as to what they think hiddenness is.
  
  A debating topic would be something like: “Christian doctrine teaches that it is necessary for God to hide himself, such that the Christian learn about faith. Arguing for this point of view is X. Arguing against this is Y.” (obviously, this is just an example).
  
  The fact that James has to define his framework in his opening paragraph, just goes to underline this point I think.
  
  I’m afraid that the lack of structure to the playing field, meant that I didn’t really get where either of you were starting from, and I lost interest before finishing either.
  
  I know this sounds a bit negative, but I intend it as constructive criticism for next time.
julzabro

Interesting debate! It’s really tedius, however, to understand your points here. Maybe I’m just not smart enough to understand your eloquent speaking styles. I really wish you were doing this via video, but that’s just me.

I’ve had many debates and discussions regarding this topic and other related topics. I’ve been in a debate with a Rabbi on Youtube for awhile concerning IF God is good or SHOULD be good or not. The Rabbi, refreshingly, claims that God is not, nor does He have to be, good. Christians will rarely, if ever, admit this even though their doctrine is attached to a plethora of immoral acts committed by this God easily found in the Old Testament. Saying that THIS god must be good or IS love is easily unraveled when looking at the WHOLE Book! As an Atheist, there are many ways to answer this but the basic tenet is this; A god who is hidden, or better said, impotent is simply Nature and if He IS real, being off duty renders Him immoral and uncaring. A god who does nothing, especially considering the suffering in the world, is not worthy of worship. No argument for freewill or God’s mysterious ways can solve this without sacrificing our own superior morality.

Thanx,
julzabro

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